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This study attempts to provide a balanced understanding of “civil society” over 
and against the non-political, economic view by probing into Hume’s political 
thought through the tradition of Hobbes and Mandeville, and demonstrating the 
theoretical similarities as well as differences between their analysis of human 
nature, of the principles sustaining civil society, and of the political-economic 
mechanisms underlying the rise of the modern state. Rather than reading Hume 
as a theorist of “commercial sociability” highlighting the spontaneity of economic 
activities while Hobbes and Mandeville theorists of “unsociability” stressing the 
role of political power, all of them are seen as theorists of unsocial or political 
sociability shedding light on the artificiality of the civil society. On the one hand, 
unsocial or political sociability means men’s self-love with a society-regarding 
feature, which is a combination of the desire for bodily self-preservation and 
pride. It both gives men a desire for associating with each other and prevents 
them from sustaining large and lasting society. On the other hand, civil society, 
whose establishment is the only solution to the problem caused by the society-
regarding self-love, should be understood as a synthesis of political society, 
civilised society, and economic (bourgeois) society. As an artifice instead of an 
autonomous sphere constituted by socio-economic relations, it is safeguarded 
by coercive political power, supported by institutions and practices redirecting 
men’s sense of morality and honour, and born in the process of modern state 
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building. It is undeniable that from Hobbes to Mandeville and Hume the 
connotation of “artifice” underwent some changes, for Hobbes grounded civil 
society upon the juridical relationship of artificial person, Mandeville upon the 
discipline of man’s artificial self, while Hume upon the various conventions of 
artificial virtues. Correspondingly, the meaning of “civil” became richer than 
“political”. But all of them held that politics is an original and indispensable 
dimension of human life; that political power is the ultimate foundation of civil 
society; and that the state’s desire of power provided the rise of modern 
commercial society with the crucial political-historical impetus. These ideas will 
remind us of the complexity of the foundation of civil society in human nature, 
and the significance of the political aspect of modern civil society. 
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Civil Society and Sociability: Commercial or Political? 
    In 21st-century political language, “civil society” usually means a set of 
intermediate associations which are neither the family nor the state,1 though 
various users put stress on various aspects of this concept. As a non-familial 
realm, civil society is constituted by voluntary engagements between free and 
equal individuals rather than by household-based affections; meanwhile, as 
non-political, it operates with autonomous order and principles which are 
independent from the commands of the state. A most typical example of it is the 
modern market economy. 
But the history of such a usage is much shorter than the history of this very 
idea. In early modern western political thought, civil society used to be 
understood as the synonym of the state or the political society as a whole. For 
instance, Hobbes famously equalised the state with societas civilis. 2  The 
definite distinction between civil society and the state emerged no earlier than 
in the works of Hegel and Marx. Hegel depicted civil society as a “a system of 
needs” and “a system of all-round interdependence”, which is in fact a sphere 
of modern market economy secured by the police and supported by the 
corporations, where every individual seeks the satisfaction of his own interest 
                                                        
1 “Civil Society”, in Garrett B. Brown et al (eds.), The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International 
Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018; “Civil Society”, in John Scott (ed.), A Dictionary of Sociology, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
2 DC, v.9. 
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by working for and exchanging with others. 3  Meanwhile, since the 
interdependence-based universality in civil society is merely implicit, the state, 
as an “ethical whole”, is necessitated for the actualisation of true universality 
and concrete freedom.4 Hegel’s understanding of the state is criticised by Marx 
while his distinction between civil society and the state preserved. For Marx, 
civil society “embraces the whole material intercourses of individuals” and “the 
whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage”, while modern bourgeois 
society is its full developed form.5 This is similar to Hegel’s idea. Yet Marx 
denied the actuality of the Hegelian ethical state by claiming that it is the civil 
society, the economic base, that determines the state and other 
superstructure. 6  Despite Marx’s materialism and his expectation of the 
withering away of the state are not widely accepted but within the socialist 
school, it is Marx that thoroughly de-politicised “civil society” and greatly 
influenced the way in which we understand it today. 
However, as is argued by many scholars, we should not overestimate the 
originality of Hegel and Marx, for both were deeply inspired by the Scottish 
Enlightenment philosophers. On the one hand, Scottish thinkers (Ferguson for 
example) plot civil society onto a temporal graph, and broadened this concept 
(in comparison with its traditional connotation) to depict the material, cultural, 
                                                        
3 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. by Allen Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991, §182, §189. 
4 Ibid, §258. 
5 Karl Marx & Frederich Engels, The German Ideology, Part I, ed. by C. J. Arthur, London : Lawrence & Wishart, 
1974, p82. 
6 Ibid, p83. 
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as well as political civilisation of certain societies generally. The historical 
progress of civilisation, furthermore, was often attributed to economic factors, 
especially modes of subsistence.7 On the other hand, the Scottish thinkers 
shed light on the “invisible” mechanism underlying market exchange. According 
to Hume and Smith, the division of labour not only causes improvement of 
productivity, but also creates universal economic interdependence, which forms 
a “system of natural liberty” that need not to be interfered by the government.8 
Thus we may attribute the ground-breaking contribution to the Scottish 
philosophers, for they decisively differentiated the social-economical from the 
political and discovered the autonomy and spontaneity of the former, though 
some scholars trace this differentiation further back to Locke’s understanding 
of the government as the fence to the existing system of property.9 
The above historiography is quite prevalent in literatures on civil society.10 
And interestingly, it is supported and deepened by recent studies in the history 
                                                        
7 Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, ed. by Fania Oz-Salzverger, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985. 
8 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. by R. R. Campbell & A. S. 
Skinner, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981, IV.ix.51; cf. David Hume, EMPL, “Of Money”, “Of Interest”, “Of the 
Balance of Trade”, “Of the Jealousy of Trade”. 
9 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. by Peter Laslett, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
10 E.g. Louis Dumont, From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology, Chicago & 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1977; S. Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972, ch7; Manfred Riedel, “‘State’ and ‘Civil Society’: Linguistic Context and Historical Origin”, 
in his Between Tradition and Revolution: The Hegelian Transformation of Political Philosophy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp129-158; John Keane, “Despotism and Democracy: The Origins and 
Development of the Distinction between Civil Society and the State 1750-1850”, in John Keane ed., Civil Society 
and the State: New European Perspectives, London: Verso, 1988, pp35-71; Jean L. Cohen & Andrew Ataro, Civil 
Society and Political Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992; Adam Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, NY: 
The Free Press, 1992; Charles Taylor, “Invoking Civil Society”, in his Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge, MA & 
London: Harvard University Press, 1995, pp204-225; Christopher Berry, The Social Theory of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997; “Creating Space for Civil Society: Conceptual 
Cartography in the Scottish Enlightenment”, Giornale di Storia Costituzionale, Vol. 20 (2010), pp49-60; John 
Ehrenberg, Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea, NY: New York University Press, 1999; Fania Oz-
Salzberger, “Civil Society in the Scottish Enlightenment”, in S. Kaviraj & S. Khilnani eds., Civil Society: History 
and Possibilities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp58-83. Some of these studies, such as works of 
Dumont, Seligman, Cohen and Ataro, also regard Mandeville as the forerunner of Hume and Smith who discovered 
the autonomy of socio-economic activities. 
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of political thought, especially Istvan Hont and his followers’ studies on the 
Scottish Enlightenment, which explains the conceptual transformation of civil 
society from the perspective of the early modern debate about “sociability”. (As 
a 17th- and 18th-century word, “sociability” means the human ability to form, 
sustain and preserve society).11 According to Hont and his followers, there used 
to be two modes of sociability before Hume and Smith. One is the Aristotelean-
Hutchesonian model of “high sociability” grounding society on men’s natural 
friendship and benevolence. It was criticised by thinkers such as Hobbes and 
Mandeville, for the natural love of fellows is either non-existent or insufficient 
for sustaining society larger than family. The other is the Hobbesian(-
Mandevillean) model of “unsociability”, according to which human beings are 
dominated by self-love, especially pride, thus social conflict is inevitable unless 
oppressed by the political power.12 In this context, to imagine a society besides 
family and the state is impossible. 
Such a dichotomy, nevertheless, was overcome by Hume and Smith’s 
theory of “commercial society”. For Hont, commercial society, namely the 
society in which division of labour is fully developed and “every man lives by 
                                                        
11 Istvan Hont, “Unsocial Sociability: Eighteenth Century Perspectives”, Intellectual History Archive, intellectual-
history:438, <http://arts.st-andrews.ac.uk/intellectualhistory> [28/06/2021]. 
12 Istvan Hont, Politics in Commercial Society: Jean-Jacque Rousseau and Adam Smith, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2015, ch1; Paul Sagar, The Opinion of Mankind: Sociability and the Theory of the State from 
Hobbes to Smith, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018, ch1. For Hont, the contrast between “high 
sociability” and “unsociability” is an approximation to that between Stoicism and Epicureanism. (Politics in 
Commercial Society, p15). For broad discussion about Stoicism and Epicureanism in early modern political thought, 
see Christopher Brooke, Philosophic Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to Rousseau, Princeton, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012; Tim Stuart-Buttle, From Moral Theology to Moral Philosophy: 
Cicero and from Locke to Hume, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019; Catherine Wilson, Epicureanism at the 
Origins of Modernity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; Neven Leddy & Avis S. Liftschitz, Epicurus in the 
Enlightenment, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009. 
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exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant”,13 should not be seen 
as merely the fourth and latest stage of civilisation after hunting, shepherding, 
and agriculture, but an alternative model of sociability. Because, in Smith’s 
explanation of the foundation of society, it was claimed that “Society may 
subsist among different men, as among different merchants, from a sense of 
utility, without any mutual love or affection; and though no man in it should owe 
any obligation, or be bound in gratitude to any other, it may still be upheld by a 
mercenary exchange of good offices according to an agreed valuation.”14 In 
Hont’s opinion, Smith suggested that the relationship amongst men-as-
merchants is of paradigmatic significance. Given the weakness of individual 
human beings, to preserve men’s life and satisfy men’s needs, they cannot but 
depend on each other; to sustain industry and trade, they cannot but establish 
justice. Thus with no need of natural affections or political coercion, men’s 
desire for preservation and interest leads to mutual commerce and orderly 
society, whereas government is erected posteriorly for the further security of 
justice. Hont thereby terms men’s utilitarian desire or self-interest as 
“commercial sociability”.15 And, as Hont’s followers argue, though “commercial 
                                                        
13 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, I.iv.1, emphasis added. 
14 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie., Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 1982, II.ii.3.1, emphasis added. 
15 Istvan Hont, “Unsocial Sociability”; “Commercial Society and Political Theory in the Eighteenth Century: The 
Problem of Authority in David Hume and Adam Smith”, in W. Melching et al (eds.), Main Trends in Cultural History: 
Ten Essays, Amsterdam & Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1994, p60. Hont traces this model further back to Pufendorf. See 
Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and Nation-State in Historical Perspective, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2005, ch1. Robin Douglass criticises Hont’s usage of this term for confounding “the social 
bonds that characterise commercial society” and “the origin of human sociability”. (“Theorising Commercial Society: 
Rousseau, Smith and Hont”, European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Oct., 2018), pp501-511.) Such a 
confusion probably results from the literal connection between the two pieces of Smith’s text (cf. Istvan Hont, 
Politics in Commercial Society, p9). But Hont preserves (and exploits) this ambiguity purposely, and later we will 
see the insights as well as difficulties it brings about. 
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society” is not Hume’s own words, Hume’s theory of justice and “natural society” 
could be reasonably read as a theory of “commercial sociability”.16 
The model of “commercial sociability” therefore afforded three main 
elements of the modern theory of civil society. Firstly, human beings are 
motivated by self-interest, the desire for bodily preservation and material utility. 
This does not preclude the existence of natural affections and benevolence, yet 
those are not so powerful in large-scale social interactions as self-interest. And 
unlike pride, the mental desire for outplaying others, self-interest does not 
cause zero-sum competition and conflict. 17  Secondly, to gratify their self-
interest, human beings spontaneously commerce with each other and establish 
social order on the basis of reciprocal utility. (This order, grounded on economic 
relations, can be enhanced by “social” relations constituted by mutual 
sympathy.)18 Government is necessitated in a relatively late stage, whose main 
function is to provide “external” protection for the existing natural society. Thus 
“the theory of society and the theory of the state now had to be separated even 
                                                        
16 Christopher Finlay, Hume’s Social Philosophy: Human Nature and Commercial Sociability in A Treatise of 
Human Nature, London & NY: Continuum, 2007; Paul Sagar, The Opinion of Mankind, pp54-63. 
17 Istvan Hont, Politics in Commercial Society, pp10ff. Hont on this point agrees with Hirschman that aggressive 
“passions” can be tamed by “interests”. See Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments 
for Capitalism before Its Triumph, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977; cf. Pierre Force, Self-Interest before 
Adam Smith: A Genealogy of Economic Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; David Wootton, 
Power, Pleasure and Profit: Insatiable Appetites from Machiavelli to Madison, Cambridge, MA & London: the 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2018. The difference between pride and self-interest is sharpened by 
Paul Sagar, thus he no longer reads Rousseau as a theorist of commercial sociability like Hont used to do. The 
Opinion of Mankind, pp39-46, pp155ff. 
18 Christopher Finlay, Hume’s Social Philosophy, pp86-124; Paul Sagar, The Opinion of Mankind, pp49-54; “Smith 
and Rousseau, after Mandeville and Hume”, Political Theory, Vol. 46, No. 1 (2018), pp29-58. In this sense, the 
Hontian interpretation concedes Hutchesons’s influence on Hume and Smith, though does not see this influence as 
decisive. Cf. James Harris’s model of “sympathetic sociability”, in his“A Compleat Chain of Reasoning: Hume’s 
Project in ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’”, Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, New Series, Vol. 109 (2009), 
pp129-148. About the debate on the relation between Hume and Hutcheson, see David Fate Norton, David Hume: 
Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician, Princeton, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982; 
James Moore, “Hume and Hutcheson”, in M. P. Stewart & J. W. Wright eds., Hume and Hume’s Connexions, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994, pp23-53. 
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more sharply”,19 and the role of society is stronger while that of government 
weaker.20 Thirdly, conceptually and historically speaking, commercial society in 
the narrow sense, namely the society of modern market economy, is the most 
typical or representative expression of the principle of commercial sociability.21 
In a nutshell, according to the Hontian interpretation, Hume and Smith had 
already broken with the traditional “political society” and presented a prototype 
of the Hegelian-Marxian theory in their analysis of commercial society. The 
Hontian story thus contributes to the mainstream narrative of the 
“metamorphosis” of civil society, that to a considerable extent, it is Hume and 
Smith that shaped our non-political, especially economic, understanding of civil 
society. 
Such a story, nevertheless, is not beyond controversy. From a more 
historical perspective, it is questionable whether the model of “commercial 
sociability” is entirely consistent with the ideas of the Scottish thinkers, or more 
precisely, the ideas of Hume. This is not because of the absence of “commercial 
society” in Hume’s language, but because of the very complexity of Hume’s 
theory. Rather than highlighting the naturalness and spontaneity of the 
economy-based social order, Hume regarded justice as an artificial virtue, and 
                                                        
19 Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade, pp182-183. 
20 Christopher Finlay, “Hume’s Theory of Civil Society”, European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 3, No.4 (2004), 
pp369-391, esp. p380. Moreover, according to Sagar, men’s desire of utility is determined by their imagination or 
opinion of utility, thus the latter is the true foundation of social order. Even the state is still necessary in large-scale 
society, it should be “a state without sovereignty”. “Lying behind ‘government’ there is no final, philosophically 
identifiable, and stable foundation of ‘sovereign’ authority, but only the constant and contested changing swirl of 
opinion.” Paul Sagar, The Opinion of Mankind, p10. As Hont himself regards modern commercial state as a 
combination of commercial society and popular sovereignty (Istvan Hont, “Commercial Society and Political Theory 
in the Eighteenth Century”), Sagar downplays the importance of sovereignty by developing the theory of commercial 
sociability. 
21 Christopher Finlay, Hume’s Social Philosophy, p5. 
15 
 
insisted that civil society is an artifice upheld by a series of artificial institutions 
including justice, politeness, and government. This makes Hume (to some 
extent) an outlier in the Scottish Enlightenment, criticised by both Hutcheson 
and Smith,22 differentiated from both the position of “high sociability” and that 
of “commercial sociability”, but closer to the tradition of Hobbes and Mandeville, 
though what ideas Hobbes and Mandeville exactly held also requires 
clarification. In fact, such a Hobbesian-Mandevillean argument is not a 
contingency derived from Hume’s technically over-complicated moral language, 
but an outcome of his systematic reflection on human nature, moral and social 
order, and political economy. Hume’s civil society, able to be “commercial” (in 
the sense of mode of subsistence), is nonetheless inherently artificial and 
political.23 
From a more theoretical perspective, it is also questionable whether the 
presently main-current understanding of civil society, the non-political, 
economic view, is the most productive one. Focusing narrowly on self-interest, 
it may underestimate other powerful motivations underlying large-scale social 
interaction. Stressing on the spontaneous order of economic exchange, it may 
oversimplify the difficulties of sustaining large society and the multiple 
mechanisms that are necessary for such a task. Regarding commercial society 
                                                        
22 Letter from David Hume to Francis Hutcheson, 17 September 1739, The Letters of David Hume, ed. by J. Y. T. 
Greig, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, Vol. I, pp32-35; Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, II.ii.3. 
Paul Sagar notices Hume’s difference from Smith on this point and regards Hume’s moral theory as inferior to 
Smith’s. See Paul Sagar, “Beyond Sympathy: Smith’s Rejection of Hume’s Moral Theory”, British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2017), pp681-705. 
23 Mikko Tolonen therefore terms Hume’s theory as a model of “political sociability”. See his Mandeville and Hume: 




as an embodiment of “commercial sociability” inherent in human nature, it may 
overlook the political-historical background within which modern market 
economy emerged. This one-sided view, theoretically speaking, can be 
balanced by taking Hobbes’s and Mandeville’s insights seriously. And if their 
version of civil society is already out of date, we can still benefit from Hume who 
subtly integrated the old-fashioned “political” theory with a more “modern” 
analysis of the “commercial” society. A Re-reading of Hume in the light of 
Hobbes and Mandeville, therefore, will not only provide us with a more 
adequate appreciation of Hume’s thought, but also an enriched understanding 
of civil society, its foundation in human nature, its mechanisms of operation, 
and its political and historical precondition. 
The Society-Regarding Self-Love 
The characteristic of civil society depends on the feature of men’s 
sociability. Thus the difference between the “commercial” and “political” 
versions of civil society corresponds with the difference between men’s material 
and mental desires, namely between self-interest and pride. Hont places 
Hobbes and Mandeville within the camp of “pride theory”, and therefore see 
them as theorists of “unsociability” standing opposite to Hume and Smith. His 
student Paul Sagar furthermore attempts to prove the insignificance of pride in 
Hume’s and Smith’s theories. According to Sagar, pride for Hume is far from 
the dominant passion of individuals but merely one of the four main indirect 
passions. Smith also refused to attribute men’s restless desire for wealth to 
17 
 
vanity. Additionally, the disruptive effects of pride is neutralised by the 
mechanism of sympathy. The spectators sympathising with the subject’s 
pleasure in his wealth, virtues or other goods give him love and esteem, instead 
of envy and jealousy, hence there is no conflict inherent in human nature 
causing unsociability and necessitating political power.24 But this viewpoint is 
not a proper understanding of Hume, for it underestimates the role of pride in 
shaping our self-consciousness, the way in which it combines with self-interest, 
and its potential for causing conflicts.25 
Seeing pride as one of the four main indirect passions, Hume nonetheless 
stressed “the mind has a much stronger propensity to pride than to humility”,26 
and that the idea of self is produced by the passion of pride.27 For Hume, it is 
pride, the passion taking the self as its object and something related to the self 
as its cause, that constitutes our understanding of ourselves as characterised, 
embodied, social persons. Specifically, since “which of all others produces most 
                                                        
24 Paul Sagar, “Smith and Rousseau, after Mandeville and Hume”, Political Theory, Vol. 46, No. 1 (2018), pp44-45.  
25 In fact, Sagar’s reading of Smith is also opposite to many other scholars’, e.g. Ryan Hanley, “Commerce and 
Corruption: Rousseau’s Diagnosis and Adam Smith’s Cure,” European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 7, No. 2 
(2008), pp137-158; Bert Kerkhof, “A Fatal Attraction? Smith’s ‘Theory of Moral Sentiments’ and Mandeville’s 
‘Fable’”, History of Political Thought, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1995), pp216-233; Dennis Rasmussen, The Problem and 
Promise of Commercial Society: Adam Smith’s Response to Rousseau, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2008, ch.2; Thomas Horne, “Envy and Commercial Society: Mandeville and Smith on ‘Private 
Vices, Public Benefits’”, Political Theory, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Nov., 1981), pp551-569; Robin Douglass, “Morality and 
Sociability in Commercial Society: Smith, Rousseau, -and Mandeville”, The Review of Politics, Vol. 79 (2017), 
pp597-620; and even Istvan Hont, Politics in Commercial Society, p92. 
26 THN, 2.2.10.4, SBN390. 
27 THN, 2.1.2.4, SBN278. Scholars interpret this argument in various ways. Pride may turn our attention to ourselves, 
though it also makes us open to the opinions of others (Robert Henderson, “David Hume on Personal Identity and 
Indirect Passions”, Hume Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Apr., 1990), pp33-44; Pauline Chazan, “Pride, Virtue, and Self-
Hood: A Reconstruction of Hume”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1992), pp45-64); pride may let 
us concern our past and future actions, thus construct our identity through time (Jane McIntyre, “Personal Identity 
and the Passions”); pride may determine what characters are of importance for making us who we are (Donald 
Ainslie, “Scepticism about Persons in Book II of Hume’s Treatise”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 37, 
No. 3 (Jul., 1999), pp469-492); pride may also let us recognise our (moral) agency (Jennifer Welchman, “Self-Love 
and Personal Identity in Hume’s Treatise”, Hume Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Apr., 2015), pp33-55; A. Oksenberg Rorty, 
“‘Pride Produces the Idea of Self’: Hume on Moral Agency”, Australian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 3 (1990), 
pp255-269; Susan Purviance, “The Moral Self and the Indirect Passions”, Hume Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Nov., 1997), 
pp195-212; A. E. Pitson, Hume’s Philosophy of the Self, London: Routledge, 2002). 
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commonly the passion of pride, is that of property”,28 pride may intertwine with 
our self-interest and lead to restless desire for riches. In other words, the desire 
for material good, rather than neatly differentiated from the desire for mental 
good, might to a considerable extent be derived from the latter. And besides the 
principle of sympathy, pride is also influenced by the principle of comparison, 
which makes people take pride in their particularity and superiority to others, 
and also want to be seconded by the praises of others. So pride is on the one 
hand a society-regarding passion that makes the existence and opinions of 
others necessary for one’s own self-understanding, yet on the other hand self-
centred and conflict-causing, because the gratification of one’s pride usually 
puts others in a disagreeable comparison. “The proud never can endure the 
proud”.29 
Hume’s idea of pride is in many aspects similar to the one we find in 
Mandeville, as Mikko Tolonen has reminded us in his critique of the Hontian 
interpretation. Mandeville, especially in his later works, clearly identified self-
liking (a technical synonym for pride but without its moral connotation) as an 
original human passion that cannot be reduced to self-love (in the narrow sense, 
namely the bodily desire of self-preservation), and considered self-liking as a 
moment constituting our self-evaluation.30 Yet Tolonen does not entirely negate 
the distinction between Hobbes, Mandeville, and Hume, but re-organises it as 
                                                        
28 THN, 2.1.10.1, SBN309. 
29 THN, 3.3.2.7, SBN596.  
30 Cf. Jerrold Siegel, The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp111-138. 
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a split between “Hobbes and the early Mandeville”, on the one hand, and “the  
late Mandeville and Hume”, on the other. In this way he overturns the Hontian 
model by placing Hobbes and the early Mandeville within the “selfishness” 
camp, who reduced human motives completely to bodily self-preservation.31 
For Tolonen, it is the material selfishness, rather than the society-regarding 
passion of pride, that causes men’s unsociability. Thus Tolonen, while 
overcoming the shortcomings of the Hontian model, in turn misses the similarity 
between Hobbes and the two later thinkers. In fact, none of the three regarded 
selfishness, self-preservation or self-interest as the unique or main motivation 
of human beings.32 According to Hobbes and Mandeville (in both his early and 
late phase), human beings are motivated by the desire for self-preservation as 
well as by pride, namely the desire that comes from the mental pleasure of 
contemplating one’s own power, or of having precedence over others.33 Since 
pride cannot make sense without comparing oneself with others, and cannot 
give full gratification but when it is seconded by the recognition of others; human 
beings must live together with others, yet they must more often than not 
displease each other due to the very competitiveness of such a self-centred 
passion. As is effectively summarised by Hobbes, “wanting is one thing, ability 
another. For even those who arrogantly reject the equal conditions without 
                                                        
31 Mikko Tolonen, Mandeville and Hume, ch1. 
32 About the intellectual history of “selfishness” “self-love” and “egoism”, see Christian Maurer, Self-Love, Egoism, 
and Selfish Hypothesis: Key Debates from Eighteenth-Century British Moral Philosophy, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2019, “Introduction”. On Hobbes and egoism, see Bernard Gert, Hobbes: Prince of Peace, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010, ch2. 
33 L, vi.39; FB, I, passim. 
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which society is not possible, still want it”.34 
Taking the role of pride into consideration, there is no substantial or 
paradigmatic difference between Hobbes, Mandeville and Hume’s theory of 
sociability. This is not to deny that pride may take various forms, as A. O. 
Lovejoy has insightfully pointed out. Pride as self-esteem or due pride in one’s 
own qualities is less society-regarding than pride as approbativeness and 
emulation. Also, pride as emulation is more comparative and competitive than 
self-esteem and approbativeness, for the former requires one’s obvious 
superiority over others.35 Properly speaking, Hume’s definition of pride is more 
extensive than Hobbes’s and Mandeville’s, since he paid more attention to self-
esteem or due pride.36 Yet the society-regarding and competitive forms can be 
found in Hume’s theory as well as in Hobbes’s and Mandeville’s. As a 
consequence, none of them should be simply classified as theorist of “self-
interest” or “unsociability”. Rather, all of them believed in some “unsocial 
sociability”, for pride both makes men desire society and prevents them from 
sustaining large and lasting society.37 It is such a dilemma of the society-
regarding self-love that all of them endeavoured to overcome. 
                                                        
34 DC, i.2, annotation. 
35 A. O. Lovejoy, Reflections on Human Nature, Baltimore: The John–Hopkins University Press, 1961, “Lecture 
III”. 
36 Cf. Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s Treatise, Cambridge and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1991; Jacqueline Taylor, Reflecting Subjects: Passion, Sympathy, and Society in Hume’s 
Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, ch6; Christian Maurer, Self-Love, Egoism, and Selfish 
Hypothesis, pp185ff. 
37 Hont regards “unsocial sociability” as a synonym of Kant’s “commercial sociability”, for both refer to the social 
relation in which “everybody is just a means for others, a utility and not a value in itself.” See Istvan Hont, “Unsocial 
Sociability”. But we should not overlook that Kant’s unsocial sociability includes not only self-interest but also “the 
desire for honour, power” and “enviously competitive vanity”. That is why Kant, unlike Hont, took Hobbes as a 
typical theorist of “unsocial sociability”. (Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan 
Purpose”, in Political Writings, ed. by Hans Reiss, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp44-45.) 
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The Artificiality of Civil Society 
The problem of society-regarding self-love, inherent in human nature, calls 
for artificial solutions at multiple levels. It is heatedly debated what institutions 
or mechanisms certain thinker exactly made use of. According to the Hontian 
interpretation, by artifice Hume principally meant justice, which is, albeit not 
instinctive, an outcome of spontaneous and unintended evolution independent 
from the political power. Thus the artificiality of justice does not undermine the 
fundamental principle of “commercial sociability”. But Tolonen criticises this 
reading because it overlooks the fact that Hume’s conception of civil society “is 
grounded on government.”38 It is noteworthy that, for Tolonen, the political 
aspect of civil society lies not only in the fact that in large society justice is 
ineffective unless enforced by government. Since self-interest is not the only 
cause of social conflict, pride, as another and more typical sort of society-
regarding self-love, also requires regulation. Tolonen argues that on this point 
we can find an important agreement between Hume and (the late) Mandeville 
which is often ignored by interpreters. Hume claimed that “in like manner, 
therefore, as we establish the laws of nature, in order to secure property in 
society, and prevent the opposition of self-interest; we establish the rules of 
good-breeding, in order to present the opposition of men’s pride, and render 
conversation agreeable and inoffensive”.39 Such a double correlation between 
justice (laws of nature) and self-interest, politeness (rules of good-breeding) 
                                                        
38 Mikko Tolonen, Mandeville and Hume, p21. 
39 THN, 3.3.2.10, SBN597. 
22 
 
and pride, corresponds with Mandeville’s project of regulating self-love (self-
preservation) by government and cultivating self-liking by politeness. For both 
Hume and Mandeville, politeness is a redirection of pride. Given that direct 
expression of pride is troublesome, everyone gradually learns to praise the 
dexterity of disguising pride, thus gratifying this passion secretly. According to 
Tolonen, Hume and Mandeville’s attention to politeness is of great significance. 
On the one hand, it further demonstrates the weakness of the “commercial 
sociability” model. Tolonen correctly highlights that politeness, as an 
indispensable support for civil society, is another “key political term”, for it co-
exists with a “top-down system in which a political structure is considered 
fundamental in all aspects of life”.40 On the other hand, as a social convention, 
politeness emerges from historical evolution and works independent from 
coercive power. Hence Hume and the late Mandeville diverged from the 
Hobbesian idea that civil society is upheld merely by political coercion and 
enriched the meaning of “artifice”. 
Tolonen clearly demonstrates the similarity between Hume and Mandeville, 
but his hard double correlation is not without problems. On the one hand, 
identifying justice and government rigidly as the solution to the conflict caused 
by self-interest, Tolonen’s model cannot well capture government’s contribution 
to the regulation of pride. In fact, as we have seen, Hume’s self-interest should 
not be equalised to bare self-preservation, neither is its content self-evident, for 
                                                        
40 Mikko Tolonen, Mandeville and Hume, p21, italics added. 
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it can be shaped by and combined with pride and turn into some “real and 
imagined” wants, especially in large and polished society. Thus conflicts in large 
society are derived from pride no less than from self-interest. Correspondingly, 
government for Hume, like for Hobbes and Mandeville, is not limited to working 
against the purely material desires, but serves as the foundational defence of 
social order generally against various forms of society-regarding self-love. 
On the other hand, identifying politeness as the solution to conflict caused 
by pride, Tolonen also overlooks that pride can be channelled by substantial 
norms of virtue and vice, honour and shame, and therefore neglects the role of 
morality-regarding motives in shaping human beings internally and supporting 
social order externally.41 Politeness, or taking pride in the disguise of pride, is a 
second-order redirection of pride. Yet pride can be regulated more directly when 
people take pride in virtuous actions, or actions beneficial for the public. Hume 
considered virtue as the “most obvious cause” of pride, while pride in virtues is 
an important motive of men’s virtuous behaviours.42 Albeit moral motives are 
not the first origin of justice, politeness and other general rules, yet in large and 
civilised societies men with “a certain discipline and education” are indeed 
motivated by their regard of morality and honour. Especially when men are 
lacking the natural virtuous motives, sense of obligation and shame can 
                                                        
41 Tolonen says, “I do not think that Hume puts any relevant weight on the idea of morally-motivated rule following.” 
It seems that for Tolonen Hume’s moral philosophy has little to do with his social and political theory. Mandeville 
and Hume, p14. 
42 THN, 2.1.7.2, SBN295. Cf. Phillip Reed, “Motivating Hume’s Natural Virtues”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. 42, No. S1 (2012), PP134-147; “The Alliance of Virtue and Vanity in Hume’s Moral Theory”, Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 93 (2012), pp595-614. 
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motivate them to disguise their defects by performing the corresponding 
virtuous actions.43 In other words, pride is not specifically related to politeness 
but underlies various moral actions, and therefore supports social order in a 
more general way. Hume’s idea about the role of pride in motivating virtuous 
actions is similar to Mandeville’s (in all his phases) as well. In his early works, 
Mandeville had already paid attention to the cultivation of pride by public moral 
education. Mandeville observed that human beings committed to the norms of 
moral values will counterfeit virtuous actions due to their desire for honour and 
fear of shame. Thus for Mandeville, “the Moral Virtues are the Political Offspring 
which Flattery begot upon Pride”.44 Even Hobbes was not entirely ignorant of 
such a use of pride, for he pointed out the function of “laws of honour and a 
public rate of worth”45 in directing men’s pride to obedience and peace. In 
Hobbes’s opinion, as long as “that the road to honours does not lie through 
criticism of the current regime nor through factions and popular favour, but 
through the opposite, … there would be more ambition to obey than to 
oppose.”46 Though Hobbes underlined the dependence of “a public rate of 
worth” upon the sovereignty, and explained men’s moral commitment by a 
juridical theory of representation, rather than in socio-psychological categories, 
he did not attribute men’s observance of social order simply to the fear of  
oppressive coercive power. In fact, for all of the three thinkers, the artificiality of 
                                                        
43 E.g. THN, 3.2.1.9, SBN479; 3.2.2.25, SBN500; EPM, SBN203. 
44 FB, I, p37. 
45 L, xviii.15. 
46 DC, xiii.12. 
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civil society corresponds to some of the artificial aspects that are present within 
each individual, alike the self-discipline that results from the individual’s 
commitment to the norms of morality and honour. 47  Either through socio-
psychological mechanisms or juridical constructions, it is men’s “artificial virtue” 
(in Hume’s term), “artificial self” (in Mandeville’s term) or “artificial person” (in 
Hobbes’s term) that upholds the artificial social order. 
Therefore, for Hobbes, Mandeville as well as Hume, civil society is 
sustained by a set of interlocked artificial mechanisms. It is undeniable that 
there are significant differences between their analysis of those mechanisms. 
For instance, Hobbes was not so optimistic about the malleability and 
educability of pride, thus he assigned a more crucial role to sovereignty and did 
not mention the institution of politeness. Mandeville was more influenced by the 
Augustinian moral language, and negated the true virtuousness of men’s 
actions motivated by self-loving passions. Neither Hobbes nor Mandeville 
believe that justice could be established without the existence of coercive power. 
Nevertheless, all of them agreed, that a large and polished society is 
fundamentally secured by a coercive power enforcing justice; that a sense of 
morality and honour motivates men to act in accordance with public benefits; 
and that political authority plays an indispensable role in supporting the norms 
of morality and honour. 48  Only when taking these similarities into serious 
                                                        
47  Though, there are lots of debates about whether Mandeville believed in the possibility of real (instead of 
counterfeit) virtues, and whether for Hume actions motivated by moral motives were really virtuous. See our relevant 
discussion in chapter 2 and 3. 
48 Cf. Jeffery Church, “Selfish and Moral Politics: David Hume on Stability and Cohesion in the Modern State”, 
The Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 1(Feb., 2007), pp169–81. 
26 
 
consideration can the connections between their systems be clarified. 
Civil Society and Modern State Building 
The government has structural influence over justice, politeness, and moral 
education. Yet if we turn from the static perspective to the historical and 
dynamic, the role of politics in shaping civil society can be more clearly 
demonstrated. Here by “politics” we mean not only the formal or institutional 
existence of the government, but also its practice and policy in actual history in 
a more substantial sense. Notwithstanding justice and politeness are 
necessitated by human nature in the general sense, large and polished civil 
societies grounded on the emancipation and cultivation of men’s self-interest 
and pride is the outcome of modern state-building. In fact, the historical 
characteristics of modern society were keenly captured by both Mandeville and 
Hume, even though they were still implicit in Hobbes’s analysis of the role of 
trade in civilising men and supporting the state. For Mandeville, the maxim 
“private vices, public benefits” is best demonstrated in populous, opulent and 
warlike states rather than small, simple and peace-loving body politics. Hume 
furthermore transformed Mandeville’s distinction between small and large 
societies to that between ancient and modern societies. While ancient nations 
were founded on the frugality and public-spiritedness of the citizens, modern 
states can neither survive nor become “great” without prosperous industry and 
commerce, which depends on the stimulation provided by luxury and emulation. 
The cultivation of men’s self-love is of crucial importance for not only the 
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stability of domestic peace but also the power of the state in the face of 
international competition. In this sense, the rise of commercial society is not 
simply the natural and necessary result determined by human nature. Rather, 
to understand it we must take its political-historical background into 
consideration. 
Interestingly, it is Hont, to whose model of “commercial sociability” we want 
to make revision, that suggests us to recover the vision of “political economy” 
which sheds lights on the interaction between politics and economy, or the 
political significance of economy. 49  The formation and extension of “civil 
commerce” are attended with the states’ increasing pursuit of power over 
domestic and foreign rivals, which must be supported by sufficient human and 
material resources. For both Mandeville and Hume, therefore, the importance 
of economy lies not precisely in its contribution to social order which makes 
political power less central, but in its contribution to the political power itself. 
Instead of distinguishing civil society from the state, the economy has become 
“an affair of state”. The rising status of commerce is at bottom seen as a political 
phenomenon serving political aims.50 
According to Hont, Hume was “dismissive of those who failed to grasp the 
logic of reciprocity underlying all commerce”, and wished “to understand how 
the logic of commerce actually played itself out when superimposed upon the 
                                                        
49 Mikko Tolonen criticises Hont for putting attention narrowly to political economy while overlooking Hume’s 
theory of human nature. See Mandeville and Hume, pp18-19. This critique does not do justice to Hont, for the model 
of “commercial sociability” is exactly a theory of human nature. And, Tolonen does not recognise that Hont’s study 
of political economy could, paradoxically, complement the theory of “political sociability”. 
50 Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade, pp10-21. 
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logic of war”.51 But theoretically speaking, to hold on the perspective of “political” 
economy displaying the embedding of economy in politics, it is necessary to 
weaken the thesis of “commercial sociability” which implies the naturalness and 
autonomy of economic intercourses, because, as John Dunn and Ryan Patrick 
Hanley have pointed out, it would be problematic “whether in the long run 
politics in commercial society is ultimately either necessary or possible” if the 
latter thesis works through.52 In other words, “market, … had its own laws, and 
laws which differed sharply from those of politics”, thus there are fundamental 
tensions between the two. 53 Hont himself does not recognise the tension 
between reading Hume as a defender of “commercial sociability” and at the 
same time as a Mandevillean political economist putting the state first.54 In other 
words, he fails to recognise the latter reading, which points out the “political-
military roots of modern economic development”, may represent a revision of 
the former more commercial reading.55 If we understand Tolonen’s “political 
                                                        
51 Ibid, p6. 
52 John Dunn, “From Applied Theology to Social Analysis: The Break Between John Locke and the Scottish 
Enlightenment”, in Istvan Hont & Michael Ignatieff eds., Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in 
the Scottish Enlightenment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp119-136; Ryan Patrick Hanley, “On 
the Place of Politics in Commercial Society”, in Maria Pia Paganelli et al eds., Adam Smith and Rousseau: Ethics, 
Politics, and Economics, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018, pp16-31. 
53 Istcan Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p187. 
54 And as Finlay’s and Sagar’s development of Hont’s study focuses one-sidedly on “commercial sociability”, the 
political dimension of Hume’s anatomy of civil society is further overlooked. This is not to say Hume’s political 
economy is entirely ignored. Rather, Hume scholars continually discuss about themes such as the metaphysical and 
moral foundation of political economy, the problem of public debts, international commerce, money, and foreign 
policy. E.g. John Berdell, International Trade and Economic Growth in Open Economies: The Classical Dynamics 
of Hume, Smith, Ricardo and Malthus, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002; Carl Wennerlind, “David Hume as a 
Political Economist”, in Alexander Dow & Sheila Dow eds., A History of Scottish Economic Thought, London: 
Routledge, 2006, pp46-70; Carl Wennerlind &Margaret Schabas eds., David Hume’s Political Economy, London & 
NY: Routledge, 2008; Arie Arnon, Monetary Theory and Policy from Hume and Smith to Wicksell: Money, Credit, 
and the Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011; Jia Wei, Commerce and Politics in Hume’s 
History of England, Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2017; Estrella Trincado, The Birth of Economic Rhetoric: 
Communication, Arts, and Economic Stimulus in David Hume and Adam Smith, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. 
Nonetheless, most of these works concentrate on specific economic topics rather than considering Hume’s political 
economy generally in the perspective of his analysis of civil society. 
55 Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p150. 
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sociability” as a revision of the Hontian “commercial sociability” thesis, such a 
revision can be complemented and deepened, paradoxically, by developing 
Hont’s own insights about the emulations of trade, even though some further 
efforts may still be needed in order to integrate Hume’s theory of human nature 
and his political economy. 
In a nutshell, from Hume’s viewpoint, civil society is multi-dimensional and 
dynamic. It is grounded on men’s self-love (in the general sense), especially 
self-interest and pride and the interaction between them; it is upheld by a set of 
interlocked artificial conventions, including justice, politeness and government, 
which demands not only men’s behavioural obedience but also their sense of 
morality and honour; it is also an offspring of the process of modern state-
building. To understand Hume the anatomist of civil society, accordingly, we 
should focus neither on specific passions nor on specific institutions, but 
investigate his whole conception of the complex and dynamic mechanisms of 
civilisation. Therefore, the Hontian “commercial sociability” model must be 
revised by stressing the role of pride and politics, while Tolonen’s “political 
sociability” theory needs to be developed by connecting pride to moral virtues 
and putting the growth of commercial society within a vision of the role of the 
modern state. In this way, with the help of Hume’s insights, we may have a 
better understanding of the political dimension of modern civil society. 
Overview of Chapters 
This thesis aims to shed light on Hobbes, Mandeville and Hume’s analysis 
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of civil society, including its foundation in human nature, the artificial 
mechanisms sustaining its order, and the political-historical condition within 
which it emerges. 
Chapter 1 is devoted to Hobbes, who first presented the paradox of society-
regarding self-love through his theory of the state of nature, and provided his 
solution, the civil society, in his theory of absolute sovereignty. I start from an 
exploration of Hobbes’s analysis of human nature, especially the passion of 
self-preservation and pride. Pointing out the dependence of these passions on 
social interactions (societate mutua), I reject the interpretation of Hobbes as a 
theorist of unsociability, selfishness and egoism, while I emphasise his 
understanding of the state of nature as an outcome of the inherent paradox 
between the self-centredness and the society-regarding feature of these 
passions. Then I demonstrate how Hobbes overcomes this problem by 
developing a theory a civil society, namely a political unity with common power. 
Civil society, as an artifice, is established through the artificial person of the 
sovereign as well as the artificial person of the subjects, which supposes a split 
of personality (in the juridical sense) in both the sovereign and the subjects. 
Finally I look at men’s life in Hobbes’s civil society, including their industry and 
commercial activities. I conclude that Hobbes’s civil society is also a society 
with a civilised lifestyle and various socio-economic activities, but that still 
remains a “political” society at bottom. 
Chapter 2 examines Mandeville’s development of Hobbes’s analysis by 
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clarifying the former’s notorious maxim “private vices, public benefits”. Here this 
maxim is resolved into three theses, namely the “fear thesis”, the “pride thesis”, 
and the “luxury thesis”. In discussing the “fear thesis”, I show Mandeville’s 
Hobbesian understanding of men’s society-regarding self-love and his 
Hobbesian explanation of the origin of civil society, namely the fear of the 
government. By exploring the “pride thesis”, I shed light on Mandeville’s revision 
to Hobbes’s theory of pride and self-understanding. It allows Mandeville to 
explain the origin of moral virtues and politeness, indispensable pillars of civil 
society, with men’s artificial self, which is shaped by pride. By turning to the 
“luxury thesis”, I wish to emphasise that for Mandeville, modern large society is 
especially driven by the economic mechanism of luxury, of which the foundation 
is the combination of men’s self-love and self-liking (pride). This mechanism 
both contributes to the greatness of the state, and requires a transformation of 
the role of political power. In sum, since artifice means more than the 
sovereign’s command and the subjects’ obedience, the centre of men’s life in 
civil society moves more and more towards “civil commerce” and economic 
activities. Nevertheless, Mandeville agrees with Hobbes on the artificial and 
political features of civil society. 
The next two chapters investigate Hume’s ideas about the same themes. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the fundamental principles of Hume’s civil society. 
Examining the self-loving passions from the perspective of Hume’s theory of 
self-identity, I clarify how pride constitutes men’s characterised, embodied, 
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social self, and how the principles of sympathy and comparison inherent in pride 
give rise to men’s society-regarding self-love. This provides the foundation for 
Hume’s social and political thought. Then I move to Hume’s theory of men’s 
state of nature and the origin of justice. Adhering to the artificiality of justice, 
Hume made revisions to Hobbes and Mandeville by identifying self-interest as 
the main cause of conflict, and regarding justice as both a “convention” and a 
real “virtue”. Yet a crisis of justice emerges with the enlargement of society. 
Thereby I shed light on how Hume brings Mandeville and Hobbes back in his 
analysis of the moral motive to justice and the crisis human beings face. At last 
I discuss the origin of government and allegiance, as well as the development 
of justice and politeness, which marks the eventual formation of Hume’s “civil 
society”. For Hume, in a nutshell, civil society is grounded on multiple artifices, 
including the redirection of self-interest, obligations based on sense of morality 
and honour, the augmentation of moral sense by education and reputation, as 
well as coercion and the public propaganda of the government. 
Chapter 4 turns to Hume’s political and historical writings, putting his theory 
of civil society in the particular background of modern state-building. To begin 
with, I probe into Hume’s depiction of the origin of government in actual history. 
Given the ever-lasting possibility of inter-societal conflicts, politics is as 
fundamental and original a dimension of human association as economic 
commerce. Then, by reviewing Hume’s account of the history of civil society, I 
point out the socio-political preconditions for the rise of civilised commercial 
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society, including political institutions securing the strict execution of justice 
(especially rule of general laws), social norms honouring industry and 
commerce, and political practice favourable to the development of economy. 
Only in modern states these conditions are fulfilled. This is because in modern 
times, industry and trade are serving crucial political aims, i.e. supporting the 
military strength of the state. I therefore demonstrates Hume’s development of 
Mandeville’s political economic insights. Hume’s civil society, from this 
perspective, results from the integration of commercial society into the power 
of modern states. Rather than a derivative of the natural development of the 
economy or the natural progress of civilisation, it is an outcome of the political-
historical process of state-building.
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Chapter 1  Self-Love and Civil Society: Hobbes’s Problem and Project 
A great political philosopher might have a lot of critics, but would never be 
ignored, for he presents true problems even without offering perfect answers. 
Hobbes is in this sense a milestone in the history of political thought. Rejecting 
the Aristotelean thesis that human beings are by nature “zoon politikon”, 
Hobbes makes men’s orderly living together a fundamental problem for the 
moderns.1 As the starting point of our research, this chapter explores Hobbes’s 
demonstration of the difficulty of men’s sociability in his theory of the state of 
nature, and the solution he provides, namely the theory of civil society. The first 
section sheds light on Hobbes’s analysis of men’s society-regarding self-love. 
For Hobbes, mutual association is always needed even in the state of nature, 
whereas such sort of association cannot uphold large and lasting societies but 
lead to perpetual conflicts. Section II displays how Hobbes overcomes this 
dilemma by the establishment of civil society, which erects the common power 
of the unity through the relationship of artificial persons between the subjects 
and the sovereign. The last section focuses on men’s life within the civil society, 
especially their various socio-economic activities. We will see that both his 
depiction of the problematic human nature and his emphasis on the artificiality 
of civil society have significant influence on thinkers after him. 
                                                        
1 Parsons famously named this problem as “the Hobbesian problem of order”. See Talcott Parsons, The Social 
System, Glencoe: Free Press, 1951, pp36-37. 
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I. Self-Love, “Societate Mutua” and the Problem of the State of Nature 
1. The Paradox of Society-Regarding Self-Love: The Empirical Aspect 
Hobbes is often seen as a theorist of self-love or unsociability. At first 
glance, Hobbes’s understanding of the self and self-love is quite simple and 
distinct, deriving directly from his mechanistic philosophy. As animals with vital 
motions, human beings are motivated by passions.2 What helps the vital motion 
is called “delight”/ “good” and is desired, whereas what hinders is called “pain”/ 
“evil” and is averted. The most terrible enemy of human nature is death, which 
means “loss of all power, and also the greatest bodily pain in the losing”,3 thus 
men have a universal aversion of death and a universal desire of protecting 
their life. Self-love, especially self-preservation, is one of the most fundamental 
passions and motives of human beings.4 As the object of self-preservation, the 
“self” here is equal to one’s physical-biological existence. Self-preservation 
means exactly to preserve one’s own “nature”, that is to say, one’s body and 
limbs.5 The content and limit of the “self” therefore seem self-evident. Each one 
knows clearly who he is as well as what himself consists of, for he endeavours 
to conserve nobody but himself. To understand human nature there is no need 
                                                        
2 EL, v.14. Hobbes scholars debate a lot about the similarity and difference between Hobbes’s three main works of 
political philosophy. It is generally agreed that Hobbes’s ideas underwent some changes in explaining the causes of 
the state of nature and the legal process of erecting the sovereignty. Yet his basic arguments about the structure of 
human nature and the character of the state stayed the same. In this chapter, most of time I cite Elements of Law, De 
Cive and Leviathan indiscriminately, but I will discuss the differences between them when they actually appear and 
are of theoretical significance. 
3 EL, xiv.6. 
4 It is noteworthy, however, that this does not mean Hobbes is a psychological egoist, for Hobbes does not reduce 
all human desires to the desire of one’s own welfare. See Bernard Gert, “Hobbes, Mechanism, and Egoism”, The 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 61 (Oct., 1965), pp341-349; “Hobbes and Psychological Egoism”, Journal of 
the History of Ideas, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec., 1967), pp503-520; Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political 
Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp29-82. 
5 L, xiv.1. 
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to take their mutual engagement into consideration. In fact, “when we 
theoretically sunder society and put men into this natural state, human 
individuals are not destroyed when they are stripped of their social connections; 
rather, they are best revealed by that sundering”.6 Social interactions seem 
irrelevant in the “natural condition” of the self-loving men. 
However, Hobbes’s passion of self-love is neither Rousseau’s amour de 
soi nor Spinoza’s conatus. Rather than being independent from others and 
enclosed in his own bodily world like Rousseau’s savage, or striving for mere 
existence as Spinoza expects, Hobbes’s man is deeply influenced by others: 
Whatever seems Good is pleasant, and affects either the organs (of the 
body) or the mind. Every pleasure of the mind is either glory (or a good 
opinion of oneself), or ultimately relates to glory; the others are sensual or 
lead to something sensual, and can all be comprised under the name of 
advantages. All society, therefore, exists for the sake either of advantage 
or of glory, i.e. it is a product of love of self, not of love of friends [sui, non 
sociorum, amor].7 
There is no doubt that Hobbes’s men are self-loving, yet Hobbesian self-love is 
much more complicated. Human beings consist not only of body but also of 
mind.8 While body desires sensual pleasure or “advantages”, mind desires 
                                                        
6 Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p7. 
Hampton therefore labels Hobbes’s theory as “radical individualism”. 
7 DC, i.2. 
8 In recent years more scholars recognise that Hobbesian theory of human nature cannot be reduced entirely to 
materialism or mechanism. Precisely speaking, Hobbes’s materialism is “methodological” rather than 
“metaphysical”. For Hobbes, desire of bodily goods is neither the only nor the most important motive of men. E.g. 
S. A. Lloyd, Ideals as Interests in Hobbes’s Leviathan: The Power of Mind over Matter, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992; Bernard Gert, Hobbes: Prince of Peace, ch2. 
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glory or “good opinions of oneself”. In other words, humans are driven by 
passion of self-preservation as well as by pride. The desire of advantages may 
motivate men to associate with one another, for commodious life requires help 
from others. More importantly, pride is by its nature a society-regarding passion. 
“GLORY, or internal gloriation or triumph of the mind, is that passion which 
proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our own power, above the 
power of him that contendeth with us.”9 Glory means pre-eminence in the 
competition of power, which constitutes the only felicity of human beings.10 It is 
unintelligible unless men live together with others and evaluate themselves in 
comparison with their fellows. Glory also demands others’ response, namely 
their “honouring”, which means to value a man at a relatively high rate 
according to the rate each man sets on himself.11 According to Hobbes, the 
value or worth of a man is “dependent on the need and judgment of another”, 
thus “true value is no more than esteemed by others.”12 Honour indicates the 
true power of a man, and is itself a sort of power, for it functions as a present 
means to future goods by influencing other people. 13  Honour both 
acknowledges and adds to one’s power, and finally, his glory. Thus men’s good 
opinions about themselves must be seconded in their conversation with others. 
In a nutshell, the passion of pride and its gratification necessitate mutual 
commerce even in the state of nature. Men’s self-love is fundamentally shaped 
                                                        
9 EL, ix.1. 
10 L, xi.1. 
11 L, x.17. 
12 L, x.16. 
13 L, xi.3. 
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by this society-regarding feature, and this in turn explains the “causes why men 
seek each other’s company and enjoy associating with each other [societate 
mutua]”.14 Since such sort of mutual engagement takes place both in reality 
and in the world of imagination, not only physical-biological existence but also 
(imaginary) social fame is considered as belonging to oneself. Each one’s self 
makes full sense only with the help of imagination and opinions of other humans. 
Nevertheless, according to Hobbes, “no large or lasting society can be 
based upon the passion for glory”.15 Men’s need for social glory and the good 
opinions of others fails to make them considerate of or useful to each other. The 
complexity of the Hobbesian self and the society-regarding feature of 
Hobbesian self-love are not sufficient to give rise to true sociability, because 
each man to some extent retains his original or unreflective self-understanding. 
First of all, in the state of nature where a common measure of good and evil is 
absent, Hobbes’s men refuse to evaluate themselves according to measures 
set by others. To the contrary, 
when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand 
right Reason for judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be 
determined, by no other men's reason but their own, it is as intolerable in 
the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump 
                                                        
14 DC, i.2. Hobbes uses “society” “association” “societas” “societate” in two different senses. Sometimes this set of 
terms means men’s mutual commerce in the broad sense, whereas sometimes it means large and lasting society with 
stable order, especially when used together with “civil” or “civilis”. In this chapter, we use “societate mutua” to refer 
to men’s social interactions in the first sense and “civil society” in the second sense. 
15 DC, i.2. 
39 
 
on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand.16 
Human beings are so proud that they rival with each other not only in 
competitions for honour, but also when defining what can be counted as 
honourable. Just like all players want to use what they have most in their hands 
as the trump, men unreflectively set up measures of good and evil, honourable 
and dishonourable according to their own reason and judgment. Rich men take 
pride in their wealth, while strong men regard strength as most glorious. Each 
one compares himself with others only according to his original private measure, 
by which he could always be the winner without difficulty. As a consequence, 
there is no public yardstick against which everyone establishes his self-
evaluation, and then there is no possibility for a common code of honour applied 
to the whole society that directs men’s pride to public benefits. 
What is more, despite men’s need for praise from others, they are often 
inclined to obtain it by force, instead of by mutual ingratiation and reciprocal 
flattery. Hobbes provides several accounts for this fact. Particularly speaking, 
there are vain-glorious men who over-evaluate their power and naturally tend 
to be aggressive, attempting to confirm their superiority and enjoy the pleasure 
of vanquishing others.17 Generally, all glory-seeking men (that is, all men, no 
                                                        
16 L, v.3. 
17 The meaning of “vainglory” is ambivalent in Hobbes’s works. Sometimes vain-glory is contrasted with true glory 
or proper confidence. It “consists in the feigning and supposing of abilities in ourselves which we know are not”, 
thus vainglorious men lack confidence and usually dare not to take part in real fights. (L, xi.41, xi.11; EL, ix.1; cf. 
Gabriella Slomp, Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, 
pp33-36.) But sometimes vain-glory is contrasted with modesty. Vain-glorious men are those “supposing himself 
superior to others”, wanting “to be allowed everything”, and demanding “more honour for himself than others have”, 
whereas modest men “look for no more but equality”. (DC, i.4; EL, xiv.3) Vain glory is “vain” since it results from 
men’s over-valuation of their power. Given that human beings are in natural equality, in fact, all glory is vain in this 
sense, for glory by definition presupposes the precedence of power. But the vain-glorious people themselves are 
over-confident and aggressive, willing to harm others. Cf. Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis 
and Genesis, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1963, pp12ff. Unfortunately, Hobbes never 
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matter whether vain or not) are defensive and ready to fight others back when 
being insulted, 
For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same 
rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or 
undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst 
them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to 
make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his 
contemners, by damage; and from others, by the example.18 
Hobbes’s men are too frank to be hypocrites and too stubborn to be flatterers. 
Although one’s worth is not absolute but determined by others, and no one 
could win honour unless his self-evaluation is widely approved, yet man would 
not necessarily adjust his self-evaluation according to the opinions of others. 
The original or unreflective self-estimation is not yet eliminated. On the contrary, 
both the measure and the content of men’s self-valuation are so firm that cannot 
be easily shaped from without. Once one’s good opinions of himself are 
doubted or challenged by others, he would rather harm them then “extort” a 
higher evaluation than please them by good behavious to earn compliments. In 
fact, politeness or mutual exchange of flattery is undesirable due to the essence 
of glory, honour, and power. Hobbes’s men, “whose joy consisteth in comparing 
                                                        
explains how a man could be modest or acquire proper self-estimation in the state of nature. 
18 L, xiii.5; cf. Arash Abizadeh, “Hobbes on the Causes of War: A Disagreement Theory”, American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 105, No. 2 (May, 2011), pp298-315. Some scholar claims that not all insults cause anger. People 
will resort to violence only when their “categorial honour” (instead of “comparative honour”) is insulted, that is, 
when their “status” or “membership in the class of honourable men” is denied. See Clifton Mark, “The Natural Laws 
of Good Manners: Hobbes, Glory, and Early Modern Civility”, The Review of Politics, Vol. 80 (2018), pp391-414. 
But this interpretation is implausible, because “status” and “class” are unintelligible in the state of nature where 
common code of honour is absent. 
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himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent”.19 Honour is 
nothing if everybody has it. Hobbesian pride therefore seems more like a 
humour of frank noblemen, whose pre-eminence, even though it exists only in 
imagination, is sincerely pursued and believed by themselves.20 
Due to the absence of common measure, men in the state of nature “must 
determine the pre-eminence by strength and force of body”.21 Notwithstanding 
that power may take various forms, men’s physical existence is the ultimate 
foundation of all sorts of power, glory and honour; thus bodily violence and 
personal dominion over others are the most apparent and radical 
manifestations of one’s superiority. The desire of glory (pleasure of mind) then 
shapes or re-directs the desire of advantages (pleasure of body). “It is true that 
the advantages of this life can be increased with other people’s help. But this is 
much more effectively achieved by Dominion over others than by their help”.22 
Although sociability might be useful for acquisition of bodily pleasure, dominion 
is much more attractive given its satisfaction of both aspects of self-love. There 
is no surprise that men feeling (over-)confident in their superiority in the 
competitions are enthusiastic in subduing others.23 Moreover, even the modest 
man who has a “true estimate of himself” cannot but hold a will to do harm and 
                                                        
19 L, xvii.8. 
20 Cf. EL, xvii.15; Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, ch4. 
21 EL, xiv.4. 
22 DC, i.2. 
23 For some scholars, the existence of bellicose, vainglorious men seeking dominion over others at the risk of their 
own life implies that pride can trump the passion of self-preservation, or fear of death. Therefore Hobbes’s project 
of keeping men in awe by the sovereign’s power might fail. (E.g. Michael Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1975, pp93-94; Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p73; Paul 
Sagar, The Opinion of Mankind, p44.) But this is not the case. Those men are driven by the over-confidence in their 
power and the hope of victory, thus do not see the risk of their life in the conflicts. The passion of self-preservation 
is not overwhelmed, but only misled by their pride. Cf. Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, ch2. 
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a restless desire of power, which are “derived from the need to defend his 
property and liberty against the other”.24 Everyone is not sure whether the 
individuals he encounters are aggressive vain-glorious men or not. Trust in 
others is dangerous and stupid, for there is no way to secure one’s life once his 
moderation is exploited.25 In the structure of moral-political anarchy, therefore, 
the uncertainty about the existence of the vain-glorious people leads to a 
universal inclination towards pre-emptive actions. Hobbes concludes that 
competition, diffidence and glory give rise to a state of war of all against all.26 It 
is noteworthy that “competition” here should not be read as the struggle for 
scarce material goods and as the primary cause of conflicts.27 As is pointed out 
by Hobbes, “man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease.”28 Mutual 
conflict is inevitable despite the abundance of material goods. The “competition” 
resulting in war is in fact the competition of power, which is the means to all 
other goods and is “scarce” due to its positional feature. Such a competition is 
ignited by diffidence and glory. Actually, though glory is not regarded as the 
unique reason of conflict (especially in Hobbes’s later works), it is still a 
fundamental reason since it originally brings about the will to do harm and the 
anxiety of being harmed. Without the experience about the proud men’s 
conduct, both mutual “diffidence” and the vicious “competition” of power after 
                                                        
24 DC, i.4. 
25 DC, i.3. M. M. Goldsmith, Hobbes’s Science of Politics, NY: Columbia University Press, 1966, pp78ff. 
26 L, xiii.6. 
27 Comp. David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes, Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1969, pp14-20; Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p60; Gregory S. Kavka, 
Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. 
28 L, xvii.10. 
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power would not take place.29 
According to Hobbes, the state of nature is a dilemma caused by human 
nature, especially the society-regarding self-love. Human nature is not defined 
by unsociability. For Hobbes’s men, “societate mutua” is necessary for the 
formation of self-understanding and the gratification of self-love. Nonetheless, 
Hobbes’s men are anything but sociable animals. As Hobbes insightfully 
captures, 
even if man were born in a condition to desire society, it does not follow 
that he was born suitably equipped to enter society. Wanting is one thing, 
ability another. For even those who arrogantly reject the equal conditions 
without which society is impossible, still want it.30 
The paradox of human nature is dual: human passions are both society-
regarding and self-centred, consequently, they give rise to both the presence of 
desire and the lack of ability of living together. Human beings depend on others 
as well as they may enter into conflict with them. 
2. The Paradox of Natural Right: The Moral Aspect 
The complexity of the Hobbesian self and the problem of society-regarding 
self-love reflect on the moral level as well. “What is not contrary to right reason, 
                                                        
29 About the declining role of glory in Hobbes’s account of the state of nature, see Gabriella Slomp, “From Genes 
to Species: The Unravelling of Hobbesian Glory”, History of Political Thought, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Winter 1998), pp552-
569. Cf. Yves Charles Zarka, La Decision Metaphysique de Hobbes: Conditions de la Politique, Paris: Vrin, 1987, 
pp306-309; Arash Abizadeh, “Glory and the Evolution of Hobbes’s Disagreement Theory of War: From Elements to 
Leviathan”, History of Political Thought, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2020), pp265-298. 
30 DC, i.2, annotation. 
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all agrees is done justly and of Right.”31 For Hobbes, self-preservation is both 
a natural passion and a natural right. We have mentioned that self-love, as a 
passion, requires more than one’s physical-biological existence. Now self-
preservation, as a right, is not limited to one’s own life and body, either. Since 
each man has a right of self-preservation, he has also the right to use the means 
for that purpose. In the state of nature where everyone is threatened by others 
but governed by his own private reason, “there is nothing he can make use of, 
that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies”.32 
The right of self-preservation therefore must be a right to all things, even to one 
another’s body, as long as one judges that actions against others are necessary 
for protecting oneself.33 This leads to an important consequence that in the 
state of nature “mine” becomes a society-regarding concept. On the one hand, 
it extends far beyond one’s own physical-biological existence, for each one has 
a property right to others’ bodies and possessions. Yet on the other hand, 
everybody loses the absolute dominion over himself, because his life is partly 
owned by others in return. The performance of natural right is not self-sustained 
but presupposes “societate mutua” among individuals. What is regarded as 
“belonging to oneself” is complicated and unexclusive.34 
                                                        
31 DC, i.7. 
32 L, xiv.4. 
33  Men’s self-loving passions become society-regarding because of pride, while men’s natural rights become 
society-regarding because of private judgement. It is noteworthy that private judgment is inherently connected with 
pride, for adherence to private judgment is an original symptom of pride. See Arash Abizadeh, “Hobbes on the 
Causes of War: A Disagreement Theory”, esp. pp308-312. 
34 Hobbes is therefore not a possessive individualist defining men as natural proprietors of their own persons. Comp. 
C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1962, p3. Hobbes rejects the possibility of grounding sociability on Grotius’s “oikeiosis” or Locke’s self-
ownership from the starting point. Johan Olsthoorn, “Hobbes on Justice, Property Rights and Self-Ownership”, 
History of Political Thought, Vol. 36. No. 3 (Autumn, 2015), pp471-498. 
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But as the moral expression of men’s society-regarding self-love, men’s 
socialised natural right by no means leads to community or collective self-
preservation (preservation of the species). Though all things (including others’ 
bodies) could be thought as everybody’s “mine”, they are not treated without 
discrimination. Hobbes points out that 
Of things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own 
life, and limbs; and in the next degree, in most men, those that concern 
conjugal affection; and after them, riches and means of living.35 
Properties are associated with oneself to varying degrees. Things regarded as 
one’s self in the most original or unreflective sense, namely one’s body and 
limbs, take priority. Granted your body is mine, I would never make as much an 
effort to preserve your life as to preserve my “own life and limbs”. From 
everybody’s standpoint, bodies and possessions of others become “his” just 
because they could function as means of one’s self-preservation, i.e. the 
preservation of his own life. That is to say, natural right is socialised for no other 
reason but self-love. The extensive right that everybody has to everything does 
not bring about extensive care or protection, rather, such a right is at bottom 
self-centred. 
The natural rights, unable to establish general concord, are also unable to 
establish any individual’s private security or dominion. The paradox of natural 
rights is also dual: on the one hand, they are both society-regarding and self-
                                                        
35 L, xxx.12. 
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centred; on the other hand, they are both unlimited and void. These rights are 
of no use since they oppose with each other when serving conflicting subjects, 
i.e. conflicting selves. According to Hobbes, 
the effect of this right is almost the same as if there were no right at all. 
For although one could say of anything, this is mine, still he could not enjoy 
it because of his neighbour, who claimed the same thing to be his by equal 
right and with equal force.36 
Everyone’s performance of his natural rights is obstructed by his fellows, 
because of (not merely in spite of) their ownership of their own body, life and 
possessions. Therefore, in juridical terms, the state of nature “is neither 
Community, nor Propriety, but Uncertainty.”37 This is considered by Hobbes as 
an additional reason for the state of war, 
to the natural tendency of men to exasperate each other, the source of 
which is the passions and especially an empty self-esteem, you now add 
the right of all men to all things, by which one man rightly attacks and the 
other rightly resist (an unfailing spring of suspicion and mutual 
resentment).38 
Men’s attacking one another is not merely an empirical fact, let alone a fact 
demonstrating men’s natural evil. 39  Such actions are assigned with moral 
significance, for they are done “rightly”, despite and because the “right” here is 
                                                        
36 DC, i.11. 
37 L, xxiv.5, original italics. 
38 DC, i.12. Original emphasis. 
39 Comp. Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, pp13-15 
47 
 
understood as a morally blameless liberty instead of a Hohfeldian right which 
is correlated with others’ duty.40 The state of war is characterised by conflicts of 
human nature as well as by rights of conflicts and conflicts of rights. 
The natural rights, setting aside their mutual opposition, are also inherently 
unfruitful. They cannot have full effects since individuals have no way to control 
the wills and actions of others. That is to say, men’s wills and actions are not 
“owned” by one another like their bodies and possessions. Despite the lack of 
a property system distinguishing “mine” from “thine”, not all sorts of exclusive 
ownership are removed from the state of nature. According to Hobbes, besides 
the ownership of goods and possessions, we are also able to talk about 
ownership of speeches and actions, 
A PERSON, is he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his 
own, or as representing the words or actions of another man, or of any 
other thing to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction. 
When they are considered as his own, then is he called a natural person; 
and when they are considered as representing the words and actions of 
                                                        
40 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal 
Essays, ed. by W. W. Cook, NH: Yale University Press, 1966, pp36ff; cf. David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, 
pp29-34. Also see Kant’s comments on this point, “their juridical state, i.e. the relation in and through which they 
are capable of rights … is a situation of war, in which everyone must be constantly armed against everyone.” 
Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, ed. by Wener S. Pluhar, tr. by Stephen R. Palmquist, 
Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009, pp106-107, footnote, italics added. For some scholars, Hobbes’s theory of natural right 
and natural law is naturalistic rather than normative, because self-preservation and seeking peace are at bottom 
prudentially rational conduct rather than moral conduct. E.g. Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes; 
Thomas Nagel, “Hobbes’s Concept of Obligation”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Jan., 1959), pp68-83; 
Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, pp89ff. However, other scholars hold that Hobbes’s 
natural jurisprudence is consistent with prudence but cannot be reduced to the latter entirely. In other words, 
Hobbes’s moral theory is prescriptive rather than descriptive. E.g. Michael Oakeshott, “The Moral Life in the 
Writings of Thomas Hobbes”, in his Hobbes on Civil Association, pp80-132; Richard Tuck, Hobbes, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989; Arash Abizadeh, Hobbes and the Two Faces of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2018. Here we generally agree with the second strain of interpretation. Yet it is noteworthy that, affirming the 
moral status of natural rights does not mean natural laws always oblige men to seek peace. Neither does it necessarily 
mean the normative force of natural laws is secured by the God. (See footnote 55.) As we will see later, since natural 
right is prior to natural laws, the natural rights as moral rights lead to conflicts rather than moral order. 
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another, then is he a feigned or artificial person.41 
Of persons artificial, some have their words and actions owned by those 
whom they represent. And then the person is the actor, and he that owneth 
his words and actions is the AUTHOR, in which case the actor acteth by 
authority. For that which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called 
an owner (and in Latin dominus, in Greek kurios), speaking of actions is 
called author. And as the right of possession, is called dominion; so the 
right of doing any action, is called AUTHORITY.42 
Like goods and possessions, speeches and actions can also be “owned” by 
human beings or other subjects. But owning an action should not be simply 
understood as to perform it. The owner of speeches and actions is not 
necessarily the performer, but the one who has the ultimate right of doing these 
things and is responsible for them. Actions performed by someone could be 
owned either by himself or by others. If they are owned by himself, then he is a 
natural person; if they are owned by others, then he acts as an artificial person, 
namely a representative or an actor, while the owner becomes the author who 
holds the original right, namely “authority”, of doing such actions.43 
In the state of nature, albeit there is no exclusive ownership of possessions, 
everybody is regarded by each other as a natural person owning his speeches 
and actions exclusively. It is only himself that is in charge of those speeches 
                                                        
41 L, xvi.1-2, original italics. 
42 L, xvi.4, original emphasis. 
43 Cf. Hannah Pitkin’s classic study, “Hobbes’s Concept of Representation--I”, American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 58, No. 2 (Jun., 1964), pp328-340. 
49 
 
and actions and is responsible for them. Therefore, Hobbesian natural right is 
based on the authority that each individual has as a natural person, since 
natural right is nothing but “the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as 
he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own 
life; and consequently, of doing anything, which in his own judgment, and 
reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto”.44 Like a coin with 
two sides, natural right is, on the one hand, the dominion over everything, which 
is unlimited but unexclusive; and on the other hand, the authority of the natural 
person over himself, which is exclusive but limited. 
This is important for our appreciation of the state of nature and the 
Hobbesian self from a normative perspective. Firstly, one’s words and deeds 
are by no means attributed to others, but thought to be owned by oneself. They 
are seen as reflections of his own judgment and “signs” of his own (good or evil) 
intention, while man’s internal mind is invisible. Only in this way can mutual 
diffidence and hostility make sense.45 Secondly, although each man has a right 
to all things, even to one another’s body, he is not enabled to control the 
speeches and actions of others. Such an asymmetry between “dominion” and 
“authority” is of great practical significance. Unlike the power of inanimate things, 
the power of a human being cannot be possessed, used and enjoyed directly 
by another man without cooperative actions from the subject himself. Having 
                                                        
44 L, xiv.1, emphasis added. 




no authority over others’ actions, a man in the state of nature thus is not enabled 
to make use of other’s power or means effectively for the sake of his self-
preservation. His natural rights fail to transform into power due to this inherent 
shortcoming. 
In sum, the paradox of natural rights corresponds with the paradox of 
natural passions, i.e. the society-regarding self-love, and intensifies the 
dilemma of the state of nature. The unexclusive ownership of body and 
possessions prevents the establishment of stable community or property, 
causing a conflict of rights between individuals, while the exclusive ownership 
of speeches and actions prevents men from controlling or being controlled by 
each other (and then forming some sort of order), and gives rise to diffidence 
and enmity. 
3. Natural Laws, “Societate Mutua” and the State of Nature 
The state of nature is a state of self-contradiction. On both empirical and 
normative levels, for Hobbes, human beings are on the one hand too society-
regarding to be self-sufficient like a Rousseauian savage, while on the other 
hand too self-centred to be considerate of or useful to each other. Nonetheless, 
the misery of the state of war motivates men to get rid of it. To form stable and 
lasting social relations, a new type of virtue and discipline is necessary. 46 
According to Hobbes, although there is no original concord between individuals 
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on good and evil, men to some degree achieve a second-ordered consensus 
through rational reflection, 
Men are therefore in a state of war so long as they judge good and evil by 
the different measures which their changing desires from time to time 
dictate. All men easily recognize that this state is evil when they are in it, 
and consequently the peace is good. Thus though they cannot agree on 
a present good, they do agree on a future good. And that is the work of 
reason; for things present are perceived by senses, thing future only by 
reason. Reason teaches that peace is good, it follows by the same reason 
that all necessary means to peace are good, and hence that modesty, 
fairness, good faith, kindness and mercy (which we have proved above 
are necessary for peace) are good manners or habits, i.e. virtues.47 
Conflicts are inevitable as long as men judge good and evil according to private 
measures and act according to private judgments. However, even men are 
influenced by different sensations and passions, in their second-ordered 
reflection, conflict itself is recognised by everybody as a common evil, whereas 
peace a common good. This recognition is achieved through role exchange so 
that everybody “thinks himself into the other person’s place”. 48  With the 
technique of role switching, men’s self-centredness is balanced. The 
conclusions drawn from such reflection, as dictates of right reason, are 
                                                        
47 DC, iii.31. 
48 DC, iii.36. Hont points out the similarity between Hobbes’s “role switching” and “sympathy” of eighteen-century 
Scottish philosophy. Istvan Hont, Politics in Commercial Society, p33. 
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therefore natural laws and true moral principle. Since the fundamental spirit of 
natural laws is “to seek peace when it can be had”49, Hobbesian virtues must 
not be defined as individual excellence or superiority over others, but “good 
manners” such as modesty, equity, kindness and mercy in “societate mutua”.50 
“The sum of virtue is to be sociable with them that will be sociable… And the 
same is the sum of the law of nature; for in being sociable, the law of nature 
taketh place by the way of peace and society”.51 Rather than satisfying pride 
and causing competition of honour, Hobbesian virtues serve to make men more 
sociable to each other. Correspondingly, besides demonstrating the legal 
means to set up order, the main content of the laws of nature is the discipline 
of sociability aiming to smooth the irregular edges and corners of human nature 
and fit the stones together into an edifice.52 Only if natural laws are observed, 
i.e. when men’s society-regarding self-love is overcome by disciplines of 
sociability, can stable mutual associations be possible. 
Yet natural laws are hardly effectual in the state of nature. Rather than 
categorical imperatives, Hobbesian natural laws are conditional. The general 
rule of reason provides human beings with two alternatives: “Every man, ought 
to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot 
                                                        
49 DC, iii.2. 
50 About the difference between classic virtues and Hobbesian virtues, see Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of 
Hobbes, chapters 3 & 7. 
51 EL, xvii.15. 
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in his From Humanism to Hobbes: Studies in Rhetoric and Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, 
pp162-189; “Hobbes and the Social Control of Unsociability”, in A. P. Martinich & Kinch Hoekstra eds., The Oxford 
Handbook of Hobbes, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp432-450. 
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obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war.”53 As the 
latter half of this sentence displays, the natural right of self-preservation takes 
priority over the fundamental natural law. Men are obliged to be sociable only 
when others are sociable as well. Thus in the state of mutual diffidence it might, 
paradoxically, be reasonable to suspend carrying out the natural law, i.e., the 
very dictates of reason seeking peace. “The laws of nature oblige in foro interno; 
that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place: but in foro externo; 
that is, to the putting them in act, not always.”54 Some interpreters argue that 
humans always have moral obligation to seek peace, yet this obligation is not 
behaviourally binding in the state of nature.55 This is not exactly the case. In 
fact, “the laws of nature oblige in foro interno” means merely that men should 
have a desire for peace, looking forward to the moment when peace becomes 
possible, but such a desire does not necessarily overwhelm the desire of 
preserving oneself in other reasonable ways (depending on one’s private 
judgment). In sum, even with the help of reason and “sympathy” (role-switching), 
men would not naturally display sociability to one another. 
For Hobbes, the state of nature is eventually a miserable condition. 
According to his famous description, 
                                                        
53 L, xiv.4, original italics. 
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In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof 
is uncertain, and consequently, no Culture of the Earth, no Navigation, nor 
use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea, no commodious 
Building, no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require 
much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth, no account of Time; 
no Arts, no Letters, no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, 
and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, 
brutish, and short.56 
Life in the state of nature is firstly depicted as a life of “solitude”, lacking “society”. 
Here “society” should be understood in a narrow sense as “large and lasting 
society”. As we have seen before, not all social relations are excluded from the 
state of nature. Yet the existence of “societate mutua” does not prevent the war 
of all against all, for “societate mutua” have neither empirical nor normative 
binding force on the self-loving individuals. Justice and injustice “are qualities 
that relate to men in society, not in solitude”.57 The state of solitude is therefore 
a state of anomie, a vacuum of order in which life is determined by violence and 
everyone strives to survive in face of the perpetual threat of death. 
Meanwhile, in socio-economic terms, life in the state of nature is also 
“poore, nasty and brutish”, lacking “industry” and “commodities”. In the 
continual war, “everything is his that getteth it, and keepeth it by force”.58 
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Rationalised labour is useless. Culture and social communication are 
undeveloped. For Hobbes, industry and commodious life come along with 
society (in the narrow sense), thus socio-economic activities and civilised way 
of life are also unavailable without security and order. The state of nature is 
both a non-political and a non-civilised condition where basic security, stable 
social relations and civilisation are all absent. 
    Staying in the state of nature is contrary to human nature. According to 
Hobbes, “The passions that incline man to peace, are fear of death; desire of 
such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry 
to obtain them.”59 Putting it in a simpler way, “the final cause, end, or design of 
men, who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others, in the introduction of 
that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in commonwealths, 
is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life 
thereby.”60 For the purpose of self-preservation and civilised commodious life, 
regular “societas” must be established. The state of nature, i.e. the dilemma 
resulting from the society-regarding self-love, must be overcome. 
II. Civil Society: Common Power and Artificial Person 
1. Society and “Civil Society” 
    As is well known, Hobbes’s solution is the introduction of political power, or 
in other words, the erection of “that great LEVIATHAN called a 
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COMMONWEALTH, or STATE (in Latin CIVITAS)”.61 At first glance, the word 
“civitas” might remind us of the ancient city (polis) and suggest an analogy 
between the “state” and the Aristotelean political community. But Hobbes’s 
usage of this word is anything but classical. For him, the 
state/civitas/commonwealth should at bottom be defined as some kind of 
“society”.62 According to Hobbes, society (societas) “is a voluntary arrangement, 
what is sought in every society is an Object of will, i.e. something which seems 
to each one of the members to be Good for himself.”63 Different from the natural 
concord of animals, society is founded upon voluntary choices of individuals for 
their own sake, and can be seen as a product of men’s unique society-regarding 
self-love. The state, which is the product of mutual covenants between 
individuals who are equal and free in the state of nature for the purpose of 
security, is therefore undoubtedly a “society”.64 Nonetheless, the understanding 
of the state as a society brings about a theoretical problem. Since there has 
already been “association with each other” (societate mutua) in the state of 
nature and that this fails to rescue individuals from the state of war, how can 
the state, a society (societas) as well, overcome the troublesome society-
regarding self-love and achieve peace? 
    The answer of this problem is both simple and complex, that the state is 
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not only a society, but also a “civil” society (societas civilis). “Societate mutua” 
is transitory and unstable, whereas civil societies are large and lasting societies 
(magnarum & diuturnarum societatum) with effective disciplines restraining 
each member. That is to say, it is the “civil” or political feature of the state that 
differentiates it from “society” in the general sense, and it is only by capturing 
such a feature that we can explain how the state works. 
Hobbes does not disappoint us, for his endeavour to clarify what civil 
society contains more than mere society/association runs through all his main 
works in political philosophy. As is emphasised in De Cive, “civil Societies are 
not mere gatherings (congressus); they are Alliances (Foedera), which 
essentially require good faith and agreement for their making.” 65  For the 
formation of a civil society, not only “voluntary arrangement” but formal 
agreement is requested to establish a stable legal relationship between 
individuals. Moreover, a civil society is “also a civil person (persona civilis)” or 
a “union” holding “common power”.66 Through formal agreement (covenant with 
each of the rest), everybody “transfers” his right of governing himself to one 
man or one assembly, and “submits” his will to the will of that man or that 
assembly, namely the sovereign of the state. In other words, all members of the 
civil society relinquish their own private judgments and their right of resisting 
the sovereign who acts only according to his own will. As long as there is only 
one will taken as the will of all, the civil society becomes “one person” that is 
                                                        
65 DC, i.2, annotation. 
66 DC, v.9. 
58 
 
enabled to combine everybody’s strength and resources for common peace or 
benefits.67 And the common power, according to Hobbes, is “the greatest of the 
human powers”.68 
In all the three main works in political philosophy, Hobbes suggests that 
the unique characteristics of civil society are its common power and its legal 
status as a “civil person”. By common power, the state can effectively keep all 
subjects in awe, oppress the aggressive proud men, and secure all sorts of 
“societas mutua” among individuals (including private agreements) when all 
other associations are not able to do. Meanwhile, by legal status as a civil 
person/union, the state is distinguished from all other kinds of “societas” in 
formal and normative respects. Furthermore, it is only through the authority as 
a civil person (de jure) that the state can obtain its common power (de facto), 
because power cannot be “common” unless it is mobilised by and for the union. 
However, at first glance, civil society still looks quite similar to two other 
types of “societas”, namely personal dominion and non-state corporation. Let 
us begin from comparing civil society with personal dominion, which is the 
associations between masters and servants or between parents and children. 
If the content of the state-making covenant is the subjects’ transfer of right to 
the sovereign, then civil society shows no significant theoretical difference from 
personal dominion in the state of nature, for the former is eventually based on 
the natural right or natural power of the rulers no less than the latter is. 
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According to Hobbes, “the argument that transfer of right consists solely in non-
resistance is that the recipient already had a right to all things before the transfer 
of the right; hence the transfer could not give him a new right.”69 The subjects’ 
transfer of right to the sovereign does not add anything new to the natural right 
already held by the sovereign, but only takes away the obstacles to the 
performance of his natural right. Their relinquishment of private judgments also 
leads merely to negative submission to the sovereign’s own judgment, but fails 
to create a true “union” of will acknowledged by everyone. As Hobbes explained, 
the submission of will means “not to withhold the use of his (the sovereign’s) 
wealth and strength against any other men than himself (the subject)”.70 In other 
words, though the sovereign dominates the whole society of subjects without 
resistance and even freely disposes their material possessions (like a master), 
he remains in the state of nature as a natural man acting at his own will, and 
the power he relies on is his natural power rather than the “common power” 
contributed by his subjects. That turns out to be a fatal problem for Hobbes’s 
whole theory, for personal dominion, the non-civil association, is far from 
competent to overcome the state of war. Natural power is too unstable, and the 
sovereign’s will, even when its content is the preservation of the whole society, 
is entirely foreign to the subjects.71 
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What is more, granted that civil society is a “union”, Hobbes also needs to 
shed light on the qualitative distinction between civil society and non-state 
corporations. Hobbes has recognized “although every commonwealth is a civil 
person, not every civil person (by converse) is a commonwealth”.72 Non-state 
systems or corporations, united in one person in the pursuit of some common 
benefits of some particular individuals (e.g. companies of merchants), are 
unions and civil persons as well, thus are analogous to the state. As Otto von 
Gierke keenly points out, the contractual theory of state might “tend towards the 
inclusion of the theory of the State in the general theory of Society, which 
permitted associations other than the State to appeal to a similar origin and to 
claim a similar justification.” 73  In other words, “societas civilis” might be 
confused with other sorts of mutual association, such as non-state corporations. 
An easy answer to this problem is that the subjects have subjected themselves 
“simply and in all things” in civil society, whereas “only in certain matters” in 
non-state corporations, thus the latter is subordinate to the former. 74  
Nevertheless, since “the existence associations depends essentially on the 
same natural power of association which also created the State”, the state 
seems no more than an enhanced and extended version of a trading group.75 
Hobbes attempted to overcome these difficulties in all of his main works of 
                                                        
72 DC, v.10; also see EL, xix.9. 
73 Otto von Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society: 1500-1800, tr. by Ernest Barker, London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1938, p62. 
74 DC, v.10. 
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political philosophy, and to a large extent his basic insights did not change. For 
instance, Hobbes always distinguishes “natural commonwealth” (personal 
dominion) from the “artificial commonwealth” (commonwealth by institution), 
highlighting the artificiality of the latter.76 It is also stressed that no non-state 
corporations could be established but “with the permission of their 
commonwealth”. 77  Yet the most innovative solution is found in Leviathan. 
Hobbes insists that civil society holds “a common power to keep them (the 
subjects) in awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit”. 78  
Meanwhile, Hobbes accomplishes a clearer explanation of the legal-normative 
character of the civil society with the help of the theory of authorisation and 
representation. In this new discussion of personhood, Hobbes focuses no 
longer on the entities (individuals and corporations) represented but the agents 
acting as representatives. Both the sovereign and the subjects experience 
some kind of split of personhood in civil society, as both are enabled to act as 
“artificial persons”.79 Through the actions of artificial persons, the common 
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power is established and mobilised. For Hobbes, therefore, it is by the 
introduction of common power and artificial person that “civil society” 
outperforms all other types of associations, and overcomes the conflicts 
aroused by society-regarding self-love. 
2. Common Power and the Taming of Pride 
Let us start from the common power, the function of which is easier to 
understand. As we have mentioned in section I, the state of war results from 
men’s perpetual competition for superiority, and men’s pursuit of superiority 
derives from their pride and their diffidence of the potential threats caused by 
the proud men (especially when whether a man is proud or not is unknown). 
When there is no natural common measures of good and evil, just and unjust, 
the proud men will consider their own reason as right reason, their self-
evaluation as appropriate evaluation, and be aggressive to anyone who 
displays any signs of disagreement or contempt. When there is no stable and 
obvious inequality of power, the proud men will not be prevented from harming 
others, and everyone cannot help but attacking others since they are not 
protected from being attacked. Therefore, once there are common measures 
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and a lasting greatest power securing the order, the state of war will cease. 
These two conditions are perfectly fulfilled by the common power. As “the 
greatest of the human powers”, the common power can sufficiently defend the 
group from foreign invasions as well as prevent injuries of one another by the 
deterrence of punishment. In the face of expectable punishment instead of 
uncertain outcome of mutual fight, the desire of self-preservation and fear of 
death will teach men to oppress their pride, give up aggressive behaviours. 
Diffidence between each other is in this way eliminated. That is why Hobbes 
calls the Leviathan “King of the Proud”.80 Additionally, the common power also 
brings about common measure of values. On the one hand, the existence of 
the common power by itself sets up a common measure for the comparison of 
power, since the inequality of power is so obvious that no one can evaluate 
himself as more powerful than the state. On the other hand, for Hobbes, 
considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves; 
what respect they look for from others; and how little they value other men; 
from whence continually arise amongst them, emulation, quarrels, 
factions, and at last war, to the destroying of one another, and diminution 
of their strength against a common enemy; it is necessary that there be 
laws of honour, and a public rate of the worth of such men as have 
deserved or are able to deserve well of the commonwealth; and that there 
be force in the hands of some or other, to put those laws in execution.81 
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Pride is not entirely excluded from civil society, for it is deeply rooted in human 
nature. The civil society does not change human nature. As Hobbes admits, 
“ambition and longing for honour cannot be removed from men’s minds, and 
sovereigns have no duty to attempt to do so.”82 But in civil society, subjects are 
only permitted to evaluate themselves according to the common measure (the 
laws of honour) endorsed by the sovereignty, and have no right of questioning 
the worth the state assigns to them. As long as the state ensures “that the road 
to honours does not lie through criticism of the current regime nor through 
factions and popular favour, but through the opposite, … there would be more 
ambition to obey than to oppose.”83 Hobbes also points out the importance of 
civil education and discipline. Subjects must be taught correct moral and 
political principles, as well as public code of honour and manners of 
conversation. Yet Hobbes is not entirely optimistic about the effectiveness of 
education, for not all humans, but only the naturally modest men, are 
educable.84 The vain-glorious ones may be too stubborn to give up their own 
measures of evaluation. As there is no natural consensus about the content of 
the common measure, it must be put in execution by common power, in other 
words, “by a consistent employment of rewards and punishments”. At bottom, 
the peace in civil society is guaranteed by the common power. 
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Nevertheless, we should not conclude that the state of war is terminated 
simply because the society represses the self, i.e. the troublesome society-
regarding self-love is oppressed by the overwhelming power of the civil society. 
The “common” power, different from any natural power of natural man, is itself 
a normative power, and the civil society overcomes the difficulty of human 
nature in a much subtler way. To appreciate Hobbes’s project adequately, we 
now move to the other element of civil society, the artificial person. 
3. Artificial Person and the Split of the Self 
    The concept of “artificial person” is inseparable with “representation” and 
“authorisation”. In Leviathan, Hobbes for the first time explains the 
establishment of civil society in terms of representation and authorisation, 
The only way to erect such a common power … is … to appoint one man, 
or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own, and 
acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their 
person, shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the 
common peace and safety … This is more than consent, or concord; it is 
a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of 
every man with every man, in such manner, as if everyman should say to 
every man, I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this 
man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy 
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right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner.85 
In the state-making covenant, each individual not only “transfers” his original 
natural right to the sovereign, but also “authorises” the sovereign to bear his 
person and act in his name.86 That indeed brings a new sort of right to the 
sovereign. As we have discussed in section I, although in the state of nature 
everybody has a right of possession (dominion) to all things, even to each 
other’s body, his right of action (authority) is strictly limited to his natural person. 
No one has the right of doing any act in the name of others. But in civil society, 
the sovereign becomes an artificial person who acts not for himself (as a private 
man) but in the name of all his subjects. The right he performs is no longer a 
natural right but artificial authority, therefore in principle the power he employs 
is no longer a natural power but common power. In this way, civil society is 
distinct from personal dominion. 
The authorisation has even greater influence on the subjects. The state-
making covenant does endow the sovereign with new rights of action, but it 
does not mean that all actions in civil society are monopolised by the sovereign 
himself. The sovereign is not the only actor on the stage of politics. Hobbes 
informs us that “common power” is not only the sovereign’s own power for the 
common use, nor limited to the exploitation of material resources in the whole 
society. For the sake of peace and common defence, the sovereign can and 
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ought to make use of “the strength and means of them (the subjects) all”.87 
Therefore, the subjects, instead of being passive and let the sovereign do what 
he wants, are required to cooperate or assist him positively by actions. Non-
resistance does not exhaust the full range of obedience. For instance, a subject 
“obligeth himself, to assist him that hath the sovereignty, in the punishing of 
another”.88 But in doing these cooperative or supportive actions, the subjects 
should act according to the sovereign’s will, which might be different from or 
even opposite to their own original will. Here we meet the problem of the 
divergence of wills. Albeit the subjects give up their right of acting at their private 
will, the absence of a common will shared by the whole society still hinders the 
constitution of the true “union” and the formation of common power. This 
difficulty, nonetheless, is solved by introducing the legal relationship of 
representation and authorisation. Through the state-making covenant, every 
subject authorises all the commands of the sovereign, acknowledging himself 
as the owner of the sovereign’s speeches and actions. That is to say, the 
sovereign’s reason, judgment, will and command are no longer alienated from 
or foreign to the subjects, but belonging to them, considered as their own will 
and judgment. “When he wills, they are willing through him.”89 Therefore to act 
in consistency with the sovereign’s commands, is de jure to act in consistency 
with themselves, though the subjects’ actions seem to be no more than some 
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sort of “hypocrisy” de facto (for even a Muslim in private conscience has to pray 
publicly to Jesus if his sovereign gives that command).90 Since everybody takes 
the sovereign’s will as their own, the civil society becomes “a real unity of them 
all, in one and the same person”. Correspondingly, the sovereign is enabled to 
make use of the “common power”, which is contributed by the subjects through 
their supportive actions. 
Notably, at the same time of the formation of that unity, the self of each 
subject is split into two parts, one presented immediately in his actions 
according to his original private will, while the other re-presented in the 
sovereign’s actions and (more commonly) in his own actions commanded by 
the sovereign’s will. The sovereign, as an artificial person/representative/actor, 
is involved in the constitution of each subject’s selfhood. Hobbes concedes that  
for seeing there is no commonwealth in the world, wherein there be rules 
enough set down, for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men; 
as being a thing impossible: it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of 
actions by the laws prætermitted, men have the liberty, of doing what their 
own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves.91 
Therefore, the first part of the self is not entirely substituted by the second even 
in civil society. As long as there is “silence of laws”, the first part remains as it 
used to be in the state of nature. But the second part demonstrates that civil 
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society is able to manage the self-centred individuals in a unique way 
unavailable in other forms of mutual association. Due to the involvement of the 
sovereign’s wills and commands in each individual’s self, their judgments of 
self-preservation and glory are transformed (in fact, replaced by the judgments 
of the sovereign). With no need of substantial education or change of human 
nature, the conflict-making self-love and self-centred natural rights are 
harnessed through this legal process. The introduction of artificial person 
therefore not only assigns a proper title to the sovereign to make use of the 
common power, but no less importantly leads to a change of the subjects’ life 
in civil society. 
    The story has not ended yet, however. Theoretically speaking, when acting 
in accordance with the sovereign’s commands, even the subjects themselves 
to some extent become artificial persons. But to make this point clear, we need 
to take a necessary detour, and first concentrate our attention on Hobbes’s own 
analysis of non-state corporations within civil society. 
    According to Hobbes, systems are “any numbers of men joined in one 
interest, or one business”. Among all systems, some are regular, in which “one 
man or assembly of men, is constituted representative of the whole number”.92 
Both civil society and non-state corporations are “regular systems”. Civil society 
is an absolute and independent system, whose representative (the sovereign) 
has unlimited power, whereas all non-state corporations are “dependent, that is 
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to say, subordinate to some sovereign power, to which every one, as also their 
representative, is subject.” 93  The power of representatives of non-state 
corporations is limited, for it is valid only over certain part of subjects concerning 
certain business. More importantly, in terms of authorisation, civil society and 
non-state corporations are constituted through totally different ways. While the 
representative of civil society, the sovereign, is authorised by all the subjects 
he represents, the representatives of non-state corporations are not authorised 
by the group members they represents, but by the sovereign: 
Of systems subordinate, some are political, and some private. Political, 
otherwise called bodies politic, and persons in law) are those which are 
made by authority from the sovereign power of the commonwealth.94 
Private bodies regular, and lawful, are those that are constituted without 
letters, or other written authority, saving the laws common to all other 
subjects. 
Private bodies regular, but unlawful, are those that unite themselves into 
one person representative, without any public authority at all …95 
According to Hobbes’s definitions, all lawful systems, political or private, must 
be endorsed by public authority from the sovereign. Therefore, albeit civil 
society and non-state corporations have the same structure of representation, 
they are grounded on different structures of authorisation. In non-state 
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corporations, regardless of who or what is represented, the author is always the 
sovereign. 
    Here are two points deserving our notice. Firstly, the relationship between 
the representative and the represented, and that between the actor and the 
author, are no longer identical. More precisely, the representee is not always 
the author. Secondly, the sovereign, who himself is a representative, becomes 
an author in civil society.96 
    The first point may seem odd according to our ordinary impression of 
Hobbes’s theory. But in fact, the asymmetry between representation and 
authorisation is by no means a weird phenomenon. For example, in his analysis 
of the representation of inanimate things, Hobbes says, 
Inanimate things, as a church, an hospital, a bridge, may be personated 
by a rector, master, or overseer. But things inanimate, cannot be authors, 
nor therefore give authority to their actors; yet the actors may have 
authority to procure their maintenance, given them by those that are 
owners, or governors of those things. And therefore, such things cannot 
be personated, before there be some state of civil government.97 
In this model, it is the inanimate thing that is represented, but it is the owner or 
governor that is the author. The “rector, master, or overseer” acts as a 
representative in correlation to that thing, while as an actor in correlation to its 
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“owner or governor”.98 The same model can be applied to “children, fools, and 
madmen” as well, 
Likewise, children, fools, and madmen that have no use of reason, may 
be personated by guardians, or curators; but can be no authors, during 
that time, of any action done by them, longer than, when they shall recover 
the use of reason, they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet during the 
folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give authority to the 
guardian. But this again has no place but in a state civil, because before 
such estate, there is no dominion of persons.99 
In sum, for Hobbes, things or men without the capacity of being authors can be 
represented as well, but the representative-actor is authorized only by the one 
who has the right of governing them. 
    This model is also applicable to the non-state corporations in civil society. 
The subjects have already authorised and given up their right of governing 
themselves to the sovereign. That is to say, in spite of their natural faculty (i.e. 
rational agency) for authorising representatives and constituting unities, they 
lack the legal right to freely do so once the civil society is established, unless 
by a converse authorisation from their governor, the sovereign. And if they 
retain such a right, all representatives of all associations are potentially 
sovereign. There would be sovereigns under the sovereign, commonwealths 
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within the commonwealth, and confusion and war.100 As Hobbes underlines, 
the sovereign, in every commonwealth, is the absolute representative of 
all the subjects; and therefore no other can be representative of any part 
of them, but so far forth, as he shall give leave.101 
Albeit subordinate systems do not represent the sovereign, they cannot exist 
unless the sovereign authorises them. 
In fact, the sovereign in civil society works more often as an author than 
not. Firstly, all civil laws are authorised by the sovereign. “There is, requisite, 
not only a declaration of the law, but also sufficient signs of the author and 
authority. The author, or legislator, is supposed in every commonwealth to be 
evident, because he is sovereign.”102 Secondly, the sovereign also authorises 
all public ministers. “A PUBLIC MINISTER, is he, that by the sovereign, … is 
employed in any affairs, with authority to represent in that employment, of the 
commonwealth.” 103  More broadly, all lawful actions of the subjects are 
authorised by the sovereign as well, and such lawfulness derives from nothing 
but the sovereign’s authority. 
According to our common sense, to “authorise” somebody or something is 
not necessarily to “author” something. For instance, an officer may issue a 
driving license to a man, authorising his action to drive a car, yet the officer is 
not the author or owner of his driving. However, Hobbes does not take this 
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difference into consideration. As Hannah Pitkin observes, “the Hobbesian 
account begins with the ascription of action itself; this seems to be what he 
means by an action being a person’s ‘own’ or not his ‘own’. But this notion is 
immediately interpreted in terms of authorization, which is to say that the 
ascription of actions is identified with three other ideas: the ascription of the 
normative consequences of action, the giving (and receiving) of the right to act 
(authority to act), and having authority in general, particularly having authority 
over someone else.”104 For Hobbes, being an author equals to owning some 
actions, equals to letting others do those actions by his authority, and equals to 
being responsible for those actions.105 In the previous case, since the subjects 
have already given up their rights of governing themselves (including driving a 
car) to the sovereign, then it is the officer (who represents the sovereign) that 
holds the original authority and extends it to the driver, and it is the officer that 
is responsible for the driver’s lawful driving. Therefore, when the driver drives 
on the left side of road in the UK, his driving is owned by the officer (and 
ultimately the state). If a Chinese used to driving on the right side questions his 
manners of driving, he could attribute the responsibility to the UK government. 
But if he drives on the right side in the UK or in some no man’s land (where 
there is no laws) and causes a traffic accident, he himself is responsible for it, 
because his driving was not authorised by anyone but owned by himself. In this 
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sense, the authoriser is always the owner and author. 
    The text of Leviathan suggests that for Hobbes all actions done by the 
sovereign’s command are done by his authority, and therefore the sovereign is 
the owner and author.106 Now the two points we have demonstrated above, 
namely the asymmetry between representation and authorization, and the 
sovereign’s being an author, could be applied to our analysis of each subject’s 
actions. When acting according to the law and the sovereign’s other commands, 
regardless of being ministers or not (that is to say, regardless of representing 
the sovereign or not), the subject should not be regarded as an entirely natural 
person. Even while he is personating himself or a non-state corporation (from 
the viewpoint of civil laws), his actions are authorised and owned by the 
sovereign (from the viewpoint of politics). The subject becomes an actor of the 
sovereign. Considering his relation with the sovereign, he is an artificial person. 
We have argued that once an individual enters civil society, his self splits 
into two parts. Now, the split of self can be understood in terms of the split of 
personhood. In the realm of “liberty of subject” where laws are silent, everyone 
acts according to the original reason or appetites of himself as a natural person, 
like they used to do in the state of nature. But when it comes to actions in 
accordance with laws and the sovereign’s commands, the subject acts as an 
artificial person, because his actions are derived from the sovereign’s will and 
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therefore authorised/owned by the sovereign. 107  Therefore, the split of 
personhood corresponds with the distinction between natural liberty and civil 
obedience, as well as the difference between the state of nature and civil 
society (also named as “artificial commonwealth”). The artificiality of the person 
of the individuals is correlated to the artificiality of the commonwealth. Peace is 
secured in this way, besides by the deterrence of common power over the 
society-regarding self-love. Making use of the category of corporation theory, 
Hobbes provides a way of forming unity without changing human nature. While 
the diversity and depth of natural human passions remain as they are, men 
establish an artificial order in the artificial civil society through the legal 
relationship of artificial persons. In a word, stable associations are achieved in 
the world of artifice. 
III. “Societate Mutua” in Civil Society 
    The civil society, as a political society established on the basis of common 
power and artificial person, rescues human beings from the miserable state of 
war. However, in spite of its unique role in human life, civil society by no means 
excludes other types of “societate mutua” among men. In Hobbes’s opinion, 
“the use of laws, which are but rules authorized, is not to bind the people from 
all voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a motion, as not to 
hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashness, or indiscretion”.108 
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Civil (political) relations do not constitute the whole range of men’s ordinary life. 
For Hobbes, along with the erection of political power, the formation of various 
stable social relations (such as commercial and trade relations) and the 
establishment of civilised way of life are accomplished at the same time.109 That 
can be seen especially in men’s socio-economic activities in civil society. 
    We have discussed that economic activities are absent in the state of 
nature, because there is neither distinction of “mine” and “thine” while everyone 
has a right to everything, nor possibility of mutual trust in the state of war. 
Industry and trade are possible only when property and covenant are secured. 
And as the famous Hobbesian maxim goes, “property and commonwealths 
came into being together”.110 In civil society, rules of exclusive private property 
and of “all kinds of contract between subjects, as buying, selling, exchanging, 
borrowing, lending, letting, and taking to hire” are prescribed by the 
sovereign,111 and safeguarded by the common power. Nevertheless, as is often 
overlooked by Hobbes’s readers, what men achieve in civil society is not limited 
to the basic peace of living together (which is opposite to “solitude”). In 
Hobbes’s eyes, 
Regarding this life only, the goods citizens may enjoy can be put into four 
categories: 1) defence from external enemies; 2) preservation of internal 
peace; 3) acquisition of wealth, so far as this is consistent with public 
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security; 4) full enjoyment of innocent liberty. Sovereigns can do no more 
for the citizens’ happiness than to enable them to enjoy the possessions 
their industry has won them, safe from foreign and civil war.112 
The dual aim leading men out of the state of nature, namely safety and 
contended life, must be fulfilled in the civil society. Therefore, besides a bare 
preservation against internal and external dangers, there should also be 
“contentment of life” or “commodious living” based on lawful wealth and liberty 
(which are opposite to poverty, nastiness and brutality). 113 Specifically, for 
Hobbes, the wealth and commodities of both the subjects and the state are 
acquired mainly by industry. 
To understand men’s social life in civil society, here we should pay attention 
to the significance of industry in Hobbes’s theory. Industry is tightly tied with 
men’s sociability, for it plays an indispensable role in the cultivation of human 
nature (especially of reason) as well as in the formation of social disciplines. 
According to Hobbes, “those other Faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, 
and which seem proper to man only, are acquired and encreased by study and 
industry; and of most men learned by instruction and discipline”.114 Thanks to 
industry, men develop their faculties necessary for social communication and 
become more disciplined animals. In fact, men could not be men in the full 
sense unless by industry, neither could regular social interactions be imaginable. 
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Moreover, in civil society, human beings are directly motivated to associate 
with each other for the sake of industry. They transfer their property “mutually 
one to another, by exchange and mutual contract”, 115 and even unite into 
regular subordinate corporations for common benefits. 116 As a consequence of 
industry along with the education from the sovereign that peace is good and 
complaisance is honorable, men in civil society develop much “thicker” and 
“deeper” social relations than political relations constituted merely by the state-
making covenant. 
Meanwhile, industry, specifically labour and trade, is considered as the 
most effective means of accumulating material wealth. According to Hobbes, 
For the matter of this nutriment, consisting in animals, vegetals, and 
minerals, God hath freely laid them before us, in or near to the face of the 
earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour, and industry of 
receiving them. Insomuch as plenty dependeth, next to God's favour, 
merely on the labour and industry of men. 
This matter, commonly called commodities, is partly native, and partly 
foreign: native, that which is to be had within the territory of the 
commonwealth; foreign, that which is imported from without. And because 
there is no territory under the dominion of one commonwealth, except it 
be of very vast extent, that produceth all things needful for the 
maintenance, and motion of the whole body; and few that produce not 
                                                        
115 L, xxiv.10. 
116 L, xxii.18. 
80 
 
something more than necessary; the superfluous commodities to be had 
within, become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, by 
importation of that which may be had abroad, either by exchange, or by 
just war, or by labour. 117 
By industry, natural resources are exploited and circulated, transforming into 
commodities which gratify men’s need for “enjoyment of life”. Although military 
activity can be seen as another way to enrichment, they “sometimes increases 
the citizens’ wealth but more often erodes it”. In Hobbes’s eyes, “as a means of 
gain, military activity is like gambling”.118 Hobbesian way of life in civil society, 
therefore, is far from simple, primitive or warlike, but a civilised lifestyle on the 
ground of rationalised labour and trade. Even on international level, the states 
may trade with each other rather than stay in a strict state of war of all against 
all.119 
What is more, industry is of great significance not only for the subjects’ 
private enjoyment of life or for the civilisation of men, because labour and trade 
have become constitutive elements of the power of the state, 
there have been commonwealths that, having no more territory than hath 
served them for habitation, have nevertheless, not only maintained, but 
also encreased their power, partly by the labour of trading from one place 
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to another, and partly by selling the manufactures whereof the materials 
were brought in from other places.120 
State requires power in face of international competition, diffidence and desire 
of glory. As an artificial “man”, the state could not survive in the material world 
without adequate “nutrition”, which is material riches obtained by industry. In 
this sense, Hobbes even points out the conformity between the power of the 
state and the power of the subjects. “The good of the sovereign and people 
cannot be separated. It is a weak sovereign that has weak subjects,” thus 
unnecessary laws as “traps for money” should be avoided, and the subjects 
should be left with enough liberty of initiative.121 In this way, socio-economic 
activities not only support the civil society by building more peaceful relations 
among men and making their life civilised, but also contribute to its strength and 
prosperity directly. 
However, that is not to say Hobbes is an advocate of “possessive 
individualism” or a theorist of political economy.122 Despite his attention to the 
role of social interactions, especially of economic activities, his standpoint is at 
bottom political. Whatever these social interactions may add to the civil society, 
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they could do nothing but lead to war of all against all without “civil” society—
the unity with common power based on artificial persons. What Hobbes is 
primarily concerned about is always peace and order, for what worries him 
fundamentally is the potential for the collapse into the state of nature. Therefore, 
Hobbes would not grant a Lockean principle of property. Property is nothing but 
“what he can keep for himself by means of the laws and the power of the whole 
commonwealth, i.e. by means of the one on whom its sovereign power has 
been conferred”,123 thus it can exclude other subjects but not the sovereign. 
Not to mention that immoderate private wealth itself is a potential threat to the 
state, and the sovereign has even a “duty” (not just a right) to control it.124 
Hobbes does not permit unregulated foreign trade, either, for some subjects 
may “furnish the enemy with means to hurt the commonwealth” for the sake of 
private gain.125 Hobbes is also an opponent of luxury. Pursuit of consumer 
goods far exceeding men’s ordinary need of life is an expression of pride and 
could arouse conflicts.126 For Hobbes, some things “pleasing men’s appetites” 
could also be “unprofitable” or even “noxious”, and must not be imported.127 In 
essence, the power of Hobbesian states is not social-economic power, but 
political-legal power. What this power relies on, is not “societate mutua” 
between men and its byproduct (material wealth), but the artificial relations 
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between the sovereign and the subjects as well as between the subjects 
themselves constituted by the state-making covenant. These relations, though 
they seem quite “thin”, work as the ultimate resolution of the dilemma of society-
regarding self-love. 
Conclusion 
Hobbes brings about a significant theoretical development to early modern 
debates of natural law and sociability, though he comes from a direction 
opposite to the orthodoxy of the time and was criticized by most of his 
contemporaries. The challenge he presents to the theory of natural sociability 
is fatal, because “societate mutua”, which used to be regarded as an expression 
of men’s natural sociability and as the foundation of large society, is the problem 
itself rather than the solution. Hobbes’s insight is that the relationship between 
self-love and the desire for society is neither antagonistic nor harmonious, but 
dialectic. With the mechanism of pride (and the diffidence this causes), the 
society-regarding self-love naturally leads to universal conflicts between 
individuals. Therefore, a common life must be artificial; even though such 
artificiality is neither foreign nor alien to men. The common life need to be 
accepted by the subjects themselves. For Hobbes, this is achieved by civil 
society (societas civilis), in which society-regarding self-love is handled both by 
the deterrence of common power and by the transformation of the self, due to 
the introduction of the artificial person. When and only when men have entered 
civil society, civilised life and richer social relations (especially economic 
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activities) become available, and men are provided with enjoyment far beyond 
bare self-preservation. 
Hobbes’s theory is far from pleasant, but no theories of sociability could 
steer clear of the problem he poses, nor pretend to ignore it from the time 
Hobbes articulated it. To provide a more satisfactory explanation of human 
nature and society, nearly all the most important political thinkers of the 
seventeenth century tried in their own way to offer a response to Hobbes. 
Furthermore, when we come to the eighteenth century, Hobbes’s insights are 
inherited and developed by another notorious thinker, Bernard Mandeville.
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Chapter 2  The Mandevillean Maxim and the Transformation of Civil 
Society 
In the history of social and political thought, Mandeville is famous as well as 
notorious for his maxim “private vices, public benefits”.1 He was sometimes 
seen as a “populariser of Hobbes”.2 In the eyes of his contemporaries (and 
many modern scholars), Mandeville accepts the Hobbesian selfish theory and 
the Augustinian understanding of morality, therefore denies the real existence 
and the practical value of the sociable virtues such as benevolence and public-
spiritedness. For Mandeville, the foundation of society is nothing but man’s self-
love. His maxim is almost an exculpation or exhortation of evil, and should be 
regarded as a moral scandal for the moderns. Some contemporaries, shocked 
and enraged by him, even played a malicious joke on his name: “Man-Devil”.3 
Nevertheless, sometimes Mandeville is also admired as a precursor of modern 
social and economic sciences, for his maxim reveals the rationale underlying 
modern civil society. Pointing out the gap between individual motive and social 
consequence as well as the tension between moral value and social-economic 
                                                        
1 About the strains of literature of maxim, see E. J. Hundert, “Bernard Mandeville and the Enlightenment’s Maxims 
of Modernity”, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 56, No. 4 (1995), pp577-593. 
2 James Dean Young, “Mandeville: A Populariser of Hobbes”, Modern Language Notes, Vol. 74, No.1 (Jan., 1959), 
pp10-13. 
3 J. M. Stafford ed., Private Vices, Public Benefits? The Contemporary Reception of Bernard Mandeville, Solihull: 
Ismeron, 1997. Modern scholarship on Mandeville’s Hobbism and Augustinianism, see Thomas Horne, The Social 
Thought of Bernard Mandeville: Virtue and Commerce in Early Eighteenth-Century England, London and 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1978, ch2; Laurence Dickey, “Pride, Hypocrisy and Civility in Mandeville’s Social and 
Historical Theory”, Critical Review, Vol.4, No.3, pp387-431; Mikko Tolonen, Mandeville and Hume, ch1; Christian 
Maurer, Self-Love, Egoism and the Selfish Hypothesis, pp58-85; Joost Hengstmengel, “Augustinian Motifs in 
Mandeville’s Theory of Society”, Journal of Markets and Morality, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2016), pp317-338. 
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mechanism, Mandeville accomplishes the “discovery of society”, the operation 
of which is determined by principles independent from both the will of single 
individuals and the command of the state.4 Especially, the Mandevillean maxim 
very much inspired modern macro-economics, though there are still debates 
about whether Mandeville is a mercantilist or an advocate of laissez-faire.5 The 
multiple images of Mandeville, as a disciple of Hobbes or a foreteller of modern 
civil (economic) society, indicate the complexity of Mandeville’s thought that 
could easily be underestimated.6 
To a considerable extent, such a complexity derives from the fact that the 
Mandevillean maxim has various meanings while answering various questions, 
in which the content of “private vices”, “public benefits” as well as the 
mechanism linking them are not simple.7 In fact, such a formula runs through 
multiple levels of Mandeville’s theory, working in his analysis of a) the origin of 
                                                        
4  E. J. Hundert, The Enlightenment’s Fable: Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of Society, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
5 Economists inspired by Mandeville include Adam Smith (see his An Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the 
Wealth of Nations, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981), John Maynard Keynes (see his The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp359-361), and Fredrick Hayek 
(see his Dr. Bernard Mandeville: New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, London: 
Routledge/ Kegan Paul, 1978). For representative studies considering Mandeville as a theorist of laissez-faire, see 
F.B. Kaye, “Introduction”, in Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, pp. cxxiv-cxlvi; Nathan Rosenberg, 
“Mandeville and Laissez-Faire”, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol.24, No.2 (Apr.-Jun., 1963), pp183-196; F. A. 
Hayek, Dr. Bernard Mandeville. On Mandeville’s mercantilism, see L. S. Moss, “The Subjectivist Mercantilism of 
Bernard Mandeville”, International Journal of Social Economics, Vol.14, No.6, pp167-184; Thomas Horne, The 
Social Thought of Bernard Mandeville, ch4. 
6 Some scholar, e.g. Mikko Tolonen, believes that there is a split between the early Mandeville (the follower of 
Hobbes) and the late Mandeville (the precursor of Hume and Scottish Enlightenment). See his Mandeville and Hume, 
passim; cf. Malcom Jack, “Man Become Sociable by Living Together in Society: Re-Assessing Mandeville’s Social 
Theory”, in Edmundo Balsemão Pires & Joaquim Braga (eds.), Bernard de Mandeville’s Tropology of Paradoxes: 
Morals, Politics, Economics, and Therapy, Cham: Springer, 2015, pp1-14. 
7 An exception is Hector Monro, The Ambivalence of Bernard Mandeville, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, pp211-
223. According to Monro, the Mandevillean maxim is a “blanket” phrase owing to the multiple meanings of “vice”. 
Under this blanket Mandeville includes six theses. 1. The commercial prosperity of modern states depends on luxury. 
2. Apart from luxury, there are some pernicious practices which help to contribute to the community’s prosperity, or 
at least to the prosperity of some members of it. 3. Unworthy motives do far more to keep society going than public 
spirits, or disinterested benevolence. 4. Apart from the part played in society by self-love and self-liking in general, 
some particular practices, pernicious in themselves, may be of advantage to the community. 5. Some evils go so deep 
in to the basis of society, and it is idle to suppose that they can be got rid of easily. 6. Since all human actions aim at 
self-preservation, they are all vicious: virtue itself is built upon the vice of pride. Monro’s clarification is helpful, 
but the six theses he presents overlap with each other and lack a systematic explanation. 
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society, b) the origin of morality and manners, and c) the origin of prosperity. 
Correspondingly, the Mandevillean Maxim can be divided into “fear thesis”, 
“pride thesis”, and “luxury thesis”. If we consider him as a theorist of sociability, 
Mandeville then presents a synthesis of moral, political and economic theories 
which explains the principles of commercial society on multiple levels from 
individual moral psychology to macroscopic political-economic mechanisms. As 
we have discussed in the previous chapter, Hobbes has made a decisive 
contribution to the theorising of modern society by putting forward the problem 
of self-love and presenting the solution of civil society. In this chapter, we will 
see that the multiple-meaning maxim “private vices, public benefits” manifests 
Mandeville’s new development, which preserves Hobbes’s basic insights while 
providing a revised understanding of human nature, and brings about a thicker 
concept of civil society. The following sections will in turn discuss the three 
theses behind Mandeville’s maxim. 
I. Mandeville’s Hobbism and the “Fear Thesis” 
1. Self-Love, Self-Liking, and the State of Nature 
It is not without truth to read Mandeville as a disciple of Hobbes. Similarities 
can be easily found between the two thinkers. Like Hobbes, Mandeville is also 
a theorist of self-love, an opponent of natural sociability, and a critic of “virtue” 
in the traditional sense. Specifically speaking, Mandeville’s Hobbism is most 
obvious in his explanation of the origin of society. 
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Mandeville’s starting point in the analysis of human nature is almost the 
same with Hobbes’s. Human beings are driven by two fundamental passions, 
self-love and self-liking. As a universal passion of all creatures, self-love is the 
“Will, Wishes, and Endeavours” to preserve oneself or one’s species. It gives 
rise to desire, an appetite of happiness which compels him to crave what he 
thinks will sustain or please him, as well as fear, a strong aversion of evil which 
inspires him to avoid pain or everything that makes him uneasy.8 But self-love 
is not the only motivation that Nature has grafted in humans. Since no creature 
can love what it dislikes, “to encrease the Care in Creatures to preserve 
themselves, Nature has given them an Instinct, by which every Individual values 
itself above its real Worth” and likes its own Being superior to what it has to any 
other, namely self-liking.9 At first glance, self-liking seems to be comprehended 
by self-love, for the former is no more than a symptom or by-product of the latter. 
Nonetheless, Mandeville emphasises that self-liking should not and could not 
be reduced to the desire of bare self-preservation. In some cases, the 
frustration of self-liking might lead one to suicide, because the suffering 
overcomes the natural resistance of self-preservation.10 As “superior value” or 
“high esteem” that individuals set upon “their own Persons”,11 self-liking aims 
at the pleasure of the mind instead of bodily enjoyment. This kind of value is 
                                                        
8 FB, I, p219; II, p134; EOH, p21.  
9 FB, II, p134; EOH, p3. 
10 FB, II, p143. As a medical, Mandeville also provides interesting analysis of men’s psychological health, in which 
the frustration of self-liking is seen as the cause of hypochondria. See Bernard Mandeville, A Treatise of the 
Hypochodriack and Hysterick Deceases in Three Dialogues, London, 1730; Mauro Simonazzi, “Bernard Mandeville 
on Hypochondria and Self-Liking”, Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring, 2016), 
pp62-81. 
11 EOH, p3. 
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imaginary rather than real, exists in the world of opinions, and is unintelligible 
unless individuals compare themselves with each other and seek approbation 
from others. That is to say, Mandeville’s self-liking, like Hobbes’s pride, is a 
society-regarding passion which presupposes mutual engagement between 
humans. In fact, “pride” is nothing but an excessive and therefore vicious 
display of “self-liking”, while the latter concept is a technical term without a 
moral connotation. 
For Mandeville as well as for Hobbes, therefore, it is not natural “Fondness 
to his Species”12 but the society-regarding love of oneself that leads to men’s 
mutual association. 
I am willing to allow, that among the Motives, that prompt Man to enter into 
Society, there is a Desire which he has naturally after Company; but he 
has it for his own Sake, in hopes of being the better for it; and he would 
never wish for, either Company or any thing else, but for some Advantage 
or other he proposes to himself from it.13 
To gratify their self-love and self-liking, men cannot help but seeking advantage 
(material satisfaction) and superiority (Hobbes prefers to say “glory”), which 
cannot be obtained without staying together with others. 14  In this sense, 
Mandeville argues that the sociableness of men arises only from the multiplicity 
of their desires and the continual opposition they meet with in their endeavour 
                                                        
12 FB, II, p203. 
13 FB, II, p203. Italics added. 
14 Thomas Horne, The Social Thought of Bernard Mandeville, p38. 
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to satisfy them.15 
However, following Hobbes, Mandeville is not so optimistic as to believe 
that the society-regarding self-love could bring about a peaceful large society 
spontaneously. On this topic Mandeville provides two slightly different versions 
of explanation. In the early version of the Fable, Mandeville presents a depiction 
of the development of human desires. Human beings are originally more 
moderate and less aggressive than Hobbes’s men, for their desire of ease and 
security, their fear of death, the mildness of their natural appetites, and their 
various ways to supply their wants have made them “timorous animals”16. Yet, 
they could not avoid mutual conflicts. Mandeville underlines, paradoxically, that 
it is precisely the society-regarding feature of men’s love of self arouses the 
state of war: 
All untaught Animals are only solicitous of pleasing themselves, and 
naturally follow the bent of their own Inclinations, without considering the 
good or harm that from their being pleased will accrue to others. This is 
the Reason, that in the wild State of Nature those Creatures are fittest to 
live peaceably together in great Numbers, … and consequently no 
Species of Animals is, without the Curb of Government, less capable of 
agreeing long together in Multitudes than that of man.17 
Similar to Hobbes, Mandeville also makes a comparison between human 
                                                        
15 FB, I, p396. 
16 FB, I, p226. 
17 FB, I, p27. 
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beings and wild animals living in natural concord. Unlike untaught animals, 
human beings do care about others and form mutual associations, but they 
would not be friendly or sociable to each other. The trouble is caused by the 
mechanism of pride. Though no creatures can fight offensively while their fear 
of death lasts, the fear itself can be overcome by “anger”, a passion “which is 
rais’d in us when we are cross’d or disturb’d in our Desires”, stimulating us to 
remove or destroy whatever obstructs us. 18  Furthermore, when anger is 
accompanied by grief because of seeing others enjoy what we want, human 
beings become even envious and willing to do harm. Hence, once each 
individual bestows the highest worth to nobody but himself and desires 
positional superiority to others, anger and envy are inevitable. 
As soon as his Pride has room to play, and Envy, Avarice and Ambition 
begin to catch hold of him, he is rous’d from his natural Innocence and 
Stupidity. As his Knowledge increases, his Desires are enlarge’d, and 
consequently his Wants and Appetites are multiply’d: Hence it must follow, 
that he will be often cross’d in the pursuit of them, and meet with 
abundance more disappointment to stir up his Anger in this than his former 
Condition, and Man would in a little time become the most hurtful and 
noxious Creatures in the World.19 
The development of pride enlarges men’s desires, the frustration of desires 
produces anger, and anger results in conflicts. That is the reason why 
                                                        
18 FB, I, p221. 
19 FB, I, pp226-227. 
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Mandeville considers peaceful concord without government as inconsistent 
with human nature, for there would always be resentful people in the 
competition for positional good, even if “the Soil, the Climate, and their Plenty 
be whatever the most luxuriant Imagination shall be pleased to fancy him”.20 
Mandeville’s men eventually become as aggressive as Hobbes’s, rendering the 
state of nature a state of perpetual war. 
In his later works, Mandeville more and more regards self-liking as an 
original passion of human being. According to intellectual historians, it is 
Butler’s critique of Hobbism that motivated Mandeville to revise his ideas.21 Yet 
theoretically speaking, such a shift, rather than demonstrating a break with 
Hobbes, actually makes Mandeville’s position closer to Hobbes’s. Mandeville 
now negates the possibility of a Golden Age of natural innocence when 
individuals are not influenced by pride. Even the most untaught savages are 
proud. In fact, the more uncivilised men are, the more aggressively they act due 
to this passion. Mandeville summarises the effect of self-liking as “natural 
Instinct of Sovereignty”, “Principle of Selfishness”, or “Desire of Dominion”.22 
That is to say, in spite of their need for association with each other, individuals 
                                                        
20 FB, II, p370. 
21 Mikko Tolonen, Mandeville and Hume, ch2. Mandeville’s distinction between self-love and self-liking is usually 
considered as an important theoretical development in Part II than the original Fable. Cf. E. J. Hundert, The 
Enlightenment’s Fable, pp52-115; Bert Kerkhof, “A Fatal Attraction? Smith’s ‘Theory of Moral Sentiments’ and 
Mandeville’s ‘Fable’”, History of Political Thought, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp219-233; Christian Maurer, 
Self-Love, Egoism and the Selfish Hypothesis, pp58-85. But if due attention is paid to the role of pride in Part I as 
well as in Hobbes’s theory, such a development should not be regarded as a decisive split between “the early 
Mandeville” (a disciple of Hobbes) and “the late Mandeville” (a precursor of Hume). First, if we do not equalise 
Hobbes’s own thought with the 17th- and 18th-century popularised Hobbism, then the introduction of self-liking 
makes Mandeville more similar to, rather than more different from Hobbes. Second, Mandeville’s explanation of 
the mechanism of pride and good manners has already taken shape in Part I. Cf. Hector Monro, The Ambivalence of 
Bernard Mandeville, pp119-120. 
22 FB, II, p229, p320. 
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are so stubborn as to look upon everything as centring in themselves, and 
prefer to extort esteem from others by domination rather than by mutual 
complaisance. As Mandeville describes, 
Man would have every thing he likes, without considereing, whether he 
has any Right to it or not; and he would do every thing he has a mind to 
do, without regard to the Consequence it would be of to others; at the 
same time that he dislikes every Body, that, acting from the same Principle, 
have in all their Behaviour not a special Regard to him.23 
We have mentioned that all untaught animals except men do everything 
“without considering the good or harm to others”, and this is the reason why 
they are able to live together peacefully. But when it comes to humans, doing 
things “without regard to the Consequence it would be of to others” means 
anything but independence or solitude. As is manifested by Mandeville’s next 
sentence, each individual demands “a special Regard” to himself from others. 
In other words, human beings want and only want others as subjects or 
admirers, whereas refuse to consider others as equals or fit themselves into the 
association. Rather than the Rousseauian natural goodness, here men’s 
disregard of others is only a cause of hostility and quarrel, a symptom of the 
Hobbesian paradox of society-regarding self-love.24 
                                                        
23 FB, II, p317. 
24 Mikko Tolonen is to some extent misled by the literal similarity between Mandeville and Rousseau, when he 
argues that “Mandeville is at pains to point out that he was not making the same mistake that natural jurists made 
when talking about natural weakness or aggressiveness in men: these are social rather than natural traits.” See Mikko 
Tolonen, Mandeville and Hume, p67. (Adam Smith might be responsible for this reading, see his “Letter to the 
Authors of the Edinburgh Review”, in The Edinburgh Review, From July 1755 to January 1756, Edinburgh, 1756, 
pp63-79.) Albeit both Mandeville and Rousseau deny that human beings naturally desire society for its own sake, 
their descriptions of human nature depart from each other from the very beginning. Cf. Robin Douglass, “Morality 
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Nevertheless, in his analysis of the mechanism of self-liking, Mandeville 
goes further than Hobbes by deconstructing Hobbes’s doctrine of natural rights. 
As we have discussed in the previous chapter, in Hobbes’s state of nature, the 
dilemma of society-regarding self-love also reflects as conflicts of natural rights. 
Individuals not only fight with each other, but do so rightly, since everyone has 
unlimited rights to everything. The Hobbesian natural rights, different from 
classical “natural right” but mere “subjective claims”, are confirmed by “right 
reason” or natural laws. But from Mandeville’s point of view, man’s belief in his 
unlimited natural rights is no more than another symptom of self-liking. It is the 
natural instinct of sovereignty that “prompts him to put in a Claim to every thing 
he can lay his Hands on”, and makes man conceive himself as entitled to attack 
each other.25 Similarly, exclusive property is absent in the state of nature, 
because everybody just takes everything, including his descendants, to be his 
own. As an anatomist of human nature instead of a natural lawyer, Mandeville 
has no interest in discussing whether these claims of rights are actually 
endorsed by natural laws, but regards them as mere facts that need to be 
explained in psychological terms. In this way, Mandeville provides a naturalistic 
explanation of the Hobbesian natural jurisprudence. 
For Mandeville, in sum, the problem of the state of war can be ascribed 
entirely to men’s love of self, especially their self-liking. While Hobbes points 
                                                        
and Sociability in Commercial Society: Smith, Rousseau, and Mandeville”, The Review of Politics, 79 (2017), 
pp597–620; Simon Kow, “Rousseau’s Mandevillean Conception of Desire and Modern Society”, in Rousseau and 
Desire, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009, pp62-81. 
25 FB, II, p318, p223. 
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out that “Wanting (of society) is one thing, ability another”, 26  Mandeville 
captures the paradox in a similar way, that Nature should send human beings 
into the world “with a visible Desire” after society, but “no Capacity for it at all”.27 
The passion that opens the road to society at the same time obstructs it. 
2. Civil Society as a Body Politic 
Mandeville’s solution to the problem of the state of nature is also the 
establishment of the civil society. As we have discussed in the previous chapter, 
for Hobbes, “civil society” (societas civilis) is the synonym of political society or 
“state”. It is an artificial “unity” rather than natural multitudes, which has “one 
will” through artificial persons and hence is enabled to keep all subjects in awe 
by using “common power”. Now almost all of these main points can be found in 
Mandeville’s theory as well: 
By society I understand a Body Politick … where under one Head or other 
Form of Government each Member is render’d Subservient to the Whole, 
and all of them by cunning Management are made to Act as one.28 
… in our Nature we have a certain Fitness, by which great Multitudes of 
us co-operating, may be united and form’d into one Body; that endued 
with, and able to make Use of, the Strength, Skill, and Prudence of every 
                                                        
26 DC, i.2, annotation. 
27 FB, II, p230. Mandeville himself misunderstood Hobbes’s opinions and overlooked the similarity between them. 
According to Mandeville, Hobbes believes “that Man is born unfit for Society, and alledge no better Reason for it, 
than the Incapacity that Infants come into the World with” (FB, II, p177), whereas himself “speak of men and women 
full grown” when demonstrating men’s “necessitous and helpless condition” (FB, II, p180). However, in fact, 
Hobbes was also talking about grown humans, who both desire the presence of others and conflict with them. 
28 FB, I, pp399-400. 
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Individual, shall govern itself, and act on all Emergencies, as if it was 
animated by one Soul, and actuated by one Will.29 
Mandeville also understands civil society as political society with government 
enforcing the common power extracted from all its members. As he claims, “the 
undoubted Basis of all Societies is Government”. 30 Since the state of war 
results from men’s anger which is ignited by their self-liking and overcomes 
their fear, “the only useful Passion that Man is possess’d of toward the Peace 
and Quiet of a Society”31, there should be some force that is efficient to increase 
men’s fear while curb their anger. That is the punishment of the government. 
Mandeville agrees with Hobbes that when laws are strictly executed, individuals 
with “Experience, Understanding and Foresight” 32  then have to discipline 
themselves for the sake of self-preservation, for they would face definite 
punishments instead of uncertain outcomes of battle once they attack others. 
The unlimited claim to everything is meanwhile substituted by exclusive right of 
property, established and secured by the government. In a nutshell, political 
power is the ultimate defence of large and lasting society. 
Besides the Hobbesian theoretical explanation, Mandeville also presents a 
conjectural history of the civil society, displaying how human nature is tamed 
step by step. 33 Such a story begins with the primitive families. The most 
                                                        
29 FB, II, p204. 
30 FB, II, p204. 
31 FB, I, p227. 
32 FB, I, p227. 
33 Cf. Frank Pelmeri, “Bernard de Mandeville and the Shaping of Conjectural History”, in Bernard de Mandeville’s 
Tropology of Paradoxes, pp15-24. 
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uninstructed savages, albeit they express their natural affections sometimes, 
treat their descendants violently and capriciously because of their “domineering 
spirit” and lacking of understanding. Under their overwhelming power, the 
savage children learn reverence for their parents, which is a compound of fear, 
love, and esteem, and start to become governable. But owing to the incapacity 
of savage parents to regulate their own passions and to govern others, the 
savage families cannot get rid of the state of war, especially when the children 
grow up and begin to quarrel with each other. Mandeville agrees with Hobbes’s 
conclusion that familial relation is not the foundation for large and lasting society, 
and even the short-lived peace within the families should be ascribed to power 
and fear more than to love.34 
According to Mandeville, “the first thing that could make Man associate, 
would be common Danger”.35 The danger from wild beasts makes human 
beings increasingly depend on one another beyond small families, and gives 
rise to large congregations in pursuit of their same interest. In this, Mandeville 
reminds us of the typically Hobbesian theory of the state of nature: 
Different Families may endeavour to live together, and be ready to join in 
common Danger; but they are all of little use to one another, when there 
is no common Enemy to oppose. If we consider, that Strength, Agility, and 
Courage would in such a State be the most valuable Qualifications, and 
                                                        
34 FB, II, pp224ff; I, pp400-401. Cf. Richard Chapman, “Leviathan Writ Small: Thomas Hobbes on the Family”, 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 69, No. 1 (Mar., 1975), pp76-90. 
35 FB, II, p264. 
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that many Families could not live long together, but some actuated by the 
Principle I named, would strive for Superiority: this must breed Quarrels, 
in which the most weak and fearful will, for their own Safety, always join 
with him, of whom they have the best opinion.36 
Men become the greatest danger to each other because of the “stanch Principle 
of Pride and Ambition”.37 Once they get rid of the threats from non-humans, 
conflicts between them are inevitable. Even social contracts cannot last long as 
there is no power to enforce the obligation and punish perjury. In this condition, 
individuals have no better choice but unite in bands and companies. While 
Hobbes admits “acquisition” as another approach to civil society besides 
“institution” or covenant, Mandeville argues that society depends “either on 
mutual Compact, or the Force of the Strong, exerting itself upon the Patience 
of the Weak”. 38 Thanks to the association, the weak obtain security (self-
preservation), meanwhile the strong satisfy their desire of dominion (self-liking). 
To preserve peace and order, the authority to punish “are snatch’d away out of 
every Man’s Hands, as dangerous Tools, and vested in the governing part, the 
supreme Power only”.39 Besides the monopoly of power, the leaders are also 
creative in inventing various ways of curbing mankind (especially by laws and 
penalties), thereby they can make more use of their subjects and govern vast 
                                                        
36 FB, II, pp311-312. 
37 FB, II, p302. 
38 FB, II, pp206-207. As Hobbes believes in the fundamental equality of human beings, the advantages the strong 
men have in the state of nature is not quite stable, and “commonwealth by acquisition” is not so formally perfect as 
“commonwealth by institution”. Mandeville’s standpoint here is closer to Rousseau’s, that the state of nature is 
already a state of inequality where the weak and the strong have different incentives to associate with each other. 
39 FB, II, p323. 
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numbers of people more easily. This is the second step towards society. With 
the invention of letters and the announcing of written laws, the government is 
finally consolidated, indicating the full establishment of the civil society. 
It is noteworthy, however, that Mandeville not only agrees with Hobbes on 
the role of common power. He does not forget that the essence of civil society 
is a “unity” with “one will”  or “one soul”, either. As we known, for Hobbes, 
subjects of civil society not merely submit negatively to the oppressive power, 
but have a positive obligation to obey the sovereign’s commands through the 
relationship of artificial persons. Mandeville’s adherence to this point seems 
strange at first glance, for he has decided to abandon Hobbes’s juridical-
normative theory, especially the category of corporation theory, and therefore 
cannot make use of concepts such as obligation and representation. 
Nevertheless, in his own way, Mandeville distinguishes civil society from a 
multitude merely overwhelmed by great might, 
There is a great Difference between being submissive, and being 
governable; for he who barely submits to another, only embraces what he 
dislikes, to shun what he dislikes more; and we may be very submissive, 
and be of no Use to the Person we submit to: But to be governable, implies 
an Endeavour to please, and a Willingness to exert ourselves in behalf of 
the Person that governs.40 
                                                        
40 FB, II, pp204-205. Cf. E. J. Hundert, The Enlightenment’s Fable, pp66-67. Hundert pays due attention to this 
paragraph by pointing out that fear and superior strength alone could not “sufficiently account for the various forms 
of submission required in any stable political order”. But his simplistic understanding of Hobbes leads to an 
underestimation of the substantial similarity between the two thinkers. 
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For Mandeville as well as for Hobbes, to form a unity is not merely staying 
quietly under a superior force, but to act willingly as the sovereign commands, 
letting one’s own strength be used according to the sovereign’s will. While for 
Hobbes such a “willingness” derives from the obligation and authorisation, from 
Mandeville’s perspective, it requires individuals finding their own interest in 
serving the public. Therefore, the substance of Hobbes’s juridical-normative 
distinction between negative submission and positive obedience is maintained 
in Mandeville’s theory, but has been transformed into a psychological distinction. 
As a consequence, what makes men “governable” is no longer the legal 
process of covenant and authorisation, but the “dextrous management” of the 
politicians through which obedience and service are made profitable for the 
individuals themselves.41 “All of them by cunning management are made to act 
as one”.42 
Furthermore, in Mandeville’s opinion, individuals are even required to be 
willing to defend their civil society at the risk of their own lives. This is obviously 
inconceivable for Hobbes, because the desire of self-preservation could never 
be overcome and the natural right to secure one’s life could never be 
transferred. But from Mandeville’s viewpoint, sacrificing oneself for the body 
politic is both necessary and possible. It is necessary since civil society, albeit 
achieves peace and order in itself, is still in the face of wars from without, and 
                                                        
41 Insightful comments on the turn from juridical principles to “skilful management”, see Michel Foucault, The 
Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp1-51, despite 
Foucault’s discussion focuses on political economy instead of the regulation of social opinions. 
42 FB, II, p400. 
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hence must be defended. It is also possible, because the politician can “alter 
his Measures, and take off some of Man’s Fears”.43 That is to say, although the 
fear of death is the foundation of civil society, it can be manipulated and 
overcome when more virtuous and public-spirited behaviours are needed, and 
this is of course achieved by “cunning management”. To sum up, in Mandeville’s 
theory, the civil society is thoroughly artificial where the skilful manipulation of 
passions is expected to play not only an equal but even a greater role than 
Hobbes’s juridical relations used to do. 
Mandeville’s Hobbesian theory of the origin of society well illustrates the 
mechanism of “private vices, public benefits”. It is nothing but the fear of death 
(or punishment) along with the strong men’s desire of dominion, private vices 
for individuals, that give rise to large and lasting society. Yet, if submission is 
not the only requisite for the “raising or maintaining” of civil society, the question 
of what makes human beings willing to behave virtuously must be answered. 
At this point, Mandeville the anatomist of human nature departs from Hobbes 
and works out his own explanation. 
II. The Civilisation of Man and the “Pride Thesis” 
1. Self-liking, Virtues and Politeness 
Mandeville apparently denied the existence of a “master passion” 
dominating human beings forever. Neither self-love nor self-liking could always 
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overwhelm the other. In most of time, the two fundamental passions are 
mutually intertwined, either intensified or checked by each other. As is pointed 
out by Mandeville, “an untaught Man would desire every body that came near 
him, to agree with him in the Opinion of his superior Worth, and be angry, as far 
as his Fear would let him, with all that should refuse it.”44 It suggests that even 
in the state of nature where human beings display their “domineering spirit” in 
a most unscrupulous way, their self-liking or pride is to some extent restrained 
by fear of death. Yet as long as the outcome of combats is uncertain and the 
hope of winning both self-preservation and esteem still remains in men’s hearts, 
the fear of death is not strong enough to extinguish their ambition, thus is often 
surmounted by anger. When it comes to civil society, in turn, pride is suppressed 
by fear, because fear then becomes stronger when the penalties are expectable 
due to the severe execution of the government. Nonetheless, so far we should 
neither draw a conclusion that self-liking is always in contradiction with the 
requirement of peace and order, nor consider fear as the only object that can 
be regulated by the government. For Mandeville, self-liking or pride is also open 
to manipulation. In fact, this passion is much more flexible and thus more useful 
than fear of death, since it can be directed quite accurately to various targets. 
The presupposition of such a manipulation is that Mandeville denied the 
existence of a natural common measure of happiness or glory. Worth and 
excellency are uncertain. “Some think it the greatest Felicity to govern and rule 
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over others: Some take the Praise of Bravery and Undoubtedness in Dangers 
to be the most valuable… So that, tho’ they all love Glory, they set out differently 
to acquire it.”45 But the absence of common measure, which Hobbes considers 
as an origin of conflicts, opens up the space for “skilful management”. And as 
long as the management is “skilful” enough, self-liking will not arouse the state 
of war. 
The most important function of self-liking in civil society is to promote men’s 
moral virtues. According to Mandeville, 
The Chief Thing, therefore, which Lawgivers and other wise Men, that 
have laboured for the Establishment of Society, have endeavour’d, has 
been to make the People they were to govern, believe, that it was more 
beneficial for every Body to conquer than indulge his Appetites, and much 
better to mind the Publick than what seem’d his private Interest. … But 
whether Mankind would have ever believ’d it or not, it is not likely that any 
Body could have persuaded them to disapprove of their natural 
Inclinations, or prefer the good of others to their own, if at the same time 
he had not shew’d them an Equivalent to be enjoy’d as a Reward for the 
Violence, which by so doing they of necessity must commit upon 
themselves. … being unable to give so many real Rewards as would 
satisfy all Persons for every individual Action, they were forc’d to contrive 
an imaginary one, that as a general Equivalent for the trouble of Self-
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denial should serve on all Occasions, and without costing any thing either 
to themselves or others, be yet a most acceptable Recompense to the 
Receivers.46 
In Mandeville’s opinion, peace and order of the society are guaranteed neither 
by men’s natural benevolence nor by some enlightened or generalised self-love 
considering public good as one’s own long-term interest. Nor did he believe in 
the spontaneous unity between private and public benefits that Smith pointed 
out in the theory of the “invisible hand”. Firstly, it is psychologically improbable 
for men to prefer remote interests to immediate gratification. “Things at a 
Distance, tho’ we are sure they are to come, make little Impression upon us in 
Comparison with those that are present and immediately before us.” 47  
Furthermore, it is rather troublesome that not each individual virtuous actions 
could be perfectly rewarded, though acting virtuously is generally beneficial for 
everyone. On the one hand, for most individuals in most occasions, “whenever 
they check’d their Inclinations or but followed them with more Circumspection, 
they avoided a world of Troubles, and often escap’d many of the Calamities that 
generally attended the too eager Pursuit after Pleasure.” 48  Thereby the 
regulation of men’s immediate desires, as a “general rule”, is in accordance 
with men’s long-term selfishness. But on the other hand, Mandeville has 
recognised the existence of free-riders threatening the smooth operation of the 
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general mechanism of society. “It being the Interest then of the very worst of 
them, more than any, to preach up Publick-spiritedness, that they might reap 
the Fruits of the Labour and Self-denial of others, and at the same time indulge 
their own Appetites with less disturbance … ” 49 Rather than short-sighted 
individuals who cannot help pursuing their immediate interests, the free riders 
parasitise upon the social mechanism and exploit the public-spiritedness of 
others. In sum, there are some particular occasions where breaking general 
rules become more profitable for some particular men. Being selfish, humans 
lack intrinsic motives to observe public order and promote public good. 
Given that “real rewards” are not always effective motivation, politicians 
then turn to “imaginary rewards”, i.e. the flattery of men’s self-liking. Emulation 
is introduced to the multitudes; conquest of one’s appetites and beneficence to 
others are praised as virtues which belong to high-minded people, whereas 
actions injurious to society or rendering oneself less serviceable to others are 
called vices. Due to the aversion of shame, the good opinion of themselves, as 
well as their desire of approval from others, human beings endeavour to subdue 
their appetites as well as they can, or to conceal their imperfections when it is 
impossible to completely eliminate them. Pride is in this way played against 
other passions, for men’s loss in their former self-denial get over-paid by the 
satisfaction of self-liking. As substitutes for the undisciplined anger, desire of 
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praise and fear of shame might even overwhelm the fear of death, encouraging 
people to risk their lives on the battlefield. Actually, Mandeville defines shame 
as “a sorrow Reflexion on our own Unworthiness, proceeding from an 
Apprehension that others either do, or might, if they knew all, deservedly 
despise us”.50 That is to say, the sense of “worthiness” or “deservedness” is 
inherent in men’s evaluative passions. Thus we should not underestimate the 
sincerity of men’s endeavour in observing the social norms which have been so 
deeply internalised in their hearts, because even vicious actions unknown to 
others lead to a harm of self-liking (in terms of self-esteem). This explains the 
origin of moral virtues, “the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride.”51  
But it is noteworthy that “virtues” achieved by humans are not real virtues. 
For Mandeville, virtue requires not only external behaviours but also virtuous 
motive, namely a “rational ambition of being good”.52 Therefore, real virtue, or 
virtue in the strict sense must be a total victory over all passions, whereas what 
people actually do is no more than “a conquest which one passion obtains over 
another”.53 The latter is not a mere Gygesian concealment of selfishness, for 
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we do restrain many of our immediate desires, yet the self-denial we carry out 
is far from complete since we fail to oppress our self-liking. In this sense, the 
pride-motivating actions are “counterfeited” rather than real virtues. And for 
human beings who never get rid of self-love, real virtue is beyond our reach.54 
Now the impossibility of having real virtues brings about the problem of the 
reality of moral virtues. According to some scholars, Mandeville does not reduce 
moral virtues to self-love and self-liking, for he adheres to the distinction 
between real and counterfeited virtues. Thus the impossibility of being really 
virtuous does not negate the reality of virtues as a criterion according to which 
men’s actions are judged.55 Nevertheless, since our idea of virtues as thorough 
self-denial has no corresponding object in practice, it is itself an outcome of the 
politicians’ education and our self-deception. Finding that 1) some actions are 
beneficial for the public, and 2) having a false belief that those actions can and 
should be done with a total conquest of passions will better arouse men’s self-
liking and more effectively motivate men to perform these actions, the 
educators would like to instil such an understanding of virtue, namely pure self-
denial, in our mind. Consequently, we imagine a “rational ambition of being 
good” as the motive of our beneficial actions and take it for granted. The 
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counterfeit of virtue is therefore logically prior to the idea of real virtue, for the 
latter is in fact a purification of the former. 
Counterfeit of virtues bring about unity to members of civil society by 
directing their actions to the common good. Yet there remains a paradox in this 
“skilful management” of passions: while pride is used for curbing other passions, 
pride itself remains, if not increases. Such a paradox gives rise to problems for 
both individuals and society. For individuals, in terms of psychology, men’s self-
committed pursuit of virtues is in fact a self-deception. As is keenly pointed out 
by Mandeville, the more proud individuals are, the more likely they would 
mistake virtues as inherent in human nature rather than an artefact. 
For it must be granted, that in order to search into ourselves, it is required, 
we should be willing as well as able; and we have all the Reason in the 
World to think, that there is nothing, which a very proud Man of such high 
Qualifications would avoid more carefully, than such an Enquiry: Because 
for all other Acts of Self-denial he is repaid in his darling Passion; but this 
alone is really mortifying, and the only Sacrifice of his Quiet, for which he 
can have no equivalent.56 
Given that self-denial can be rewarded by nothing but gratification of self-liking, 
there is no compensation and hence no motive for men to suppress their pride 
in turn, which in this case means to admit their being proud. The sidestepping 
of pride, no matter intentionally or not, is itself a symptom of it, illustrating the 
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fact that self-liking is “a most stubborn and an unconquerable passion”.57 At the 
same time, on the level of society, the potential of mutual conflicts, as the by-
product of self-liking, is not entirely precluded. Despite being introduced as a 
counterfeit for virtue, pride is at bottom a desire for superiority over others, a 
positional good which could never be shared by everyone. “What is very 
peculiar to this Faculty of ours, is, that those who are the fullest of it, are the 
least willing to connive at it in others.”58 Openly enjoyment of self-liking is no 
other than an offence to others, and immediately arouses envy and hate. Then 
for the sake of peace pride in turn must be played against, by nothing but 
itself.59 Nonetheless, since the entire suppression of this passion is impossible 
for human nature, the only way of regulating pride is concealment. For 
Mandeville, if counterfeited virtues are to a large extent consequences of 
sincere self-deception, then politeness is a more conscious hypocrisy which 
requests no more than appearance. As long as barefaced expression of pride 
is considered as a vice while manners and good-breeding are praised, “the Man 
of Sense and Education never exults more in his Pride than when he hides it 
with the greatest Dexterity.”60 The covering of pride is itself a source of sense 
of pride. Moreover, besides the exchange of outward for secret satisfaction of 
self-liking in each individual’s heart, there is also a mutual exchange of flattery 
among members of society, as politeness requires “not only to deny the high 
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Value they have for themselves, but likewise to pretend that they have greater 
Value for others, than they have for themselves”.61 Once men have learnt to 
cater the pride of each other voluntarily, they “assist one another in the 
enjoyment of life, and refining upon pleasure; and every individual person is 
rendered more happy by it”. 62  This indicates the accomplishment of the 
socialisation and civilisation of human beings. 
While in Hobbes’s theory the legal relationship of artificial persons 
eventually bonds civil society into a unit, for Mandeville, on the other hand, it is 
the artificial mechanisms of moral virtues and politeness that make human 
beings to “Act as One” and “subservient to the Whole”.63 This is another form 
of the Mandevillean maxim besides the “fear thesis” we mentioned previously: 
with the help of pride, the most irresistible “private vice”, human beings tame 
other vices and this very vice itself, and finally obtain complaisance and 
sociability, the most fundamental “public benefits” for civil society. Nevertheless, 
since pride is no longer a subversive but a constructive power open to “skilful 
manipulation”, Mandeville’s abandonment of Hobbes’s jurisprudence 
necessitates a systematic revision or development of Hobbes’s theory of 
human nature. From Mandeville’s viewpoint, the regulation of pride 
demonstrates another way of founding the artificial institutions of civil society 
on men’s artificial self. 
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2. Self-Liking and the Artificial Self 
As a society-regarding passion, generally speaking, self-liking cannot 
make sense without others and opinions, because one’s good estimation of 
himself is formed through his comparison with others, and need to be 
recognised by others in turn. This is the foundation upon which every individual 
is enabled to be influenced by the social conventions and norms. However, if 
we consider in detail the theories of different thinkers, the degree of men’s 
dependence on the opinions of others can be quite different since self-liking 
may takes various forms. For the Cynic and Stoic schools, the extreme self-
esteem “may take the form of an indifference to or contempt for the opinion of 
other persons, or of some classes or types of other persons”.64 In Hobbes’s 
theory of the state of nature, as we have already seen, the vain-glorious 
individuals do desire praises from others, yet incline to “extort” a high opinion 
by force, since both the measure and the outcome of their self-evaluation are 
determined by themselves and hardly influenced by others substantially. 
Nonetheless, from Mandeville’s perspective, men’s self-liking to a larger extent 
relies on others’ opinions: 
Nature has given them an Instinct, by which every Individual values itself 
above its real Worth; this in us, I mean in Man, seems to be accompany’d 
with a Diffidence, arising from a Consciousness, or at least an 
Apprehension, that we do over-value ourselves: It is this that makes us so 
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fond of the Approbation, Liking and Assent of Others; because they 
strengthen and confirm us in the good Opinion we have of ourselves.65 
In comparison with Hobbes’s men, Mandeville’s individuals are more self-
reflective,  uncertain about their worthiness, and less confident in their self-
evaluation. As a consequence, the approval from others is of great significance, 
not merely as an outward token of recognition but as an indispensable evidence 
constituting the validity of our own self-appraisal. In this case, the disagreement 
between the self and others may not necessitate a change of others’ opinions, 
i.e. a violent extortion of higher estimate, but an adjustment of ourselves. 
Mandeville then attributes a greater role to the opinions of others in the 
gratification of our self-liking, for they become a constituent of one’s self-
understanding. Though historically speaking the wildest savages may naively 
disregard others’ attitudes because of their “instinct of Sovereignty”, from 
mutual conflicts they would sooner or later learn their incapacity of determining 
their own worth independently. The more civilised human beings are, the 
deeper they are influenced by others. 
This is not to overestimate the importance of others’ attitudes relative to the 
self. For Mandeville as well as for Hobbes, man “never loves nor esteems any 
Thing so well as he does his own Individual; and that there is Nothing, which 
he has so constantly before his Eyes, as his own dear Self.”66 The ultimate 
centre of men’s passions is always the self whose happiness is the goal of “the 
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whole Design of life”, no matter how much we may care about others. When 
Horatio argued that “what we fear, is the Judgment of others, and the ill Opinion 
they will justly have of us”, Cleomenes, the spokesman of Mandeville, corrected 
him by pointing out that 
when we covet Glory, or dread Infamy, it is not the good or bad Opinion of 
Others that affects us with Joy or Sorrow, Pleasure or Pain; but it is the 
Notion we form that Opinion of theirs, and must proceed from the Regard 
and Value we have for it. If it was otherwise, the most Shameless Fellow 
would suffer as much in his Mind from publick Disgrace and Infamy, as a 
Man that values his Reputation. Therefore it is the Notion we have of 
Things, our own Thought and Something within our Selves, that creates 
and Fear of Shame.67 
Our concern for the judgment of others derives from our concern for our own 
persons and own worth. That is why the senses of honour and shame are in 
fact esteem and fear of oneself. In Cleomenes’s words, the self is both an “idol” 
set up by each individual, and its own “worshiper”. What is more, as an object 
of men’s fundamental passions, such a self must have at least a minimum level 
of identity or sameness through a variation of time. As claimed by Mandeville, 
It is that Self we wish well to; and therefore we cannot wish for any Change 
in ourselves, but with a Proviso, that that τò self, that Part of us, that 
wishes should still remain. … No Man can wish but to enjoy something, 
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which no Part of that same Man could do, if he was entirely another.68 
Regardless of what sort of good or amelioration human beings desire, some 
essential consciousness of oneself must remain the same in spite of all 
alterations taking place in one’s life, otherwise self-love and self-liking become 
nonsense. Nonetheless, from Mandeville’s perspective, the “self” or “person” of 
each individual is far from a self-evident reality. Notwithstanding Mandeville’s 
materialist metaphysics, empiricist epistemology and his unwillingness to probe 
the mind-body relation,69 the notion of the “self” is indeed problematic for him. 
Firstly, in Mandeville’s theory, personal identity through time is grounded 
on nothing but memory and therefore lacks absolute certainty. One’s 
remembrance of himself is limited and incomplete, for nobody could remember 
things that happened when he was newborn. Moreover, “this Remembrance, 
how far so ever it may reach, gives us no greater Surety of our selves, than we 
should have of another that had been brought up with us, and never above a 
Week or a Month out of Sight.”70 In other words, individuals have no intimate or 
transcendental consciousness of himself but only empirical observation, which 
is not different from spectating others. “So that all we can know of this 
Consciousness is, that it consists in, or is the Result of, the running and 
rummaging of the Spirits through all the Mazes of the Brain, and their looking 
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there for Facts concerning ourselves.”71 
But then we encounter an even more complicated problem. Given that the 
identity of the self lies in a composite of “facts”, it is not yet certain what “facts” 
should be considered as belonging to ourselves or “concerning ourselves”. The 
self, “for the sake of which he values or despises, loves or hates everything 
else”, is something “we hardly know what it consists in”.72 From Mandeville’s 
point of view, human beings are used to uniting and confounding various 
qualities or possessions together, and regard them as their “own”. However, as 
a matter of fact, these qualities or possessions can be divided into two parts, 
one “natural” while the other “acquired”. And albeit “the acquired, as well as 
natural Parts, belong to the same Person; and the one is not more inseparable 
from him than the other” 73, they are related to one’s “Person” to different 
degrees. On the one hand, “nothing is so near to a Man, nor so really and 
entirely his own, as what he has from Nature”.74 Mandeville does not provide a 
positive description of this “natural” self, but he definitely considers it as 
“meanness” and “deficiency” in the “lower steps” of the process of men’s 
civilisation, which human beings with higher level of perfection feel ashamed to 
admit and endeavour to cover up. Yet in Mandeville’s eyes, only the natural part 
of one’s self, namely the “original nakedness” of human nature without any 
ornaments and education, is what really belongs to us. On the other hand, 
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individuals also incline to involve more things to their concept of the self, which 
actually “have nothing to do with their persons”,75 such as virtues, politeness, 
knowledge, wealth and power. Mandeville does not deny that knowledge and 
politeness are real parts of oneself, “but neither of them belong to his Nature, 
any more than his Gold Watch or his Diamond Ring”.76 Nevertheless, 
There is nothing we can be possess’d of, that is worth having, which we 
do not endeavour, closely to annex, and make an Ornament of to 
ourselves; even Wealth and Power, and all the Gifts of Fortune, that are 
plainly adventitious, and altogether remote from our Persons; whilst they 
are our Right and Property, we don’t love to be consider’d without them.77 
Mandeville detects in human nature an inherent tendency of connecting all 
worthy things to themselves, or an unwillingness “to have any thing that is 
honourable separated from themselves”. 78  Though these qualities and 
possessions are acquired instead of intrinsic, individuals still endeavour to draw 
a value and respect to his person from them. In this way, self-liking shapes both 
human being’s understanding of the world and their self-understanding, for it 
functions both as a mechanism constituting one’s relationship with the external 
things and as a dynamic giving rise to an enlargement of the self. Owing to this 
passion, wealth and power are no longer regarded as mere materials, neither 
are virtues and politeness neutral behaviours, but tokens of value and glory. 
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Moreover, motivated by self-liking, human beings strive to associate these 
tokens to their natural selves, consider them as part of themselves, and 
evaluate their own worth and honour according to their possession of these 
tokens. To a large extent, rather than a static object of self-liking, the self is in 
turn an outcome of the operation of this very passion in a dynamic process. 
According to Mandeville, 
It is our fondness of that Self, which we hardly know what it consists in, 
that could first make us think of embellishing our Persons; and when we 
have taken Pains in correcting, polishing, and beautifying Nature, the 
same Self-love makes us unwilling to have the Ornaments seen 
separately from the Thing Adorned.79 
The self is like a snowball, becoming increasingly bigger on the basis of a small 
original core. In addition, as we have seen before, there is no natural common 
measure setting up tokens of worth, nor are individuals confident in their self-
estimation, then it is the opinions of others that actually determines what is 
usually annexed to men’s persons. That is to say, not only the result of one’s 
self-appraisal (through mutual comparison and approval) but even the content 
of the (acquired) self is shaped by others. 
For Mandeville, with the enlargement of men’s acquired or artificial self and 
its intertwining with the natural self, the latter can be encroached and concealed 
by the former. “What men have learned from their Infancy enslaves them, and 
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the Force of Custom warps Nature, and at the same time imitates her in such 
a manner, that it is often difficult to know which of the two we are influenced 
by.”80 Since the natural self is so mean and deficient that human beings are 
only too eager to disguise it, we “become altogether unknown to our selves” 
once the acquired qualities are made habitual and turn to a part of the self.81 
Therefore, in correspondence with the overcoming of the state of nature by 
artificial institutions, there is a conquest of the artificial self over the natural self, 
while the artificial self is both the product and the foundation of the artificial 
institutions. 
Moreover, as a response to the artificial institutions which attribute tokens 
of worth according to men’s outward behaviours, the artificial self may also 
become a sort of histrionic performance in the theatre of society.82 As long as 
the internal world of men is invisible to others and hence can be dissembled, 
the individuals are not merely passively influenced by the opinions of others, 
but may also actively and purposely manage the images of themselves in the 
eyes of others for the sake of esteem. “It is impossible we could be sociable 
Creatures without Hypocrisy.”83 Thus not only philosophically speaking but also 
sociologically speaking, the self or self-image of human beings should be seen 
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as an artefact, taking shape in the interaction between the public opinions 
(crystallised in social disciplines) and the subjects. On a purely artificial level a 
peaceful common life is achieved, notwithstanding men’s born unfitness for 
society. 
3. Civil Society, Political Power and “Civil Commerce” 
Mandeville’s emphasis on the role of the artificial social disciplines (i.e. 
moral virtues and good manners), which was mentioned by Hobbes yet not full 
developed by him, opens up new aspects of the civil society besides the 
juridical and political interaction between the subjects and the sovereign. For 
Mandeville, civil society is not only a unity with political power, but also a space 
where “civilisation” and “civility” are made possible. “I wonder how a Man of his 
unquestionable good Sense could … think of a civilis’d Man, before there was 
any Civil Society, and even before Men had commenc’d to associate.”84 By 
living in civil society and cultivating their qualities required by “civil commerce”, 
human beings become increasingly sociable. It is noteworthy that according to 
Mandeville’s usage, “civil commerce” should neither be considered as politics-
regarding activities nor be understood narrowly as trade, business or any sort 
of economic activities. In fact, by this term Mandeville means the same thing 
which Hobbes means by “societate mutua”, the mutual engagement among 
individuals.85 The peaceful and stable civil commerce demonstrates a civilised 
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lifestyle, and substantially constitutes the main part of men’s everyday life. 
Nonetheless, presenting a “thicker” concept of civil society than legal-
political relations, Mandeville to some extent blurred the role of politics at the 
same time. Firstly, despite his repeated stressing that “Laws and Government 
are to the Political Bodies of Civil Societies, what the Vital Spirits and Life it self 
are to the Natural Bodies of Animated Creatures”,86 yet the artificial institutions 
forming the artificial self and eventually making the society a “unity”, namely 
moral virtues and politeness, are not working in the same way as laws and 
government do but dependent on social opinions. Secondly, historically 
speaking, there also seems to be some ambiguity in Mandeville’s explanation 
of the origin of virtues and good manners. On the one hand, these institutions 
are many times regarded as inventions of cunning politicians and outcomes of 
dexterous statecraft, especially in the early version of the Fable. On the other 
hand, the role of politicians is downplayed in Part II. And in An Enquiry into the 
Origin of Honour, a work later than Part II, Mandeville mentions the politicians 
again, while arguing that 
I give those Names promiscuously to All that, having studied Human 
Nature, have endeavour’d to civilize Men, and render them more and more 
tractable, either for the Ease of Governours and Magistrates, or else for 
the Temporal Happiness of Society in general. I think of all Inventions of 
this Sort, the same which told you of Politeness, that they are the joint 
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Labour of Many. Human Wisdom is the Child of Time.87 
The names of “moralists and politicians” are more a mark showing the 
artificiality of the social disciplines, whereas the latter are actually products of 
long-term evolution on the basis of human nature. 88  Then it is not the 
commands of the government, but the impersonal, unintended collective 
actions of the whole society that gives rise to the norms above mentioned. To 
sum up, in Mandeville’s new picture of the civil society, both the logical and the 
temporal priority of the political power becomes problematic.89 
    At least at first glance, it is not unreasonable to consider the social norms 
as natural outcomes of the spontaneous evolution over a long time. Horatio, 
when summarising Cleomenes’s ideas, argues that “Everybody, in this 
undisciplin’d State, being affected with the high Value he has for himself, and 
displaying the most natural Symptoms, … they would all be offended at the 
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barefac’d Pride of their Neighbours: and it is impossible, that this should 
continue long among rational Creatures.”90 The inherent difficulties of human 
nature “must necessarily produce at long run, what we call good Manners and 
Politeness”. And once the conventions are ready to operate, “the whole 
Machine may be made to play of itself, with as little Skill, as is required to wind 
up a Clock”.91 For the maintenance of the civil society, special wisdom of 
politicians is not necessary. Nevertheless, when Horatio asks the historical 
origin of this mechanism instead of its philosophical reason, Cleomenes 
answers that 
In the Pursuit of Self-preservation, Men discover a restless Endeavour to 
make themselves easy, which insensibly teaches them to avoid Mischief 
on all Emergencies: and when human Creatures once submit to 
Government, and are used to live under the Restraint of Laws, it is 
incredible, how many useful Cautions, Shifts, and Stratagems, they will 
learn to practice by Experience and Imitation, from conversing together.92 
For Mandeville, the fact that politeness derives from long-term civil commerce 
does not negate its dependence on the regulation of government and laws. In 
other words, the social norms, however necessary and accordant with human 
nature, cannot come into being but in an existing body politic. 
    In his whole explanation of civil society, Mandeville always holds that “the 
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undoubted Basis of all Societies is Government”.93 To “civilise Men” is not 
different from to “establish them into a Body Politick”.94 Although the redirected 
self-liking can be used to play against the destructive self-love as well as 
against itself, the intersubjective disciplines, or the mutual exchange of 
psychological goods among individuals, is not expected to substitute the 
vertical power relationship. As Hobbes warned long before, self-liking, or the 
desire of comparative superiority to others, is at bottom an unsafe and 
potentially aggressive passion, for its inherent inclination to zero-sum 
competition could never be eliminated.95 In other words, the difficulty of the 
society-regarding self-love, albeit much moderated by various psychological 
techniques, is never entirely solved in Mandeville’s theory. The social 
mechanisms of moral virtues and good manners are hence fragile and 
precarious in essence, always operating on the edge of causing conflict. In 
Mandeville’s opinions, 
The grosser Sort of them it often affects so violently, that if they were not 
withheld by the Fear of the Laws, they would go directly and beat those 
their Envy is levell'd at, from no other Provocation than what that Passion 
suggests to them.96 
It is the laws that keeps the self-liking on the right line, preventing it from 
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becoming excessive envy and destroying the peace. Therefore, putting aside 
the debates about whether Mandeville’s “conspiracy account” should be 
interpreted literally, we ought not to underestimate the significance of politics in 
Mandeville’s entire theoretical framework. In terms of the principles of civil 
society, the mission of redirecting men’s passions could not be completed but 
by holders of political power, regardless of the personal wisdom or insight of 
individual politicians. In a nutshell, there is a systematic need for government, 
even if we decide not to take Mandeville’s words about the cunning politicians 
seriously. 
    Thereby it would not surprise us that according to Mandeville, setting up 
standards of worth and attributing tokens of honour are exactly powers and 
functions of the government. 
When we say the Sovereign is the Fountain of Honour, it signifies that he 
has the Power, by Titles or Ceremonies, or both together, to stamp a Mark 
upon whom he pleases, that shall be as current as his Coin, and procure 
the Owner the good Opinion of every Body, whether he deserves it or 
not.97 
As “the Fountain of Honour”, the sovereign determines glory and ignominy of 
the individuals while supporting his determination with power. Although 
Mandeville admits that “no Art could ever have fix’d or rais’d” men’s self-liking 
“in any Breast, if that Passion had not pre-existed and been dominant there”,98 
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it is the government that fixes the specific objects of this passion, enforces the 
redirection and ultimately puts the social disciplines into practice, regardless of 
whether the content of these norms is inventions of wise lawgivers or 
consequence of unconscious evolution. In this sense, moral virtues and good 
manners in civil commerce are at bottom dependent on political power, though 
they work on human nature in a totally different way than pure juridical-political 
institutions or commands. Considering Hobbes’s discussion on the system of 
public honour in civil society, the positions between Mandeville and Hobbes 
may be closer than many scholars have thought. This is not only due to the 
literal similarity in their emphasis on the roles of fear and government, but also 
because of their common awareness about the fundamental problem of modern 
society, i.e. the difficulty of society-regarding self-love. 99  In other words, 
Thomas Horne’s insightful comments are applicable to both thinkers: “The 
moral problem of commercial society is, then, not simply a conflict between self-
interest and sociability; it is also a conflict between different aspects of 
sociability”. If for Hobbes, the latter conflict is one between men’s need of others’ 
approval and a real concern for their opinions (let alone their welfare), then for 
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Mandeville there is at least a conflict “between the concern for the opinion of 
others and concern for the welfare of others”.100 Mandeville’s more optimistic 
view on the malleability of human nature gives him a better prospect of coping 
with this problem by milder means, but never liberates him completely from the 
long shadow of Hobbes. In fact, both the cultivation of self-liking and the 
government are indispensable. 
    Yet Mandeville does accomplish an important development of Hobbism by 
shedding light on the evolutionary disciplining of men’s love of self and 
enriching the understanding of civil society. In spite of its ever-lasting 
significance, politics is no longer the whole or the main part of the civil life of the 
individuals. Especially, when it comes to modern large society where the 
majority of “civil commerce” takes the form of commercial activities, men’s self-
love and self-liking are channelled to a new realm beyond Hobbes’s vision, 
namely economy. As a theorist of political economy as well as moral psychology, 
Mandeville keenly captures the great importance of this new aspect of civil 
society, treating it as the best exhibition site of the promise and problem of the 
society-regarding self-love. 
III. The Engine of Prosperity and the “Luxury Thesis” 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Hobbes is not totally ignorant 
about economy. The “commodious life” is one of the main aims of the civil 
society from the very beginning; also, roles of industry and commercial activities, 
                                                        




both in the cultivation of men’s sociability and in the growth of state power, are 
clearly noticed in his discussion about “the nutrition and procreation of a 
commonwealth”. But these ideas are quite brief and only peripheral for 
Hobbes’s entire theory. Hobbes never attempted to integrate them with his 
complicated analysis of human passions (especially pride), neither did he 
devote much to theorising the material power of the commonwealth. Such two 
steps are taken by Mandeville. In his “research into the Nature of Society”, 
Mandeville argues that 
Not only that the good and amiable Qualities of Man are not those that 
make him beyond other Animals a sociable Creature; but moreover that it 
would be utterly impossible, either to raise any Multitudes into a Populous, 
Rich and Flourishing Nation, or when so rais'd, to keep and maintain them 
in that Condition, without the assistance of what we call Evil both Natural 
and Moral.101 
What we call Evil in this World, Moral as well as Natural, is the grand 
Principle that makes us sociable Creatures, the solid Basis, the Life and 
Support of all Trades and Employments without Exception.102 
From Mandeville’s viewpoint, the “private vices”, i.e. the self-loving instincts of 
human beings, lead to not only sociability of individuals but also greatness or 
flourish of the whole nation. By stressing the role of “evil both natural and moral”, 
Mandeville connects the micro theory of personal morality to the macro theory 
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of politico-economic mechanisms, enabling his maxim to run through his whole 
analysis of modern society. 
    Looking at Mandeville’s arguments in detail, what is firstly noteworthy is 
the great attention he pays to the material prosperity of a civil society, which 
differentiates him from not only Hobbes (and most of the natural lawyers) with 
his concerns for legal-political power, but also republican authors, who regarded 
the virtues and public-spiritedness of the citizens as the most vital ingredients 
of state’s greatness.103 Yet unlike modern economists caring about the utilities 
of the individuals, this derives from Mandeville’s concern for the international 
political condition of civil societies. Mandeville notices the competition and wars 
modern states are facing. For Mandeville, besides peace and complaisance 
among individuals, “public benefits” for a civil society means its “earthly good”, 
namely being a large, populous, rich, industrious, glorious, powerful and warlike 
nation. In other words, what constitutes the vitality of the state is the abundance 
of material and human resources, therefore “trades and employments” are of 
considerable significance. Even in military affairs which used to be the stage of 
civic virtues, it is now public finance and manpower that play the decisive role. 
what have the Aldermen, the Common-Council, or indeed all People of 
any Substance to do with the War, but to pay Taxes? The Hardships and 
Fatigues of War that are personally suffer’d, fall upon them that bear the 
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Brunt of every Thing, the meanest Indigent Part of the Nation, the working 
slaving People. … Such a Variety of Labours in every great Nation require 
a vast Multitudes, in which there are always loose, idle, extravagant 
Fellows enough to spare for an Army.104 
On the one hand, men of property, of whom the military force usually used to 
be made up, no longer devote themselves to the war personally, but make a 
contribution to financing the war through national taxation. Even for those of 
them serving as officers, what really matters is their sagacity and sense of 
honour (which for Mandeville results from the manipulation of self-liking), 
whereas civic spirit is irrelevant. On the other hand, the army now mainly 
consists of “the working slaving people”, namely the labour force at the bottom 
of society. Though lacking traditional martial virtues, they are ready for 
mobilisation and can be easily trained and disciplined. Thus according to 
Mandeville, there is no need to worry about the war capacity of a state as long 
as “Military Affairs are taken care of as they ought, and the Soldiers well paid 
and kept in good Discipline”.105 Mandeville keenly grasps the transformation of 
the foundation and pattern of war, the most vital political affair for the survival 
of a civil society.106 However, the dependence of war capacity upon material 
and human resources does not reject but in turn requires a highly prosperous 
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society where the wheel of industry spins fast and smoothly. In Mandeville’s 
eyes, it is the demand that determines the condition of the whole economic 
system, therefore such a society is impossible unless people abandon “all the 
Virtue and Innocence that can be wish’d for in a Golden Age”,107 bid farewell to 
the natural simplicity of small peaceful society, and turn to men’s various 
desires for help. Most of the moral virtues, albeit no more than counterfeit, still 
require some abstinence and reduce men’s capacity of consumption and 
production. 
In correspondence with economy’s becoming a matter of state affairs, 
enjoyment of commodities must become the focus of men’s love of self. 
Nonetheless, according to Mandeville, the ever increasing concern individuals 
have for economy-regarding activities (including consumption and production 
stimulated by the former) derives neither from a simple bodily desire of material 
comfort, nor from a rationalised calculation of interest.108 To emancipate the 
unlimited potential of demand, what Mandeville needs is “a restless desire after 
Changes and Novelty”.109 Actually, this is a consequence of the alliance of self-
love and self-liking leaded by the latter. As our previous discussion has shown, 
each individual has an artificial self since he associates specific acquired things 
or qualities to his own person and endeavours to draw values or esteem from 
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them, while what can be regarded as a part of oneself is flexible and shaped by 
others. This is the foundational rationale of self-liking, shame and honour. Thus, 
when wealth and luxury are established as tokens of glory, with the additional 
desires of bodily satisfaction, human beings cannot but striving for 
accumulation of wealth and conspicuous consumption, then bring about a 
flourishing market finally, as long as the overall balance of trade is secured and 
the “working slaving people” are kept in compelling poverty by skilful politicians. 
Especially, Mandeville points out that the concrete content of luxuries and 
fashions is ever-changing, “for if the wants of Men are innumerable, then what 
ought to supply them has no bounds; what is call’d superfluous to some degree 
of People, will be thought requisite to those of higher Quality”.110 Consequently, 
the dynamics of economy can be ever-lasting, and with the advance of the 
industry even the “very Poor liv’d better than the rich before”.111 Now we get the 
most well-known form of the Mandevillean maxim or the “luxury thesis”: private 
vices that may lead to unhappiness or misery of specific individuals, namely 
luxury, vanity, avarice, greed, emulation and etc., are eventually the most 
powerful engine of the economic machine, giving rise to the “worldly greatness” 
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of a nation.112 
In comparing the “luxury thesis” with the other two theses, however, there 
are several points worth of notice. Firstly, despite of its reliance upon “dextrous 
management”, the “luxury thesis” works in a more spontaneous way than the 
other two do. Unlike political institutions and political power, the operation of the 
economy of luxury depends on the interaction (civil commerce) between 
members of civil society, whereas has nothing to do with coercive force. 
Meanwhile, unlike the mechanisms of moral virtues and politeness, luxury is 
able to arouse specific “public benefits” directly, with no need to be played 
against, redirected, restrained or disguised, regardless of whether such 
redirection or concealment is intended or not. The transformation of luxury into 
prosperity is itself not an outcome of manipulation, while the role of 
manipulation is only to encourage luxury and to keep the final balance of trade. 
According to Mandeville, 
The short-sighted Vulgar in the Chain of Causes seldom can see further 
than one Link; but those who can enlarge their View, and will give 
themselves the Leisure of gazing on the Prospect of concatenated Events, 
may, in a hundred Places, see Good spring up and pullulate from Evil, as 
naturally as Chickens do from Eggs.113 
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In this sense, the “luxury thesis”, as an economic phenomena, indicates a more 
autonomous and naturalistic (though at bottom artificial) aspect of the civil 
society. 
Secondly, besides its contribution to national prosperity, luxury, regarded 
as tokens of honour, is also beneficial for the improvement of men’s sociability 
by cultivating their artificial self and redirecting their pride. The market economy 
produces a society of strangers which becomes the best stage for hypocrisy. 
Meanwhile, albeit all human virtues are counterfeited as well, in comparison 
with other personal qualities, the conspicuous consumption itself is a most 
effortless adornment of men’s bare self, 
The most admired among the fashionable People that delight in outward 
Vanity, and know how to dress well, would be highly displeas’d if their 
Clothes, and Skill in putting them on, should be look’d upon otherwise than 
as Part of themselves; nay, it is this Part of them only, which whilst they 
are unknown, can procure them Access to the highest Companies, … 
without the least Regard to their Goodness, or their Understanding.114 
For Mandeville, the difference between the ancients and the moderns lies not 
in that between true virtue and counterfeit, but that between different contents 
of counterfeit or hypocrisy. Yet such a difference brings about important effects. 
On the one hand, while ancient virtues are accessible only for the few, modern 
honour and politeness, expressed in luxury, can be achieved by the 
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plebeians.115 On the other hand, luxury is usually accompanied by arts and 
civility. With the mediation of imaginary values, the artificiality of man’s self and 
the boom of economy construct a positive feedback mechanism. 
Notwithstanding its incapacity of promoting true virtues, luxury is at least a way 
of taming men’s offensive self-liking. Once human beings take pride in wealth 
and luxury instead of physical conquest and personal dominion, the emulation 
is no longer harmful but channelled to pacific realms. 
Thirdly, when individuals pursue luxuries through the market, they obtain 
additional incentives to act sociably. As market economy extends as well as 
deepens the interdependence among individuals to an unprecedented level, 
mutual accommodation is promoted in men’s civil commerce, and industry itself 
becomes a training course of disciplines.116 In other words, besides men’s 
general dependence on others in their seeking for approbation, the peculiar 
principles of market-based economic activities furthermore compel them to 
cooperate with each other.117 In sum, by satisfying men’s love of self (including 
self-love in the narrow sense and self-liking) and transforming it to state power 
as well as sociability, economic activities now function as the engine of large 
and lasting civil society. The civil society is closer and closer to the bourgeois 
society, the system of needs or material intercourses in Hegel and Marx’s terms. 
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Yet Mandeville is not a theorist of bourgeois society, for he cares more 
about the greatness of the state than the welfare of the individuals. A civil 
society engined by economic activities is necessitated more by the condition of 
international competition than by human nature itself. Meanwhile, Mandeville 
also reminds us that in this condition the role of government becomes subtler. 
An economy running around luxuries also needs to be regulated by “dextrous 
management”, which mainly means to give everybody an opportunity of being 
employed as well as to maintain the balance of international trade. Concretely 
speaking, the government is expected “to promote as great as a variety of 
Manufactures, Arts, and Handicrafts, as Human Wit can invent; and the second 
to encourage Agriculture and Fishery in all their Branches, that the whole Earth 
may be forc’d to exert it self as well as Man.”118 Good politicians should also 
conduct the course of trade to prevent the deficit. 
Moreover, Mandeville is aware that “Trade is the Principal, but not the only 
Requisite to aggrandize a Nation: there are other Things to be taken care of 
besides”119. As we have seen already, such a “promotion” or “encouragement” 
of industries and transactions cannot be achieved when men are content with 
a simple, tranquil and idle way of life, but by evoking their envy and emulation. 
However, redirecting men’s self-liking to the conspicuous consumption 
necessitates not only a system of honour singing its praise, but also an 
institution through which money and commodities are associated with oneself. 
                                                        
118 FB, I, p215. 
119 FB, I, p116. 
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That is to say, the goods and products, as external things, are not self-evidently 
considered as one’s own from which the worth of one’s person can be drawn. 
As is pointed out by Mandeville, “Wealth and Power, and all the Gifts of Fortune, 
that are plainly adventitious, and altogether remote from our Persons; whilst 
they are our Right and Property, we don’t love to be consider’d without them”.120 
Notwithstanding the lack of a well-developed theory of property in Mandeville’s 
social and political thoughts, yet he notices that wealth and possessions cannot 
become a part of one’s self without the institution of property. As a link in the 
formation of men’s artificial self, property is not merely a requisite of pacific 
economic activities, but also a precondition upon which the mechanism of self-
liking is enabled to work. But on the other hand, the restless passions of 
emulation, envy, avarice and greed at the same time increase the risk of mutual 
conflicts in a stirring society. Therefore, for the sovereign power, “the Meum and 
Tuum must be secur’d, Crimes punish’d, and all other Laws concerning the 
Administration of Justice, wisely contriv’d and strictly executed”.121 To a large 
extent, the institution of property then can be seen as a junction of the three 
main theses of the Mandevillean maxim: it is established and secured according 
to the “fear thesis” (by political power), working together with the “pride thesis” 
(the mechanism of honour) and putting the “luxury thesis” (the mechanism of 
economy) in to effect. 
To sum up, Mandeville lists the tasks of the government as follows, 
                                                        
120 FB, II, p359. 
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“Would you render a Society of Men strong and powerful, you must touch 
their Passions. Divide the Land, tho’ there be never so much to spare, and 
their Possessions will make them Covetous: Rouse them, tho’ but in Jest, 
from their Idleness with Praises, and Pride will set them to work in earnest: 
Teach them Trades and Handicrafts, and you’ll bring Envy and Emulation 
among them: to increase their Numbers, set up a Variety of manufactures, 
and leave no Ground uncultivated; Let Property be inviolably secures, and 
Privileges equal to all Men; suffer no body to act but what is lawful, and 
every body to think what he pleases; for a Country where every body may 
be maintained that will be employ’d, and the other Maxims are observ’d, 
must always throng’d and can never want People, as long as there is any 
in the World.”122 
In a large society powered by luxury, the role of the political power is not yet 
eliminated or undermined but transformed. It stimulates the social competition 
for the tokens of worth as well as controls its intensity, and itself benefits from 
both men’s acquired sociability and the material power generated by the socio-
economic course. In a nutshell, Mandeville’s civil society is on the whole an 
artefact, since even the “semi-autonomous region”123 of economy is embedded 
in artificial institutions, norms and regulations. 
                                                        
122 FB, I, p200. 





The Mandevillean maxim, no matter which particular form it takes, is at 
bottom a response to the problem and project put forward by Hobbes. It 
demonstrates the complicated relationship between the society-regarding self-
love and the civil society. For both Mandeville and Hobbes, the society-
regarding self-love cannot lead to sociability autonomously but arouses a state 
of war if not regulated, while the civil society is an artificial unity founded on the 
artificial self of human beings. But for Mandeville “artifice” means something 
more than for Hobbes. While Hobbes equates artificial to political, the 
confidence in the malleability of men’s self-liking makes Mandeville no longer 
regard social order entirely dependent on the coercive force and legal rights of 
the government, but inclines him to give a greater role to “civil commerce” (or 
Hobbes’s societate mutua) between individuals, from which the mechanisms of 
virtue and politeness emerge. The civil society, consequently, is more and more 
understood as a space where a civilised way of life is formed within the context 
of increasingly stirring socio-economic activities with the help of the property 
system. That is why Mandeville seems to have provided some “proto-
sociology”. 124 Nonetheless, Mandeville sticks to using “civil society” in the 
political sense. Historically, the “process of civilisation”, albeit begun in primitive 
families and tribes, did not have decisive effects until the establishment of the 
government and the written laws. Theoretically, the inherent difficulty of society-
                                                        
124 Pekka Sulkunen, “The Proto-Sociology of Mandeville and Hume”, Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 
15, No. 3 (2014), pp361-365. 
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regarding self-love both drives the large society warlike in the face of other 
nations and preserves the root of conflicts within it. Commercial society or civil 
commerce could not be secured merely by “commercial sociability”, hence 
political power is always needed to maintain the precarious balance. This is a 
doctrine Mandeville cannot give up as long as he chooses to stand with Hobbes 
on his opposition to natural sociability. 
Mandeville’s development of Hobbes marks the rising significance of new 
issues in eighteenth century political thought under the general theme of 
sociability inherited from the seventeenth century. Yet the Mandevillean Maxim 
aroused lots of criticism, for it makes us face the uncomfortable moral paradox 
of entirely reducing morality to self-love, and sociability to artifice. Furthermore, 
since Mandeville points out the necessity (not only inevitability) of “private vices” 
for the greatness of the state, he looks even more provocative than his 
Augustinian predecessors and Hobbes. Is it then possible to overcome the 
problematic elements of the Mandevillean Maxim while preserving Mandeville’s 
insights about human nature, the artificial civil society, and the political economy? 
Refusing to return to the orthodoxy of natural sociability, Hume revised and 
developed Mandeville’s arguments by providing a more sophisticated 




Chapter 3  Hume on Self-Love and the Mechanisms of Artificial Virtues 
Hume paid homage to Mandeville when he included him among the philosophers 
“who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing”.1 Yet, to tell the 
intellectual relationship between them is not easy, for Mandeville’s name was 
listed alongside philosophers who were known as Mandeville’s opponents, 
including Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler. For many scholars, Hume’s stress 
on men’s moral sense, the mechanism of sympathy, as well as natural affections 
and benevolence definitely demonstrates his debt to the Hutchesonian moral 
sentimentalists. Refusing to reduce everything to self-love (especially self-
preservation), Hume never accepts the foundational doctrine of Mandevillean 
egoism.2 Other interpreters remind us that those Hutchesonian elements are of 
little practical significance for the subsistence of social order.3 Hume’s social and 
political philosophy, especially his theory of artificial virtues, has a more 
Mandevillean aspect. And of course, to clarify Hume’s thought we must do justice 
to its very originality and complexity. 
    Based on our interpretation of Hobbes and Mandeville, this chapter probes 
into Hume’s analysis of men’s society-regarding self-love, and also endeavours 
                                                        
1 THN, intro.8, SBNxvii. 
2 Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1941, pp1-51; Gladys 
Bryson, Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century, Princeton, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1945; David Fate Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician; 
Christopher Finlay, Hume’s Social Philosophy, ch6; Christian Maurer, “Self-Interest and Sociability”, in James Harris 
ed., The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 
pp292-312. 
3 John Mackie, Hume’s Moral Theory, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980; James Moore, “Hume and Hutcheson”; 
“Utility and Humanity: The Quest for the Honestum in Cicero, Hutcheson, and Hume”, Utilitas, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Nov., 
2002), pp365-386; John Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples 1680-1760, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, ch6; Mikko Tolonen, Mandeville and Hume. Also cf. James Harris, Hume: An 
Intellectual Biography, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, ch2. 
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to clarify the coexistent naturalness, morality, and artificiality of Hume’s civil 
society. Since men’s idea of self is highly problematic in Hume’s eyes, we will 
start with an examination of the construction of our self-understanding and the 
role pride plays in it. This explains why Hume’s men, like Hobbes’s and 
Mandeville’s, are both self-centred and open to others. Then, in Section 2 to 
Section 4, we will investigate the formation of civil society step by step, from the 
state of nature to the emergence of justice, to the crisis of justice in the enlarged 
society, and finally to the establishment of government. We will see that, 
regarding justice and allegiance as “conventions” and “artificial virtues”, Hume on 
the one hand agrees with Hobbes and Mandeville on the artificiality of civil society 
as well as on the role of coercion, honour and hypocrisy, while on the other hand 
he makes this artificiality consistent with the gradual evolution of social norms 
and the moral sentiments in man’s heart. In this way, Hume offers a more 
enriched theory of civil society. 
I. The Humean Self: Between Self-Love and Sociability4 
1. Pride and the Construction of the Self 
From the perspective of Hobbes and Mandeville, the ultimate origin of the 
difficulty of social order lies in men’s society-regarding self-love, whereas the only 
solution is to establish a civil society on the basis of artifice. As we have discussed 
in previous chapters, to a large extent, the paradox of society-regarding self-love 
                                                        
4 Strictly speaking, for Hume “when we talk of self-love, ’tis not in a proper sense”, because the proper object of love 
is others (THN, 2.2.1.2, SBN329). Yet Hume still use this term in its vulgar sense as a concern for our own individual 
happiness. E.g. THN, 2.2.5.9, SBN361; 3.2.6.6, SBN529; 3.2.8.5, SBN543; EPM, 5.1.6-10, SBN215-216. Also cf. 




is derived from the ambiguity of the self. On the one hand, the self is the centre 
of all our selfish passions, the starting point from which we make deliberations 
about all our actions, the subject (and sometimes object) of all our evaluations, 
and the owner of all our possessions. It is for ourselves that human beings really 
have concern, and it is for the sake of ourselves that human beings do everything. 
But on the other hand, this very self is far from a self-evident entity. We hardly 
have a simple and clear understanding about who we are. The dearest person 
we have so much concern for is always changing during life without perfect 
identity. Our self-evaluations are not self-supporting but originate from 
comparisons with others, need to be recognised by others, or are even 
determined by the opinions of others. Nor do we have a definite idea about what 
“belongs to” us or what is “our own”, thus we may annex to our persons everything 
of which we can make use and from which some value or merit can be drawn. 
Both the formation of the self and its relationship with others as well as external 
things are complicated, leading to tensions between ourselves and the society. 
However, such a self is also open to artifice. In fact, for Hobbes and Mandeville, 
the civil society with artificial order and civilised lifestyle is precisely a counterpart 
of the artificial self, a self constructed by social institutions and conventions 
instead of the original appearance of human nature. 
The problem of the self is even more highlighted by Hume, who has a more 
philosophical interest besides the concern for men’s social and political life. In 
Hume’s eyes, the problem of the self is at first ontological. Inspired by Descartes, 
Locke, and the debaters around them, Hume carries out his own attack against 
143 
 
systems of philosophy before him, most of which presuppose external objects 
with continued and distinct existence as well as intimate consciousness of our 
self with perfect simplicity and identity. 5  According to Hume’s philosophical 
principles based on perceptions, both hypotheses are problematic, for there are 
no correspondent impressions of those sorts of substance, which should have 
been constant, invariable and uninterrupted. Our perceptions are independent 
existences, changing and often interrupted. Therefore, both the identity of 
external objects and that of ourselves are mere fictions. Yet Hume still presents 
an explanation about how these fictions are formed. All those objects to which we 
attribute a continued existence have a peculiar constancy, i.e. a resemblance 
between our broken perceptions of them suggesting such objects did not change 
upon the interruptions. Even if the constancy is not perfect, they still preserve a 
coherence from which we can infer their continued existence by causal inference. 
“The passage betwixt related ideas is, therefore, so smooth and easy, that it 
produces little alteration on the mind, and seems like the continuation of the same 
action; and as the continuation of the same action is an effect of the continu’d 
view of the same object, ’tis for this reason we attribute sameness to every 
succession of related objects.”6 Due to our natural preference for general rules, 
our imagination has a propensity to believe that the interrupted impressions are 
connected by a real, unchangeable substance. As a result, we mistake the 
                                                        
5 There were heated debates about the theme of personal identity in 17th- and 18th-century philosophy, in which 
Descartes, Locke, Clarke, Collins, Bayle, Berkeley and Malebranche are important participants. About the context, see 
Udo Thiel, The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011. 
6 THN, 1.4.2.34, SBN204. 
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succession for the identity of the objects. A similar process takes place when it 
comes to our personal identity. Since all our perceptions are related with each 
other by resemblance and causal relations, and those relations can be discovered 
by our memory, the transition between our perceptions must be quite easy. Thus 
the imagination is disposed to “feign” an identity as well as a simplicity underlying 
the related perceptions. Hume’s destruction of men’s idea of self is more thorough 
than Mandeville’s. On the ontological level, in fact, the self is nothing but a “bundle” 
or collection of successive perceptions.7 
But the mechanism of imagination is not an exhaustive answer to the 
problem concerning our personal identity. “To answer this question, we must 
distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and 
as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves.”8 It has already 
been displayed that on the level of “thought or imagination”, the relations of 
resemblance and causation bind our perceptions together, affording us a complex 
idea of the self. This self, at the same time, is in the whirl of passions. According 
to Hume’s classification, passions are impressions of reflection, which are 
subdivided into “direct passions” and “indirect passions”. Among the former are 
desire, aversion, hope, fear, etc., whereas the latter includes pride, humility, love, 
hatred, and their various mixtures. As individual members in the bundle of 
perceptions, the passions are related to each other and to other kinds of 
perceptions. We may feel proud of our virtuous characters, may be angered by a 
                                                        
7 THN, 1.4.6.4, SBN252. 
8 THN, 1.4.6.5, SBN253. 
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pain caused by our enemies, and may love another person when being pleased 
by his handsome appearance. In this way, the mechanism of passions provides 
more connections between our perceptions besides those have been discovered 
in Hume’s analysis of “thought and imagination”, such as the resemblance and 
causal relations between impressions and their correspondent ideas. Especially, 
some passions, such as hope, fear, pride and humility, rouse our memory and 
anticipation by presenting us with a conscious concern for our past or future 
experience, despite there being no simple and strict identity of the self through 
time. Therefore, part of the foundation on which our imagination constructs the 
consciousness of the self is generated by men’s passions. In Hume’s own 
words,“in this view our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate 
that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions 
influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future 
pains or pleasures.”9 
But besides establishing relations between perceptions and contributing to 
the formation of the “bundle”, some specific passions are directly relevant to the 
bundle (as a whole) itself, namely pride and humility. Hume’s analysis focuses on 
pride, as “the mind has a much stronger propensity to pride than to humility”.10 
Despite a simple impression, pride has an object as well as a cause, both of which 
are ideas: 
The first idea, that is presented to the mind, is that of the cause or productive 
                                                        
9 THN, 1.4.6.9, SBN261. Cf. Jane McIntyre, “Personal Identity and the Passions”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 
Vol. 27, No. 4 (Oct., 1989), pp545-557; “Hume on the Problem of Personal Identity”, in The Cambridge Companion 
to Hume, ed. by David Fate Norton, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp177-208. 
10 THN, 2.2.10.4, SBN390. 
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principle. This excites the passion, connected with it; and that passion, when 
excited, turns our view to another idea, which is that of self. Here then is a 
passion plac’d betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other 
is produc’d by it. The first idea, therefore, represents the cause, the second 
the object of the passion.11 
The cause produces pride, then the object is produced by pride. According to 
Hume, the object is the self, which is not the thinking substance with perfect 
identity and simplicity in the traditional sense, but “the succession of related ideas 
and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness” as 
has already been discussed.12 The cause also has something to do with the self. 
Hume makes a further distinction between the quality which operates and the 
subject on which the quality is placed. In order to produce pride, the quality must 
be able to arouse a separate pleasure, and the subject must be “either parts of 
ourselves, or sometimes nearly related to us”.13 Thus the impression of pleasure, 
the impression of pride, the idea of the cause/subject, and the idea of ourselves 
form the “double relations” of impression and idea, which is necessary for the 
occurrence of pride. For instance, we may easily feel joy from a beautiful house, 
but pride takes place only if I am the owner or the constructor of such a house so 
that it is annexed to me. Hume then lists several main causes of pride. “The most 
obvious cause” is virtue, which refers to how good qualities of our actions and 
manners determine our personal characters. The beauty of our body are also 
                                                        
11 THN, 2.1.2.4, SBN278. 
12 THN, 2.1.2.2, SBN277. 
13 THN, 2.1.5.2, SBN285. 
147 
 
“natural and immediate” causes, for whether we consider the body as a part of 
ourselves, it is still closely connected with us. Besides, we take pride in external 
advantages as well, and the closest relation, “which of all others produces most 
commonly the passion of pride, is that of property” that associates a person and 
the possessions belonging to him.14 Now the self involved in the cause is to some 
extent different from the self as the object. As successive perceptions, the self as 
object is equalised to the mind, whereas the self involved in the cause is “our 
mind and body”, who is also a bearer of social relations and an owner of property. 
In some commentators’ words, the former is an “intellectual” self, while the latter 
is an “embodied” social self, an agent, an individual person in the sense of our 
“vulgar” common life.15 As an original force in human nature, pride seems to 
generate an entirely new self in a more simple and direct way. 
However, this does not mean Hume illegitimately introduced another sort of 
self, some reality which had been denied in Book 1 of the Treatise. To the contrary, 
the embodied self or the agent is by no means in contradiction with the self as a 
succession of perceptions. Firstly, the self as a holder of virtues is well consistent 
with Hume’s arguments in Book 1. Being a bundle or heap of successive 
                                                        
14 THN, 2.1.7.2, SBN295; 2.1.8.1, SBN298; 2.1.10.1, SBN309. 
15 It has almost been a common sense in Hume scholarship that the concept of self in Book 2 is much enriched than 
that in Book 1. See Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, “‘Pride Produces the Idea of Self’: Hume on Moral Agency”, Australian 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 3 (1990), pp255-269; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on 
Hume’s Treatise, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991, ch6; Robert Henderson, “David Hume on Personal 
Identity and the Indirect Passions”, Hume Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Apr., 1990), pp33-44; Pauline Chazan, “Pride, Virtue, 
and Selfhood: A Reconstruction of Hume”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp45-64; 
Terence Penelhum, Themes in Hume: The Self, the Will, Religion, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000, ch5; Eugenio 
Lecaldano, “The Passions, Character, and the Self in Hume”, Hume Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Nov., 2002), pp175-193; 
A. E. Pitson, Hume’s Philosophy of the Self, London: Routledge, 2002; Jennifer Welchman, “Self-Love and Personal 
Identity in Hume’s Treatise”; Ruth Boeker, “Locke and Hume on Personal Identity: Moral and Religious Differences”, 
Hume Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Nov., 2015), pp105-135. Some commentators, such as Rorty, Henderson, Penelhum and 
Lecaldano hold that the embodied social self in Book 2 is substantially different from the intellectual self in Book 1, 
therefore pride provides us with a new idea of self. This view is not without truth, but it is noteworthy that for Hume, 
the embodied social self is involved in the cause rather than the object of pride, while the object, i.e. the idea of self 
exactly produced by pride, is still “a succession of perceptions”. (Also see footnote 14 below.) 
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perceptions, the self nonetheless has some structures or dispositions, which 
display various relations between individual perceptions and are relatively more 
stable than the latter. The bundle of a vain person is expected to contain more 
impressions of vanity than that of a modest person. Men with great strength of 
mind tend to have more experience of calm passions than violent ones in their 
heaps. In this way, we are still enabled to tell some qualities and characters in 
spite of the lack of pure personal identity. Hume even analogises the self to a 
republic, which makes better sense of characters than the “bundle theory”: 
I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a republic or 
commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal 
ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who 
propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts. And as 
the same individual republic may not only change its members, but also its 
laws and constitutions; in like manner the same person may change his 
character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without 
losing his identity.16 
The self is like a republic, with perceptions as the individual members, and 
characters as the laws and constitutions. Therefore, the perceptions are not piled 
together arbitrarily, but organised according to certain rules that reflect the 
features of the given person. Albeit mere characters do not constitute the 
“republic” which depends on causal relations and resemblance between 
                                                        
16 THN, 1.4.6.19, SBN261. Cf. Jane McIntyre, “Character: A Humean Account”, History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 
7, No. 2 (Apr., 1990), pp193-206; Lilly Alanen, “Personal Identity, Passions, and ‘The True Idea of the Human Mind’”, 
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perceptions, they have no difficulty being the cause of pride, and also enable 
moral evaluations as we will see later. 
Things become more complicated when it comes to the body. The body can 
be seen as our own, yet when I say “this body is mine” I mean something totally 
different from saying “this perception or character is mine”. A perception belongs 
to the self in the sense that an individual belongs to the collection. But the 
relationship between the body and the embodied self goes beyond the world of 
perceptions and have something to do with the ownership of material objects. In 
fact, though Hume considers body as a part of ourselves, he does not provide an 
explicit analysis of the body-mind relation, and mentions that some philosophers 
“regard it as something external”. 17  Nevertheless, there is no contradiction 
between Hume’s position concerning this problem and his basic philosophical 
principles. Considering the body as an external existence, we may form 
impressions and ideas of our body in the same way as cognising other objects. 
We perceive its shape, colour, motion, its various qualities as well as relationship 
with other objects, and construct it as a continued and distinct existence. But we 
may also find some unique causal relationships between our body and our 
motives, which cannot be applied to other objects. For instance, we may observe 
a constant association between the perception of a willed action -  “raise up my 
hand” -  and the perception of a bodily movement when my hand is raised up, 
as well as a constant association between the perception that my head is hit by 
a stick and the perception of pain. There are no equivalent relations between my 
                                                        
17 THN, 2.1.8.1, SBN298. 
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mind and other external existences. Therefore, the body is regarded as 
something more tightly connected with ourselves, albeit the essential relationship 
between our body and mind or our intrinsic “power” of agency is unintelligible. 
The embodiedness of the self does not discredit its ontological nature as a 
succession of perceptions, and can be explained by the bundle theory. 
The self as the owner of possessions is also explainable in this manner. 
“Property may be defin’d, such relation betwixt a person and an object as permits 
him, but forbids any other, the free use and possession of it, without violating the 
laws of justice and moral equity.”18 According to Hume’s definition, the relation of 
property involves both a relation between a person and an object, and a relation 
between persons, for it on the one hand permits a person (the owner) to deal with 
the object at his will, and on the other hand prevent others from intervention. 
Specifically, as a moral and legal institution, the forbiddance imposed on others 
does not work like physical obstacles do. Yet the moral/legal relations concerning 
property and persons can still be reduced to natural relations of perceptions. 
Regardless of whether justice is natural or artificial, from Hume’s perspective, 
property at bottom “may be look’d upon as a particular species of causation”, and 
there is no difference between moral-legal causation and physical causation.19 
On the one hand, “ownership” means that the proprietor has the liberty to operate 
as he pleases upon the object, as well as to reap advantage from it. On the other 
hand, all the others, as will be discussed in the next section, abstain from his 
                                                        
18 THN, 2.1.10.1, SBN310. 
19 THN, 2.1.10.1, SBN310. Cf. James Harris, “Hume’s Reconciling Project and ‘the Common Distinction betwixt 
Moral and Physical Necessity”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2003), pp451-471. 
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property due to their self-interest, their moral sentiments, or their desire of honour 
and reputation. Given that causation is in fact a particular species of relation 
between perceptions, ontologically speaking, the self with property and social 
status is derived from the self as a collection of perceptions. In sum, the self 
involved in the cause of pride is not substantially different from the self as the 
object of such a passion. 
Pride therefore does not produce an entirely new self with more reality or 
self-evidence, nonetheless, it indeed enriches men’s understanding of ourselves. 
As Hume has already demonstrated in Book 1, by causal relations and 
resemblance between perceptions, a “bundle” or “republic” is formed, giving rise 
to our intimate consciousness of the self as a continued existence. But the self 
so far is a person with no face, for we have no knowledge about “who I am” but 
only a bare awareness that “I am”. In other words, except for a consciousness of 
existence, there is neither an understanding of what can be seen as our own, nor 
an evaluation of what kind of person we are. In order to characterise the self, 
attention must be paid to certain perceptions as well as their relations in the 
bundle rather than the bundle as bundle. This further step is achieved by our 
indirect passions, especially pride. “The passion always turns our view to 
ourselves, and makes us think of our own qualities and circumstances.”20 Pride, 
                                                        
20 THN, 2.1.5.6, SBN287. There are some scholars arguing that the self must have been existing prior to the occurrence 
of pride, otherwise pride could not take place. (Terence Penelhum, Themes in Hume, ch5; “The Indirect Passions, 
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp206-229; Robert Henderson, “David Hume on Personal Identity and 
the Indirect Passions”.) Some others hold that the idea of self is produced by pride, thus is logically simultaneous or 
posterior to that passion. (Pauline Chazan, “Pride, Virtue, and Selfhood: A Reconstruction of Hume”; Eugenio 
Lecaldano, “The Passions, Character, and the Self in Hume”.) Amélie Oksenberg Rorty attempts to solve this problem 
by distinguishing the characterised self posterior to pride from the self prior to it (i.e. the self in Book 1). (See Rorty, 
“‘Pride Produces the Idea of Self’: Hume on Moral Agency”.) This attempt is thought-provoking, but it overestimates 
the advancement brought about by pride. In fact, the self in Book 1 and Book 2 is the same. What pride produces is a 
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itself a perception in the bundle, concentrates our attention to the whole bundle 
as well as the perceptions constituting it. With the help of the mechanism of pride, 
we identify our characters, recognise the connections between ourselves and the 
body or external properties, and also attempt to “infer an excellency in ourselves” 
from those things that cause our pride, considering them as what defines us as 
who we are.21 In this way, we step out of the intellectual world of perceptions and 
enter into the common life. Our selves are now recognised as embodied and 
characterised persons, occupying certain statuses in the web of social and moral 
relations. Yet our “vulgar” sense of the self, philosophically speaking, is formed 
on the basis of (rather than independent from) the succession of perceptions. 
2. Pride, Fame, and Society-Regarding Self-Love 
As a product of pride, men’s self-understanding is flexible and open to the 
impact of others, because pride is itself a society-regarding passion. Though 
caused by something related to ourselves and directed to the idea of the self, 
pride is far from self-sustaining. As is known to us, some causes of pride, such 
as properties, are not annexed to ourselves naturally and immediately but through 
social conventions. Furthermore, whatever cause it is, to arouse pride it must “be 
not only closely related, but also peculiar to ourselves, or at least common to us 
with a few persons”, because “we likewise judge of objects more from comparison 
than from their real and intrinsic merit; and where we cannot by some contrast 
                                                        
characterised bundle of perceptions. 
21 THN, 2.1.6.7, SBN293; Donald Ainslie, “Scepticism about Persons in Book II of Hume’s Treatise”, Journal of the 
History of Philosophy, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul., 1999), pp469-492. 
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enhance their value, we are apt to overlook even what is essentially good in 
them.”22 Hume points out that human beings “are every moment apt to” compare 
ourselves with others, and dispose to evaluate things and ourselves through 
comparison. Albeit this disposition operates generally, it has a much greater 
influence on the passion of pride, thus pride requisites not only a separate 
pleasure in the cause but also peculiarity and superiority. For example, health is 
commonly agreeable and valuable in itself, and is tightly associated with us as 
well. But it might hardly excite our pride unless we are particularly more muscular 
than others. Such a disposition especially leads to our vanity of power and shame 
of slavery: 
For supposing it possible to frame statues of such an admirable mechanism, 
that they cou’d move and act in obedience to the will; ’tis evident the 
possession of them wou’d give pleasure and pride, but not to such a degree, 
as the same authority, when exerted over sensible and rational creatures, 
whose condition, being compar’d to our own, makes it seem more agreeable 
and honourable.23 
Authority itself is agreeable, but the slavery of others will augment our pride by 
comparison. In this case, pride takes the form as enjoyment of positional goods 
and therefore causes zero-sum competitions between individuals, even giving 
rise to envy or malice. Hume does not highlight the potential danger of pride at 
                                                        
22 THN, 2.1.6.4, SBN291. 
23 THN, 2.1.10.12, SBN315. Also see Jacqueline Taylor’s insightful comments on pride and social power, Reflecting 
Subjects: Passion, Sympathy, and Society in Hume’s Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, ch3. 
According to Taylor, pride is the foundation of social stratification, but Hume did not develop this point in his analysis 
of social order in Book 3 of the Treatise. 
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this moment, but he at least agrees with his predecessors (including Hobbes and 
Mandeville) that both pride and our self-understanding derived from it cannot 
make sense without reference to others. 
What is more, human beings are directly influenced by the opinions and 
feelings of others, since they count as a secondary cause of pride, and also play 
a significant role in sustaining our pride resulting from the original causes. To 
explain this phenomenon Hume introduces the mechanism of sympathy. 
According to Hume, individuals are not secluded in each one’s own world of 
perceptions, rather we can to some extent enter the experience of others. Firstly, 
due to our observation of causal relations, the actions or appearances of others 
are considered as effects or “external signs” of their inward emotions. Having 
seen these signs, we then form a belief (i.e. an idea with great vividness) in the 
reality of the sentiments they are experiencing.24 Secondly, given that there is a 
great resemblance among human beings, the force and vivacity of the idea of 
ourselves, which we always intimately perceive, can be conveyed to the idea of 
others’ affections, enlivening the latter and transforming it into an impression.25 
                                                        
24 THN, 2.1.11.3, SBN317. 
25 Hume’s terminology here has aroused lots of debates in interpreters. In Book 2, Part 1, Section 11 of the Treatise, 
Hume mentions men’s “idea, or rather impression of ourselves” and “impression of our person” (THN, 2.1.11.4-5, 
SBN317-318). Yet according to Hume’s own analysis in Book 1, human beings cannot have an “impression” of the 
self. Cf. Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of Its Origins and Central Doctrines, 
London: Macmillan, 1941, pv. There are several plausible explanations if we adhere to our previous view and not make 
recourse to a new sort of self. Nicholas Capaldi suggests that the vivacity of our pride is conveyed to the idea of self 
and makes the latter become an impression. See his Hume’s Place in Moral Philosophy, NY: Peter Lang, 1989, pp174-
176. From another perspective, Don Garrett claims that Hume merely denies the impression of self as a simple and 
invariable substance, whereas in some sense, all impressions contribute to our idea of self could be regarded as 
impressions of ourselves. See his Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy, NY: Oxford University Press, 
1997, pp167-169. Åsa Carlson presents a similar interpretation that Hume’s usage of “impression” here is in the vulgar 
instead of philosophical sense. Although the self is no more than a bundle of perceptions, ordinary people do have some 
“vague” impression of themselves, which would be some lively memory of their personal history or perceptions of 
their body. Åsa Carlson, “There is Just One Idea of Self in Hume’s Treatise”, Hume Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1&2 (2009), 
pp171-184. In sum, despite “in sympathy our own person is not the object of any passion, nor is there any thing, that 
fixes our attention on ourselves” (THN, 2.2.2.17, SBN340), the self-consciousness is by all means important, otherwise 
we could not “feel” the emotions of others in ourselves. 
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As a consequence we not only know but by ourselves “feel” the sentiments taking 
place on others in a lively manner. Hume also notes that besides the general 
resemblance of human creatures, other relations as well facilitate the process of 
sympathy, and the more closely others are related to us, the more easily and 
strongly we sympathise with them. That is why we are more touched by the 
affections of our relatives and fellows than those of the strangers. Now the 
sympathised emotions of others may excite our second-order pride. At first, some 
good quality of ourselves or something belonging to us provides us with an 
immediate joy along with pride, and at the same time causes praise or esteem in 
the hearts of others. Then, the praise of others is sympathised by us, giving rise 
to a sentiment both pleasant and closely related to ourselves. At last we feel an 
additional pride. In Hume’s words, the minds of men are mirrors to one another, 
because they reflect each other’s emotions, and “those rays of passions, 
sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated.”26 
But for Hume, the mechanism of sympathy plays a more important role than 
exciting our secondary pride. In fact, human beings are not merely enabled to 
share the experience of others, but also take their opinions and feelings into 
serious consideration: 
These two principles of authority and sympathy influence almost all our 
opinions, but must have a peculiar influence, when we judge of our own 
worth and character. Such judgments are always attended with passion; and 
nothing tends more to disturb our understanding, and precipitate us into any 
                                                        
26 THN, 2.2.6.21, SBN365. 
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opinions, however unreasonable, than their connexion with passion; which 
defuses itself over the imagination, and gives an additional force to every 
related idea. To which we may add, that being conscious of great partiality 
in our own favour, we are peculiarly pleas’d with any thing, that confirms the 
good opinion we have of ourselves, and are easily shock’d with whatever 
oppose it.27 
Hume explains this phenomenon firstly by reminding us of the affinity between 
passions and judgments. At first glance, men’s self-evaluation about our worth 
and character is a kind of “judgment” made by reason, and could be independent 
from the feelings of ourselves and others. Nonetheless, as an evaluative passion, 
pride is always attended with such sort of judgment. The satisfaction or frustration 
of pride will to a large extent affect our judgment in the corresponding direction. 
Thus the sympathised feelings and opinions of others, by influencing our pride, 
eventually influence our self-estimation. Furthermore, Hume also notices the 
fragility of our pride. Hume’s claim here is quite similar to that of Mandeville. As 
we have discussed in the last chapter, Mandeville’s men are diffident in their self-
evaluations because they recognise their tendency to overestimate themselves. 
That makes them not so stubborn as to “extort” good opinions from others like 
Hobbes’s vain-glorious individuals. In Hume’s view, human beings also have an 
awareness of our “great partiality in our own favour”, and consequently are not 
sure about the judgments of our own qualities. Therefore, the opinions and 
feelings of others are no longer additional recognitions of our value, but rather 
                                                        
27 THN, 2.1.11.9, SBN321. 
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constitute our self-understanding, for they either confirm our own estimation or 
challenge the latter and require an adjustment of our opinions. In this sense, the 
“mirror analogy” does not represent this process very precisely, because it is 
rather by “reflections” that the “incident light” itself is fixed. 
This explains why Hume titles the corresponding section in the Treatise as 
“love of fame” instead of “pride in fame”. Pride itself is a “pure emotion in the soul” 
not necessarily attended with desires,28 but our concern about others’ evaluations 
about ourselves still gives us a desire of praise, otherwise neither our pride could 
be sustained nor our self-estimation established. Such a desire or “love of fame” 
may further arouse desires of those good qualities or properties and of showing 
them to others. “Popular fame may be agreeable even to a man, who despises 
the vulgar, … plagiaries are delighted with praises, which they are conscious they 
do not deserve.”29 The pride caused by others’ good opinions is secondary in 
time, but it surpasses or even replaces the original pride considering its impact 
on men. “This secondary satisfaction or vanity becomes one of the principal 
recommendation for riches, and is the chief reason, why we either desire them 
for ourselves, or esteem them in others”. 30  Briefly speaking, our evaluative 
passions are inherently dependent on others. And as we will see later, not only 
the outcome, but also the criteria according to which we make evaluations are 
society-regarding. 
    The passion of pride and mechanism of sympathy demonstrate men’s 
                                                        
28 THN, 2.2.6.3, SBN367. 
29 THN, 2.1.11.19, SBN324. 
30 THN, 2.2.5.21, SBN365. 
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inherent wants of society. Besides them Hume also affirms the existence of men’s 
natural benevolence, compassion, and love of others. Nevertheless, the self-
centeredness of human beings could by no means be overestimated. The 
mechanism of pride is ultimately directed to the self, and is ultimately determined 
by human nature. Hume even traces it back to our natural “organs”: 
Nature has given to the organs of the human mind, a certain disposition 
fitted to produce a peculiar impression or emotion, which we call pride: To 
this emotion she has assign’d a certain idea, viz. that of self, which it never 
fails to produce. … The organs are so dispose’d as to produce the passion; 
and the passion, after its production, naturally produces a certain idea. … 
we never shou’d be possest of that passion, were there not a disposition of 
mind proper for it. ’Tis as evident, that the passion always turns our view to 
ourselves, and makes us think of our own qualities and circumstances.31 
There is an inherent disposition in human nature that we would like to annex 
something to ourselves and take pride in ourselves because of those things. The 
mechanism of pride is as original and powerful as those of lust and hunger, 
operating as an original force besides imagination in constituting our 
understanding of the self. Albeit the society plays an indispensable role in 
determining who we are, the social factors cannot work but through the 
mechanism of pride grounded on the “organs”. For instance, the society may 
create a connection between our property and ourselves in our thought, yet only 
when such a connection touches the organs could it excite our pride, make us 
                                                        
31 THN, 2.1.5.6, SBN287, original emphasis. 
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evaluate ourselves according to property and arouses an additional desire of 
property. Likewise we may also sympathise with the pain that others suffer due 
to our harmful behaviours, but might do nothing to change the situation unless 
we really feel shame in our vices. The “organs” are like the eye of a needle; only 
that which successfully passes through is able to affect our selves. 
Our self, independent of the perceptions of every other object, is in reality 
nothing: For which reason we must turn our view to external objects; and ’tis 
natural for us to consider with most attention such as lie contiguous to us, 
or resemble us. But when self is the object of a passion, ’tis not natural to 
quit the consideration of it, till the passion be exhausted.32 
The self is not a self-sustaining substance, thus philosophically speaking it must 
be filled or composed with perceptions of various objects, and vulgarly speaking 
it must be open to the external world, especially to the interactions with our fellow 
creatures. But whatever the self consists in, it is the final centre of our self-love 
and the natural object of our pride, and for Hume, “nothing invigorates and exalts 
the mind equally with pride and vanity”.33 In this sense, the self-love of human 
beings takes priority to sociality. It is the original mechanism of men’s self-directed 
passions rather than the social commerce that determines how others would 
influence us. It is also those passions that bestow our self-understanding with 
force, making us “believe in” instead of merely “imagine” who we are. 
In a nutshell, notwithstanding Hume’s analysis is much subtler than those of 
                                                        
32 THN, 2.2.2.17, SBN340-341. 
33 THN, 2.2.10.6, SBN391. 
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Hobbes and Mandeville, human beings in his eyes are not completely sociable 
and concordant with each other. To the contrary, the complexity of the society-
regarding self-love remains in Hume’s theory and runs through his practical 
philosophy. As we will see in the following sections, for Hume, human beings can 
be socialised, but our sociability is derived from nothing but various artifices 
against our original self-love. 
II. Justice in Small Society: Hume’s Revision to Hobbes and Mandeville 
1. Enlightened Self-Love and the Artifice of Justice 
Though Hume refuses to reduce all human passions to self-love and admits 
that men do have a sympathetic concern for others, when it comes to justice, the 
fundamental principle upholding the society, he ultimately stands with Hobbes 
and Mandeville.34 For Hume, natural friendship or benevolence in human nature 
play no significant role in the establishment of social order. This is not only 
because they are “too remote and too sublime to affect the generality of 
mankind”.35 It is also because these passions by their nature cannot afford the 
stability and universality required by large and lasting society. To be stable, the 
society must be grounded on a definite system of rights and obligations, which 
requires “absolute and entire property” (perfect dominion) instead of “a constant 
and perpetual will of giving everyone his due” in the traditional sense.36 To be 
                                                        
34 The distinction between natural virtue and artificial virtue disappears in The Enquiry concerning the Principles of 
Morals. But there is no substantial difference between Hume’s analysis of justice in the Enquiry and the Treatise. 
35 THN, 3.2.1.11, SBN481. 
36 THN, 3.2.6.2, SBN526. About the context of Hume’s “strict” definition of justice, see Dario Castiglione, “Hume’s 
Conventionalist Analysis of Justice”, Annali della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, Vol. 21 (1987), pp139-173; James Harris, 
“Hume’s Peculiar Definition of Justice”, in Ian Hunter & Richard Whatmore eds., Philosophy, Rights, and Natural 
Law, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019, pp217-236. 
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universal, the social disciplines must be applied to each individual and each case 
without exceptions, therefore the particular characters of individuals or particular 
effects of single acts should not be taken into consideration. But the ordinary 
course of human nature fails to support general and inflexible rules. As is 
underlined by Hume, our private benevolence is highly partial in that we always 
desire to acquire goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends, 
while neglecting the interest of strangers and our enemies. Even our public 
benevolence cannot disregard particular situations entirely. “When a man of merit, 
of a beneficial disposition, restores a great fortune to a miser, or a seditious bigot, 
he has acted justly and laudably, but the public is a real sufferer.”37 Since a pure 
and universal love of mankind is impossible, our natural regard of public interest 
would give us a strong disposition of suspending the general rule in this condition, 
though such sort of interruptions will inevitably lead to confusion and disorder. 
Therefore, notwithstanding some “seeds” of natural sociability in human nature, 
their weakness and narrowness prevent them from being the “real and universal 
motive” to justice. In fact, “so noble an affection, instead of fitting men for large 
societies, is almost as contrary to them, as the most narrow selfishness.”38 
Rejecting Hutchesonian natural sociability, Hume turns to self-love to explain 
the origin of society. Like Hobbes and Mandeville, Hume also regards self-love 
as a troublesome or paradoxical passion. On the one hand, men’s self-love can 
be and must be society-regarding, because “whatever other passions we may be 
                                                        
37 THN, 3.2.2.22, SBN497. 
38 THN, 3.2.2.6, SBN487. 
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actuated by, pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge or lust, the soul or 
animating principle of them all is sympathy; nor would they have any force, were 
we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others”.39 As we have 
mentioned above, even the idea of the self cannot make sense unless referring 
to others. The desire of gratifying our pride specifically affords us “the most ardent 
desire of society” than any other creatures in the universe.40 On the other hand, 
this very society-regarding self-love gives rise to social conflicts rather than 
concord, because “self-love, when it acts at its liberty, … is the source of all 
injustice and violence”. 41 In Hobbes’s words, the “need” of others does not 
spontaneously and immediately give us the “capacity” to live peacefully with 
others, for we wish that others existed only to satisfy our self-love. As each 
individual takes himself as the centre, oppositions of passions and actions are 
unavoidable. 
Nevertheless, Hume makes some important revisions to Hobbes and 
Mandeville’s theory of human nature. Though self-love includes both the love of 
material gain (self-love in the narrow sense) and the concern for our reputation 
(self-liking), only the former is seen as the main cause of conflict in men’s original 
condition. Unlike Hobbes and Mandeville, Hume does not blame pride as the 
most dangerous passion leading to a “restless desire of power” or an “instinct of 
sovereignty”. According to Hume, 
There are three different species of goods, which we are possessed of; the 
                                                        
39 THN, 2.2.5.15, SBN363. 
40 THN, 2.2.5.15, SBN363. 
41 THN, 3.2.1.10, SBN480. 
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internal satisfaction of our mind, the external advantages of our body, and 
the enjoyment of such possessions as we have acquired by our industry 
and good fortune. We are perfectly secure in the enjoyment of the first. The 
second may be ravished from us, but can be of no advantage to him who 
deprives us of them. The last only are both exposed to the violence of others, 
and may be transferred without suffering any lass or alteration; while at the 
same time, there is not a sufficient quantity of them to supply every one’s 
desires and necessities.42 
In the early stage of human history where possessions are few and productivity 
is low, passions based on comparison (especially pride) cannot be very strong, 
and personal dominion is of no use for the individuals.43 At this time, men’s 
attention is attracted by the necessities for survival, thereby most quarrels or 
conflicts are about external things, which are transferable and scarce. Hume’s 
men are more primitive rather than more civilised or rationalised than Hobbes’s. 
Yet as a consequence, Hume’s original condition of mankind, though is still a 
state of disorder, is “milder” than Hobbes’s and Mandeville’s, for there is no 
violence against bodies and limbs. That is to say, human interactions are not 
games of life and death, in which players have to choose whether to trust others 
and renounce their arms or to fight, and once their trust are exploited their loss 
will be irreparable. Individuals can therefore engage with each other for many 
times during their lives, and can adjust their strategy of action by degrees 
                                                        
42 THN, 3.2.2.7, SBN487. 
43 Different from Hobbes, Hume does not take the interest of enslavement into consideration, neither does he pay 
attention to the advantage one gains by excluding others from the competition. 
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according to the response of others. In a nutshell, while a Hobbesian state of war 
precludes trial and error, iterated interactions are still possible in Hume’s original 
condition,44 leaving room for social cooperation and coordination. 
Such a possibility has to come true for the sake of survival. The lack of force, 
ability and security prevents every individual from satisfying his various 
necessities by his own labour, against which only society can provide a remedy. 
Since there is no natural motive upholding the social order, artificial disciplines 
must be imposed on human nature, especially on the self-interest. But human 
beings cannot restrain themselves merely by “natural laws” or rational reflections, 
which are too complicated as knowledge and too weak as motivation. “There is 
no passion, therefore, capable of controuling the interested affection, but the very 
affection itself”.45 However, when Hume has recourse to self-interest, he does not 
necessitate a common power to keep individuals in awe like Hobbes and 
Mandeville did, but only “an alteration of its direction”. 46  For Hume, the 
uncultivated individuals are quite sensible of the advantages of association 
thanks to their experience of family life.47 The early education received in families 
enhances men’s desire for company, even though familial affections themselves 
are too partial to support a large-scale social order. Therefore, 
this alteration must necessarily take place upon the least reflection; since ’tis 
evident, that the passions is much better satisfy’d by its restraint, than by its 
                                                        
44 An explanation of the difference between Hobbes and Hume from the perspective of game theory, see Russell Hardin, 
David Hume: Moral and Political Theorist, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, ch3. 
45 THN, 3.2.2.13, SBN492. 
46 Ibid. 




liberty, and that by preserving the society, we make much greater advances 
in the acquiring possessions, than by running into the solitary and forlorn 
condition, which must follow upon violence and an universal licence.48 
In comparison with the condition of solitude, preserving society is not a “public 
interest” transcending men’s self-love, but both “cognised” and intimately “felt” as 
everyone’s own interest, or as a “common interest” that each individual 
participates.49 Consequently, the very passion of self-interest requires human 
beings to stabilise their external possessions and abstain from the possessions 
of others, i.e. to set up the institution of property or justice. 
Nonetheless, this is a necessary but insufficient condition for the 
establishment of justice. What Hume’s individuals have recognised is something 
quite similar to Hobbes’s “hypothetical natural law”: “I observe, that it will be for 
my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act 
in the same manner with regard to me.”50 But as Hobbes has pointed out, the 
natural law revealed by the right reason, “that a man be willing, when others are 
so too, … to lay down this right to all things”,51 is no longer valid when it comes 
to the external court. Even though the advantages of society have aroused an 
inclination to peace in men’s hearts, they are still hindered from really renouncing 
their unlimited natural rights. As Hobbes points out, the main hindrance is not the 
weakness of reason, but the very rational suspicion between individuals. If each 
                                                        
48 THN, 3.2.2.13, SBN492. 
49 In this way, Hume’s theory has a starting point fundamentally different from utilitarianism. Cf. David Gauthier, 
“David Hume, Contractarian”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 88 (1979), pp3-38; Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the 
Common Law Tradition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, pp104-106. 
50 THN, 3.2.2.10, SBN490. Original italics. 
51 L, xiv.5. 
166 
 
individual cannot be sure whether others are proud and aggressive people or not, 
the most reasonable way to preserve himself is pre-emptive fighting instead of 
trusting. Therefore, in order to establish justice, the sense of the interest of 
preserving society must be shared by everybody, and this very fact must in turn 
be known to everybody. In other words, not only a “sense of common interest”, 
but also a “common sense of interest” are necessary. 
 According to Hume, such a “common sense” is available in men’s original 
condition, and it is exactly this gradually reached “common sense” makes justice 
a “convention”. As we have mentioned above, Hume’s men are not playing a life-
or-death game, in which each individual would not take any action of seeking 
peace unless he could make sure the intention of others. Hume’s men are 
enabled to have iterated interactions, through which the willingness to cooperate 
and coordinate can be identified and responded, while uncooperative actions can 
be retaliated effectively.52 Like two men pulling the oars of a boat, one’s intention 
of coordination as well as his expectation of another is expressed through the 
very action of pulling. The intention-in-action is not conditional,53 individuals can 
thus break the dilemma of rational suspicion, mutually express their sense of 
interest and obtain trust without formal covenant or superior power: 
the sense of interest has become common to all our fellows, and gives us a 
confidence of the future regularity of their conduct: And ’tis only on the 
                                                        
52 The retaliation is performed through ostracism, namely excluding the person involved from the intersubjective 
cooperation, therefore preventing him from benefiting from it. This is different from the Lockean execution of Natural 
Law for it does not impose any further disadvantage (punishment). 
53 Cf. Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, p110. 
167 
 
expectation of this, that our moderation and abstinence are founded.54 
Through iterative communication, the “confidence” and “expectation” in others 
provide human beings with a sufficient resolution to regulate themselves. “No 
more is requisite to induce any one of them to perform an act of justice, who has 
the first opportunity”.55 This eventually gives rise to the “convention” of justice, 
which is no longer a form of “pact” but the principle of coordination and 
reciprocation arising “gradually” and “by a slow progression”.56 Hume in this way 
diverges from Hobbism as well as other sorts of social contractarianism,57 and 
finds a proper concept to capture the process of evolution that Mandeville has to 
some extent recognised but not adequately theorised.58 With such a convention 
the passion of self-interest is redirected from the immediate satisfaction to the 
long-term common interest of sustaining society, thereby becomes “enlightened”, 
and is gratified “in an oblique and indirect manner”.59 Consequently, a lasting 
society is formed before the erection of political power, though this is achieved 
with the help of rational reflection and convention, or in other words by artifice. 
Hume highlights that to uphold stable social order, justice must be a general 
and inflexible rule. “However single acts of justice may be contrary, either to public 
                                                        
54 THN, 3.2.2.10, SBN490. 
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compact” as the milestone of the establishment of large and lasting society. 
59 THN, 3.2.2.21, SBN497. 
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or private interest, ’tis certain, that the whole plan or scheme is highly conductive, 
or indeed absolutely requisite, both to the support of society, and the well-being 
of every individual.”60 Albeit justice does not at each moment maximise the public 
benefits or the benefits of the concerned people, the attribution of property should 
not be determined case by case, otherwise there will be dispute and confusion. 
That is to say, not only the natural (non-redirected) self-interest, but also the 
ordinary course of our private and public benevolence need to be disciplined by 
the artificial convention. This seems implausible at the early stage of history, 
because the advantage of the “whole plan or scheme” rather than single acts 
might be too complicated for the simple minds of uncultivated humans. Yet this is 
not a problem in Hume’s eyes. When the society is primitive and small (though 
larger than family), even if some single acts of justice might not be advantageous, 
any single acts of injustice must definitely cause disorder and dissolution of 
society. By their “repeated experience of the inconveniencies of transgressing” 
the convention,61 sooner or later, individuals recognise that strict observance of 
justice is the most beneficial way of conduct in their region.62 Therefore, the 
enlightened self-interest alone is sufficient for sustaining the general rule of 
justice. There is no need of a sense of “rule-obligation”, namely a disinterested 
disposition to regulate one’s behaviours according to general rules.63 Neither is 
any coercive power required. 
                                                        
60 THN, 3.2.2.22, SBN497. 
61 THN, 3.2.2.10, SBN490. 
62 In fact, for a certain individual, the advantage of justice includes both a general interest of preserving society, and a 
particular interest of not being ostracised. But Hume focuses on the former one in his explanation of the natural motive 
to justice. 
63 Cf. Stephen Darwall, “Motive and Obligation in Hume's Ethics”, Noûs, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Dec., 1993), pp415-448. 
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2. Moral Evaluation and the Virtuousness of Justice 
But from Hume’s perspective, justice does not only mean a set of actions of 
abstaining from others’ property. Like Hobbes and Mandeville, Hume also holds 
that social order (though for Hume it is a pre-political order at this stage) has both 
outward and inward dimensions. Justice is an “artificial virtue” and a duty, that is 
to say, its reliance on “artifice” does not negate its essence as a “virtue” and “duty”. 
According to Hume, 
If any action be either virtuous or vicious, ’tis only as a sign of some quality 
or characters. It must depend upon durable principles of the mind, which 
extend over the whole conduct, and enter into the personal character.64 
Although functioning as a good indication of personal characters, external actions 
themselves have no merit, because they are too short, inconstant, and easily 
influenced by contingent factors, then cannot be the proper object of moral 
evaluation or sufficient cause of evaluative passions. “When we praise any 
actions, we regard only the motives that produce them”65, which are more durable 
and stably annexed to one’s person. In this term, virtues are qualities or 
characters approved by our moral sense, while vices are motives disapproved. 
According to Hume, human beings usually take the “ordinary course” of human 
nature as the criterion of moral evaluation: 
’Tis according to their general force in human nature, that we blame or 
praise. In judging of the beauty of animal bodies, we always carry in our eye 
                                                        
64 THN, 3.3.1.4, SBN575. 
65 THN, 3.2.1.2, SBN477. 
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the economy of a certain species … In like manner we always consider the 
natural and usual force of the passions, when we determine concerning vice 
and virtue; and if the passions depart very much from the common measure 
on either side, they are always disapprov’d as vices.66 
The experience of our everyday life tells us the ordinary course, i.e. the natural 
and usual force of our passions and emotions. This is naturally regarded as what 
a person should be influenced by in a given situation. As a result, motives 
corresponding with the ordinary course are praised, while those departing from it 
are blamed. For instance, a father neglecting his child is disapproved, because it 
shows a deviation of the ordinary course and a want of natural affection, and this 
is seen as a defect of character. (Yet, if this father does love his child while his 
actions are checked by some circumstances, we will retract our blame.) 
Here are two points worth our notice concerning this “ordinary course” 
account of moral evaluation. Firstly, the moral evaluation directly has characters 
or qualities as its object. An action would not be approved unless the character it 
signifies is considered as the ordinary course of human nature. Secondly, taking 
the ordinary course as the foundation of moral evaluation means that normative 
force is bestowed upon the natural conduct of the majority. What are praised as 
virtues is nothing but what most of us naturally do. And what are blamed as 
defects is failing to do what most of us naturally do.67 Nevertheless, such a theory 
                                                        
66 THN, 3.2.2.18, SBN483, original emphasis. 
67 Some scholars even claim that for Hume, we should be motivated solely by our natural motives to perform naturally 
virtuous actions if we want our actions to be genuinely virtuous. David Fate Norton, “Hume, Human Nature, and the 
Foundations of Morality”, in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, ed. by David Fate Norton, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993, pp148–181; Don Garrett, “The First Motive to Justice: Hume’s Circle Argument Squared”, 
Hume Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Nov., 2007), pp257-288; Elizabeth Radcliffe, “How Does the Humean Sense of Duty 
Motivate?”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Jul., 1996), pp383-407; Donald Ainslie, “Hume and 
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makes justice highly problematic. As Hume admits, observance of general rule is 
by no means the ordinary course of human nature. That is to say, justice should 
not have been praised, or at least injustice should not have been blamed.68 It is 
unreasonable to blame somebody for not doing a thing that most people would 
not like to do. In fact, according to the theory of ordinary course, no “artificial” 
things could be regarded as “virtue”, let alone “duty”. 
Fortunately, Hume does not treat the ordinary course of human nature as the 
ultimate ground of moral evaluation. Rather, it reflects “our natural uncultivated 
ideas of morality”.69 In his serious explanation of moral sense, Hume depicts 
moral evaluation as a disinterested sympathetic reaction in the hearts of 
spectators. Human beings are not dominated by interested passions, for we do 
feel the pleasure and pain of people unrelated to ourselves due to the mechanism 
of sympathy. But such sympathetic reactions are usually partial, since we 
naturally have a stronger sympathy with individuals closely related to us, and are 
always influenced by our interested passions as well. For instance, our moral 
approbation about our parents is too often confused with our natural affection to 
them and our expectation of benefiting from them. As a consequence, there would 
be frequent conflicts of opinions if individuals stick to their own point of view. 
Nonetheless, human beings have a diffidence in their own judgments and a 
                                                        
Moral Motivation”, in The Cambridge Companion to Hume’s Treatise, pp283-300; Tito Magri, “Hume’s Justice”, in 
The Cambridge Companion to Hume’s Treatise, pp301-332. Critique and revision to this view, see Philip Reed, 
“Motivating Hume’s Natural Virtues”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 42, No. S1, pp134-147. 
68 THN, 3.2.6.3, SBN531. Cf. Jonathan Harrison, Hume’s Theory of Justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981, pp24-26. 
69 THN, 3.2.2.8, SBN489. When presenting the “ordinary course theory”, Hume analogises moral evaluations with 
aesthetic judgments. But later in the Treatise, aesthetic judgments are also explained according to “effects-sympathy 
theory”. The beauty of something derives from its pleasant effects, mainly its usefulness. (THN, 3.3.1.8, SBN576) The 
“ordinary course theory” is entirely given up in Hume’s analysis of moral evaluation in the Enquiry. 
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desire of agreement with others. With the help of mutual communication, 
gradually, individuals (as spectators) learn to correct their partiality resulting from 
their particular situations and reach a general point of view. From such a 
viewpoint, they obtain sentiments of pleasure or pain by sympathising 
(extensively) with the person directly influenced by certain characters or actions. 
The so-called moral approbation is nothing but the feeling of pleasure at this 
moment, while moral blame the feeling of uneasiness. 
Now it is not hard to see the differences between the “effects-sympathy” 
mechanism and the theory of “ordinary course”. First of all, though moral 
evaluation takes characters as its ultimate object, it touches characters indirectly 
through the mediation of actions and their effects. Actually, except for the qualities 
immediately agreeable, the pleasant or painful effects sympathised by the 
spectators cannot but be caused by actions. Hume underlines that moral 
sentiments 
may arise either from the mere species or appearance of characters and 
passions, or from reflections on their tendency to the happiness of mankind, 
and of particular persons. … Tho’ I am also of opinion, that reflections on 
the tendencies of actions have by far the greatest influence, and determine 
all the great lines of our duty.70 
It is the “tendencies of actions” that demonstrates the characters’ tendencies of 
causing pleasure or uneasiness and determines the sympathetic feelings of the 
                                                        
70 THN, 3.3.1.27, SBN590. Cf. James Chamberlain, “Justice and the Tendency towards Good: The Role of Custom in 
Hume’s Theory of Moral Motivation”, Hume Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Apr., 2017), pp117-137. 
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spectator. Notwithstanding that moral judgment must be traced back to more 
durable principles of characters, the effects of actions produce some proto-moral 
evaluation, which roughly directs our moral evaluation by pointing out which 
qualities should be taken into consideration and whether they should be praised 
or blamed. In a nutshell, the consideration of the effects of actions is an 
indispensable link in the formation of moral sentiments. 
Furthermore, when effects of actions and characters are taken as the 
foundation of moral evaluation, it is utility rather than the original appearance of 
human nature that plays the core role in Hume’s moral theory.71 The ordinary 
course of mankind has no self-evident normative force. Unlike classical ethicists 
and followers of Hutcheson, Hume finds no indication of metaphysical natural 
order or providence in the natural course of men’s passions.72 In fact, as long as 
a character is beneficial to men’s private or public interest and arouses a 
sympathetic pleasure in spectators, it can be approved as a virtue; if it is so 
requisite that its absence causes a sympathetic uneasiness in spectators, it can 
then become a duty. Whether this character corresponds with the ordinary course 
of the majority is of no significance.73 
                                                        
71 Yet Hume’s utilitarianism is devoted to explaining the psychological mechanism of our moral judgement, rather 
than establishing an abstract normative principle. Friedrich Whelan, Order and Artifice in Hume’s Political Philosophy, 
Princeton, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985, pp206-218. 
72 David Fate Norton, Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician, Princeton, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1982, pp55-192. 
73 These differences between the “effects-sympathy theory” and the “ordinary course theory” are not adequately 
noticed in secondary literatures. Some scholars argue that actions are of no importance in Hume’s official doctrine 
about moral evaluation, then justice, of which the focus is nothing but the regulation of men’s actions, needs another 
moral theory which takes actions instead of characters as the object of evaluation. See Rachel Cohon, Hume’s Morality: 
Feeling and Fabrication, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, ch6-7; James Harris, “Hume on the Moral 
Obligation to Justice”, Hume Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Apr., 2010), pp25-50. There are also some scholars holding that 
once the majority of men fail to perform justice, it ceases to be a virtue or duty; thus to justify the moral obligation of 
justice, we have to find out a more persisting and effectual natural motive. See Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, “Hume on the 
Artificial Virtues”, in Paul Russell ed., The Oxford Handbook of Hume, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp435-
470; Don Garrett, “The First Motive to Justice: Hume’s Circle Argument Squared”. All of them are misunderstandings 
of the “effects-sympathy theory” due to some confusion between the two theories. 
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From this new perspective, the virtuousness of justice can be well explained. 
As an artifice invented to regulate men’s actions and uphold the society, justice 
is absolutely necessary for the public interest, therefore is approved by our moral 
sense as a virtue and duty without difficulty.74 However, as we have already seen, 
the original motive of justice is nothing but enlightened self-interest. It seems odd 
to bestow moral merit to some self-interest, for according to our intuition, virtues 
are usually altruistic qualities, while self-interest are often harmful to public 
interest. And according to some scholars, even if self-interest is virtuous, the 
virtue based on it should be prudence instead of justice.75 But Hume reminds us 
that the self-interest leading to justice is already enlightened and redirected. That 
is to say, it is enabled to work against the natural course of self-love, binding 
individuals to satisfy themselves by preserving society: 
’Tis self-love which is their real origin; and as the self-love of one person is 
naturally contrary to that of another, these several interested passions are 
obliged to adjust themselves after such a manner as to concur in some 
system of conduct and behaviour.76 
Men with the quality of enlightened self-interest will feel “obliged”, i.e. experience 
a feeling of determination, while performing justice. In this sense, enlightened 
                                                        
74 Some scholars have noticed the affinity between artificial virtues and the “effects-sympathy theory”, for both of 
them are based on utility. John Mackie, Hume’s Moral Theory, London: Routledge, 1980, pp122-125; Jacqueline Taylor, 
“Justice and the Foundations of Social Morality in Hume's Treatise”, Hume Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Apr., 1998), pp5-
30. Also cf. Francis Snare, Morals, Motivation, and Convention: Hume’s Influential Doctrines, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991, pp179-180. But Mackie and Taylor have gone too far when interpreting natural virtues as 
artifice or dependent on artifice. In fact, natural virtues do not eliminate partiality (e.g. natural affection to one’s own 
children), and such partiality can be justified as long as it can arouse pleasure on impartial spectators. In other words, 
there are still fundamental differences between natural and artificial virtues. 
75 Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: the Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp31-34; Rachel Cohon, Hume’s Morality, pp184-189. 
76 THN, 3.2.6.6, SBN529, emphasis added. 
175 
 
self-interest is not only a passion, but also a “natural obligation”,77 imposing 
disciplines upon human beings in a non-moral way. The effect or utility of such a 
motive lays foundation for its virtuousness, thus naturally arouses a sense of 
moral obligation in our hearts. As Hume claims, “the moral obligation is founded 
on the natural”.78 And since justice is praised for its “immediate tendency to 
promote the interests of society”, it is distinguished from prudence, which is only 
useful to the concerned person himself and has nothing to do with public interest, 
notwithstanding that justice is “also considered as advantageous to the person 
himself” once established.79 Hume in this way distances himself from Mandeville. 
For Mandeville, the fact that human beings do just things because of their self-
love negates the existence of true moral virtue. But in Hume’s opinion, on the one 
hand, there is in fact some disinterested moral sense in human nature, while on 
the other hand, the enlightened self-interest is no less virtuous for it is approved 
by our moral sense disinterestedly.80 
So far, it is quite reasonable to say that for Hume, there is some sort of 
sociability in human nature based on utility or interest. This is precisely the so-
called “commercial sociability” that unites individuals into society, as well as 
grounds the normative standing of the social order.81 Unlike Hobbes who denies 
                                                        
77 Cf. Tito Magri, “Natural Obligation and Normative Motivation in Hume's Treatise”, Hume Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 
(Nov., 1996), pp231-253. Yet Magri overestimates the normative force of the natural obligation. We have a sense of 
natural obligation because we do care about our long-term interest, not because we “ought to” care about it. 
78 THN, 3.2.10.4, SBN553. 
79 EPM, 6.1.13, SBN238. In both the Treatise and the Enquiry, justice is classified as a virtue useful to others, while 
prudence useful to the person himself. 
80  According to Hume’s “effects-sympathy” theory of moral evaluation, Mandeville’s moral language is self-
contradictory. “It is not very inconsistent for an author to assert in one page, that moral distinctions are inventions of 
politicians for public interest; and in the next page maintain, that vice is advantageous to the public?” (Essay, p280) 
For Hume, public utility itself is a sufficient foundation of moral merits. 
81 Istvan Hont, Politics in Commercial Society, pp7ff. 
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the validity of natural laws in the state of nature and Mandeville who reduces 
morality completely to some manipulated self-love, Hume appreciates both the 
practical function and the moral status of enlightened self-interest. With the help 
of artificial but non-political convention, Hume does find out a new solution to the 
problem of society-regarding self-love, which is neither Hutchesonian nor 
Hobbesian- Mandevillean. However, this is only the start of the story. 
III. Crisis of Enlarged Society: Mandeville and Hobbes Brought Back 
1. The Crisis of Commercial Sociability, Moral Motive, and Hume’s 
Mandevilleanism 
Rather than a “commercial society” in the strict sense, i.e. a society with 
thorough division of labour and frequent market transactions, 82  the society 
grounded on “commercial sociability” or “sociability derived from utility” is merely 
a simple one, in which life is primitive, the economy is undeveloped, and various 
wants of human beings still lie dormant. The demonstration of “commercial 
sociability” is not any complex commercial activities, but simply the abstinence 
from each other’s property. Nevertheless, Hume’s discussion of justice and social 
order is not static, for some new conditions emerge with the growth of society. On 
the one hand, due to the convention of justice, property is now stably annexed to 
one’s person, and becomes “the most common” cause of pride as well as esteem. 
While the progress of industry provides more possessions, the developed pride 
and love of fame, intertwined with self-interest, give rise to “so many wants, real 
                                                        
82 Cf. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, I.iv.1. 
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or imaginary”83. On the other hand, in the enlarged society, the long-term interest 
of observing justice becomes more remote, “nor do men so readily perceive, that 
disorder and confusion follow upon every breach of these rules, as in a more 
narrow and contracted society.”84 Hume claims that in large society the interest 
of justice is no less real, albeit more remote. “Every” unjust action eventually 
threatens the social order, no matter how late the effects will come out. But human 
beings are usually short-sighted, more attracted by contiguous things than distant 
and obscure objects. When their immediate desires become more powerful and 
the advantage of sustaining society becomes more distant, individuals cannot 
help but frequently “follow a lesser and more present interest”.85 In other words, 
the enlightened self-interest no longer functions as the sufficient motive to justice. 
The large and civilised society is now facing the danger of dissolution. 
But for Hume, this does not mean the total failure of the artificial virtue. Firstly, 
in spite of the relative weakness of its motivational force, observing justice is still 
required by men’s long-term interest. Therefore, in principle, the natural obligation 
of justice does not cease even when the natural motive to justice becomes 
invalid. 86  Secondly, due to the “progress of sentiments”, a sense of moral 
obligation naturally follows the natural obligation. It is admitted that the concern 
for public interest is not so strong as to counter-balance our present desires, yet 
the loss of public interest never fails to arouse uneasiness in the hearts of the 
                                                        
83 THN, 3.2.8.6, SBN544. 
84 THN, 3.2.2.24, SBN499. 
85 THN, 3.2.2.24, SBN499. 
86 The condition here is different from that when government becomes tyrannical. When tyranny takes place, allegiance 
is by no means advantageous, then both natural and moral obligations to it cease. 
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spectators. Hume claims that 
we never fail to observe the prejudice we receive, … Nay when the injustice 
is so distant from us, as no way to affect our interest, it still displeases us; 
because we consider it as prejudicial to human society, and pernicious to 
every one that approaches the person guilty of it. … The general rule 
reaches beyond those instances, from which it arose; while at the same time 
we naturally sympathize with others in the sentiments they entertain of us.87 
According to the abovementioned “effects-sympathy” mechanism, as long as 
justice is necessary while injustice is harmful to the public interest, human beings 
will approve the former and blame the latter. Thus justice can be sensed as a 
virtue and duty even when the majority of people lose sight of its original virtuous 
motive (i.e. enlightened self-interest) and fail to perform corresponding actions. 
In other words, notwithstanding the decay of social order, the moral obligation of 
justice remains valid, unless all individuals became unjust at one moment and 
made enlightened self-interest entirely beyond the reach of human nature.88 
The survival of the moral obligation of justice is of great significance, for 
Hume presents a further argument, that the sense of duty is able to work as a 
motive to justice and fill in the gap left by the weakened original motive. 
I suppose a person to have lent me a sum of money … I ask, What reason 
or motive have I to restore the money? It will, perhaps, be said, that my 
                                                        
87 THN, 3.2.2.24, SBN499. 
88 For Hume, morality must be realistic. “If no human creatures had that inclination, no one cou’d lie under any such 
obligation.” (THN, 3.2.5.6, SBN519) In the present case, whether individuals are able to prefer their long-term interest 
depends on their “strength of mind”, which is to a large extent a natural ability. Cf. Lauren Kopajtic, “Cultivating 
Strength of Mind: Hume on the Government of the Passions and Artificial Virtue”, Hume Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Nov., 




regard to justice, and abhorrence of villainy and knavery, are sufficient 
reasons for me, if I have the least grain of honesty, or sense of duty and 
obligation. And this answer, no doubt, is just and satisfactory to man in his 
civilised state, and when train’d up according to a certain discipline and 
education.89 
Though the first motive of justice is “nothing but self-interest”, Hume emphasises 
that such a motive is “first in time, not in dignity and force”.90 At the stage of 
civilised society, the dignity and force of enlightened self-interest have declined. 
It is the sense of duty, or the regard of the moral merit of justice, that becomes a 
motivation both “sufficient” for the person involved, and “just and satisfactory” in 
the eyes of spectators. 
Theoretically speaking, this argument is consistent with the fundamental 
principle of Hume’s moral theory (especially the “undoubted maxim”), that no 
action can be virtuous unless there be in human nature some non-moral motive 
to produce it. According to Hume,“to suppose, that the mere regard to the virtue 
of the action, may be the first motive, which produc’d the action, and render’d it 
virtuous, is to reason in a circle.”91 In other words, the moral motive, namely the 
regard of the moral merit of a certain virtue could not emerge until that virtue had 
already been performed and approved. Since the sense of duty in our case is 
posterior to the enlightened self-interest in temporal order, working not as the 
original virtuous motive but only after the establishment of justice, it would not 
                                                        
89 THN, 3.2.1.8, SBN479. 
90 THN, 3.2.8.5, SBN543, original footnote 79. 
91 THN, 3.2.1.4, SBN478. 
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lead to a vicious circle.92 
Nevertheless, it is still problematic how, on a practical level the moral motive 
to justice could work, especially when the natural motive has failed? Hume does 
not provide a detailed and systematic analysis about how morality motivates, but 
some clues can be found in the text. There is an interesting example as follows: 
But may not the sense of morality or duty produce an action, without any 
other motive? I answer, it may … When any virtuous motive or principle is 
common in human nature, a person, who feels his heart devoid of that 
principle, may hate himself upon that account, and may perform the action 
without the motive, from a certain sense of duty, in order to acquire by 
practice, that virtuous principle, or at least, to disguise to himself, as much 
as possible, his want of it. … Actions are at first only considered as signs of 
motives, but it is usual, in this case, as in all others, to fix our attention on 
the signs, and neglect, in some measure, the thing signify’d.93 
If some quality or motive is considered as a duty, then the absence of it will bring 
about a feeling of uneasiness, “a secret sting or compunction”,94 to the person 
involved. (In fact, a more appropriate name of this feeling is “humility” or “shame” 
rather than “self-hatred”, for the proper object of hatred is others.) In order to get 
                                                        
92 Cohon correctly points out that “redirected interest itself need not be a persisting motive of honest actions”. (Yet her 
further argument, that “it is not that in virtue of which we approve honest people and so classify them as virtuous”, is 
misleading.) See Rachel Cohon, Hume’s Morality, p184. Though moral motive is grounded on the natural, the former 
can motivate human beings independently from the latter. Therefore, to find out a persisting natural motive to justice 
is both theoretically unnecessary and contradictory to Hume’s text. Comp. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, “Hume on the 
Artificial Virtues”; Don Garrett, “The First Motive to Justice: Hume’s Circle Argument Squared”; Annette Baier, 
“Artificial Virtue and the Equally Sensible Non-Knaves: A Response to Gauthier”, Hume Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Nov., 
1992), pp429-439. 
93 THN 3.2.1.8, SBN479, italics added. 
94 EPM, Appx.4.3, SBN314. 
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rid of this uneasiness,95 the individual will compel himself to perform the external 
sign of that duty, even though the required natural motive does not exist in his 
heart. 
More generally speaking, in Hume’s theory, moral evaluations are often 
attended with indirect passions, which are also evaluative. “Pride and humility, 
love and hatred are excited, when there is any thing presented to us, that both 
bears a relation to the object of the passion, and produces a separate sensation 
related to the sensation of the passion. Now virtue and vice are attended with 
these circumstances.”96 From the standpoint of the spectators, moral approbation 
or blame are always accompanied with, or even equalised to, “a fainter and more 
imperceptible love or hatred”.97 As for the agents, virtues and vices are “the most 
obvious causes” of pride and humility. Despite the fact that pride and humility are 
“pure emotions in the soul, unattended with desire, and not immediately exciting 
us to action”,98 they never fail to provide us with ever-present feelings of pleasure 
or uneasiness when we reflect on our characters, which are durable and always 
presented to us. The sense of pride and humility may further give rise to desires 
to prolong the pleasure or terminate the uneasiness, which prompts us to perform 
                                                        
95 The emphasis on the motivational force of moral sentiments is usually seen as Hume’s main difference from the 
rationalists. Nicholas Capaldi, Hume’s Place in Moral Philosophy, ch2. But there are heated debates about how moral 
sentiments motivate on earth. Though moral sentiments are closely connected with indirect passions (Pall Ardal, 
Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966; a revision to Ardal’s view, see 
Donald Ainslie, “Scepticism About Persons in Book II of Hume's Treatise”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 
37, No. 3 (Jul., 1999), pp469-492), some commentators have doubts on whether morality is “inherently” motivating. 
The “self-hatred theory” suggests that the motivational force of the sense of duty ultimately depends on our desire of 
happiness and aversion of uneasiness. Charlotte Brown, “Is Hume an Internalist?”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 
Vol. 26, No. 1 (Jan., 1988), pp69-87; Elizabeth Radcliffe, “How Does the Humean Sense of Duty Motivate?”; Hume, 
Passion, and Action, ch5; Rachel Cohon, “Hume’s Moral Sentiments as Motives”, Hume Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Nov., 
2010), pp 193-213. 
96 THN, 3.1.2.5, SBN473. 
97 THN, 3.3.5.1, SBN614. Debates concerning this proposition, see Donald Ainslie, “Scepticism About Persons in 
Book II of Hume's Treatise”. 
98 THN, 2.2.6.3, SBN367. 
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virtuous actions.99 In short, with the help of pride and humility, moral motives can 
operate indirectly. It is precisely for this reason that Hume explains “moral 
obligations” as “moral obligations of honour and conscience” antithetical to 
“natural obligations of interest”100. Humean moral sense (i.e. “conscience”) is not 
Kantian practical reason or “free will” in the traditional sense, but works through 
the sentiments of honour. In this sense, causing indirect passions is “the most 
considerable effect that virtue and vice have upon the human mind”.101 
What is more, the moral motives are also assisted by the interest of 
reputation. As we have already seen, besides our own qualities the opinions of 
others have a significant influence on our pride and humility. Even the (reflexive) 
pride in our own virtues is not self-sustaining but needs to be seconded by the 
recognition of others. In Hume’s texts, the “pursuit of a character” of human 
beings is often merged with the pursuit of “a name, a reputation in the world”.102 
Individuals desiring approbation of the “impartial spectators” in their own hearts 
                                                        
99 Cf. Annette Baier, “Master Passions”, in Explaining Emotion, ed. by A. Oksenburg Rorty, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1980, pp403-423. Some commentators argue that if moral judgments motivate us merely by pointing 
out the consequences of our actions, and arousing our desire for future pleasure or aversion of future uneasiness, then 
they does not play a role that reason alone cannot do. As a result, Hume’s rejection to rationalism is invalid. See 
Charlotte Brown, “Is Hume an Internalist?”; cf. Stephen Darwall, “Motive and Obligation in Hume's Ethics”. But it is 
noteworthy that moral evaluations are not only “judgments” concerning our “actions”, but also “sentiments” concerning 
our “characters”. Since characters are durable and constant, when we are reflecting on our characters, we always feel 
some pride or “self-hatred”, and then may have a desire to prolong or get rid of our present feelings. In this way, though 
moral sentiments motivate us indirectly, they work in a way unavailable for reason. 
100 THN, 3.2.8.7, SBN545, italics added. 
101  THN, 3.1.2.5, SBN473, italics added. We are not definitely negating the direct motivational force of moral 
sentiments. But according to Hume’s texts, the role of pride and humility is of the most considerable importance in 
practice. In EPM, our moral sentiments are lent more strength because the mechanism of sympathy is replaced by 
humanity or fellow-feeling, which functions as an original principle of human nature and leads to a direct concern for 
others. However, they are still too weak to function as effectual motives. Jane McIntyre, “The Idea of the Self in the 
Evolution of Hume’s Account of Passions”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 42, No. S1 (2012), pp171-182. 
102 THN, 2.1.11.1, SBN316; EPM, 9.10, SBN276; Philip Reed, “The Alliance of Virtue and Vanity in Hume’s Moral 
Theory”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 93 (2012), pp595-614. Underlining the positive role of men’s desire for 
reputation, Reed even claims that vanity and pride may change our characters by making calm moral sentiments more 
influential on the will. See Philip Reed, “Hume on the Cultivation of Moral Character”, Philosophia, Vol. 45 (2017), 
pp299-315. But as we will see later, though vanity helps our moral sentiments to conform our actions to the rule of 




also desire praises of real spectators. For the sake of reputation, therefore, we 
have to “act” (in a histrionic sense) virtuously, regardless of whether we have the 
original virtuous motives and whether we are committed to those moral norms 
from our own perspective. That is why “vanity is rather to be esteem’d a social 
passion, and a bond of union among men.”103 
Now let us come back to the case of justice. The enlightened self-interest, 
which is necessary for both the society and the person himself, is considered as 
a quality one “ought to” have. But in the transition from the primitive to the large 
and civilised society, such a motive loses its efficacy. Human beings aware of this 
fact feel humility in themselves, then to get free from it, they cannot but pretend 
(to both themselves and others) to be just by acting justly. In addition, the moral 
motive is forwarded by some new artifice, namely custom, education and 
reputation. Praise of justice and blame of injustice are induced to the children 
from their infancy, taking root in their tender minds. Consequently, men who grow 
up in society may be so accustomed to performing justice that they obtain an 
additional pleasure of facility.104 
But these ideas may remind us of the notorious teachings of Mandeville. 
Hume does attempt to distance himself from Mandeville by refusing to reduce 
morality entirely to the invention and manipulation of the politicians. “For if nature 
did not aid us in this particular, ’twould be in vain for politicians to talk of 
honourable or dishonourable, praise-worthy or blameable.”105 At first glance, it 
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104 THN, 2.3.5.3, SBN423. 
105 THN, 3.2.2.25, SBN500, original italics. 
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seems that Hume to some extent misunderstands Mandeville’s position, for as 
we have discussed in the last chapter, Mandeville’s “inventions of politicians” is 
in fact a symbol of the evolution of social norms on the basis of men’s self-love. 
But there is still some truth in Hume’s critique of Mandeville. Regardless of 
whether morality is a product of unintended evolution or intended manipulation, 
Mandeville’s theory based on selfishness fails to explain the difference we 
experience between moral sentiments and interested passions, or in other words, 
what makes moral sentiments “moral”. Though Hume also confesses that the 
artifice of politicians “may even on some occasions, produce alone an 
approbation or esteem for any particular action”,106 we cannot understand the 
“moral” merits bestowed to the advantageous qualities or actions if we had no 
moral sense at all. Thus for Hume, self-love is not the unique or ultimate passion 
of human nature. There are indeed natural virtues based on natural virtuous 
motives. And when it comes to justice, notwithstanding the artificiality of the 
convention itself, men’s sense of moral obligation is by no means artificial. Rather, 
it is the moral sentiment, naturally and disinterestedly caused by the sympathy of 
public utility, that lays a foundation for education and manipulation. However, with 
the decay of the natural (non-moral) motive to justice in large society, individuals 
no longer perform artificial virtue automatically. At this moment, Hume agrees with 
Mandeville on some substantial aspects. Firstly, “when we wou’d govern a man, 
and push him to any action, ’twill commonly be better policy to work upon the 
violent than the calm passions, and rather take him by his inclination, than what 




is vulgarly call’d his reason.”107 Although the moral sentiments themselves are 
disinterested, they can hardly prompt us but with the help of some violent 
passions, namely sense of honour and reputation. Therefore, self-liking (or pride) 
plays a decisive role in securing the order of the civilised society. It is the 
imaginary rather than real reward that persuades individuals to act justly. 
Secondly, in fact, human beings lack the character required by the virtue of justice, 
albeit what is required is nothing sublime but merely enlightened self-interest. 
Neither can they actually “acquire by practice that virtuous principle”.108 They just 
perform the external “signs” of justice and “disguise” their lack of true virtue.109 
That is to say, the observance of justice in large society results from some 
hypocrisy or counterfeit, though human beings may do this because of their 
sincere commitment to the moral duty. Justice at this stage is artificial not only in 
the sense of “redirection”, but also in the sense of “hypocrisy”. If the enlightened 
self-interest indicates men’s “unsocial sociability”, then the pretended justice 
might be called some “unvirtuous virtue”. Despite Hume is sometimes seen as a 
“virtue ethicist”, it is Mandevillean hypocrisy rather than virtuous characters that 
constitutes the fundamental order of the civilised way of life. 
                                                        
107 THN, 2.3.4.1, SBN419, original emphasis. 
108 THN, 3.2.1.8, SBN479. 
109 In Hume’s moral theory, moral sentiments are not absolutely without moral merit. “A sense of moral is a principle 
inherent in the soul, and one of the most powerful that enters into the composition. But this sense certainly acquire new 
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2. The Problem of Sensible Knaves and Hume’s Hobbesian Moment 
Drawing Hume closer to Mandeville, the moral motives and sense of honour 
nonetheless save the social order from total destruction. However, in Hume’s later 
work The Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, he seems to recognise 
that the crisis of justice in the enlarged society was underestimated in the Treatise. 
The motivational force of the sense of duty depends on the validity of the moral 
obligation, while the moral obligation of justice is grounded on the natural 
obligation. Therefore, the ultimate foundation of Hume’s abovementioned 
arguments is that observing justice is always beneficial to our long-term self-
interest. This principle relies on a presupposition that the fatal consequence of 
“every breach” of justice, though remote, is still real. In other words, the collapse 
of social order may be delayed but not denied. But such a causal relationship 
between each unjust action and the dissolution of society is untrue. In fact, in a 
large-scale society, some amount of injustice will not lead to widespread 
confusion at all. Neither would every unjust act be discovered and retaliated by 
ostracism. The relatively optimistic arguments in the Treatise are based on an 
exaggeration of the harmful effects of injustice. In the Enquiry, Hume realises that 
according to the imperfect way in which human affairs are conducted, a 
sensible knave, in particular incidents, may think that an act of iniquity or 
infidelity will make a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing 
any considerable breach in the social union and confederacy. That honesty 
is the best policy, may be a good general rule, but is liable to many 
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exceptions; and he, it may perhaps be thought, conducts himself with most 
wisdom, who observes the general rule, and takes advantage of all the 
exceptions.110 
Besides the short-sighted men always submitting to their immediate desires and 
the just men strictly regulated by the general rule of justice, there is another sort 
of men, the thoroughly rationalised opportunists, namely the “sensible knaves”. 
Like Hobbes’s “Foole” and Mandeville’s “very worst of men”111, in a system where 
others are committed to the convention of justice, the “sensible knaves” are 
sensible enough to discern each occasion where unjust actions can be done 
without causing either the general disadvantage of social disorder or the 
particular disadvantage of being ostracised. If they perform injustice in these 
occasions while observing justice at other times, they can then maximise their 
self-interest but suffer no trouble against themselves, as if wearing the ring of 
Gyges. 
Now it is clear that this sort of men brings about great challenges to Hume’s 
theory of justice as an artificial virtue. Firstly, the existence of the sensible knaves 
shows that there are some men, or everyone potentially, lacking the natural as 
well as moral motives to justice.112 (Yet this is not a fatal problem. As we have 
discussed, a moral justification of justice does not presuppose that all men, or the 
majority of men, are motivated by enlightened self-interest.113) More importantly, 
                                                        
110 EPM, 9.2.22, SBN282-283. 
111 L, xv.4; FB, I, p34. 
112 David Gauthier, “Artificial Virtue and the Sensible Knave”. 
113 Cf. Jason Baldwin, “Hume's Knave and the Interests of Justice”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 42, No. 
3 (Jul., 2004), pp277-296. Baldwin’s response to Gauthier is not without reason, but as we will see very soon, he does 
not grasp the difficulty of the interested account of justice adequately. It is not the (potentially) widespread existence 
of the sensible knaves but their reasoning that invalidates the moral obligation of justice. 
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the reasoning of the sensible knaves demonstrates that the strict observance of 
the general rule of justice, in principle, is not the best way of maximising our long-
term self-interest. That is to say, the natural obligation of justice is false at bottom, 
and so the moral obligation is groundless. The non-knaves’ loyalty to justice 
results from either a misunderstanding of their interest due to the “noble lie” of 
the educators, or a false belief in their fellows that there was a virtuous motive to 
justice in other men’s hearts, or mere naivety and foolishness.114 If the logic of 
the sensible knaves are true, theoretically speaking, even justice is practiced by 
large amounts of honest people who never dream of taking advantages of 
opportunistic injustice, the obligation to justice is still normatively invalid. We can 
of course give a moral blame to the sensible knaves, for their unjust actions are 
pernicious to others involved and harmful to public interest. Besides, the knaves 
cannot take pride in their knavery, for no quality counts as the cause of Humean 
pride unless it is also a cause of love when realised by others.115 But the fact that 
knavery is a vice does not mean justice is genuinely a virtue and a duty. Rather, 
the “artificial virtue” looks more like a product of the cunning of unreason. In some 
commentator’s eyes, Hume’s improvement of Hobbes and Mandeville in moral 
theory is only an illusion, whereas in fact, the social norms are secured by 
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Mandevillean manipulation, or even Hobbesian coercion.116 
Hume concedes that “if a man think, that this reasoning much requires an 
answer, it will be difficult to find any, which will to him appear satisfactory and 
convincing”.117 Such a confession itself does not imply Hume’s surrender to the 
sensible knaves, since no moral philosophy promises to eliminate immorality by 
persuading all vicious people. Practically speaking, large-scale social order is 
able to bear some knavish exceptions. The very sensibility of the knaves 
presupposes that they should not really threaten the social union from which they 
benefit, otherwise they were acting stupidly and no longer “sensible”. Yet to 
overcome the inherent difficulty of justice, it must be proved that conforming to 
such a general rule is really beneficial, at least for the non-knaves. 
Hume firstly turns to the pleasure of integrity. The sensible knaves are not 
really Gyges with unique mythical ability but free riders. Since the number of 
potential free riders is uncertain, their interest of free riding is still conditional, 
because the society would nevertheless collapse if there were too many free 
riders. The sensible knaves thereby must make sure that justice is obeyed by 
others. To achieve this, they have to perform injustice secretly while praise justice 
publicly. The general point of view in moral evaluation is replaced by a 
discrimination between themselves and others. Despite the satisfaction of their 
material advantages, they sacrifice their integrity and suffer the self-contradiction 
of parasitizing the general rule undermined by themselves. Furthermore, the 
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sensible knaves also lose the pleasure of custom. According to Hume, custom 
and repetition can bestow a facility and tendency towards the performance of 
certain actions. “The pleasure of facility does not so much consist in any ferment 
of the spirits, as in their orderly motion; which will sometimes be so powerful as 
even to concert pain into pleasure, and give us a relish in time for what at first 
was most harsh and disagreeable.”118 As for justice, though some redirection of 
men’s original passion (which might be “harsh and disagreeable” at first) is 
required, observing the general rule is more available for human nature, because 
the facility of “orderly motion” brings about an additional pleasure, which is 
artificial but no less real. In this sense, the completely opportunistic deliberation 
in each single case is more contrary to the “frail” human nature inclining to general 
rules. On the one hand, in spite of the fact that “we naturally desire what is forbid, 
and take a pleasure in performing actions, merely because they are unlawful”,119 
this sort of violent pleasure will languish if injustice is performed frequently, while 
the calm pleasure of “orderly motion” can last long without decay. On the other 
hand, it is almost beyond human nature to remain “sensible”. Once the sensible 
knaves are tempted by the gain of unjust actions, giving up their moderation and 
secrecy in cheating, they “can never extricate themselves, without a total loss of 
reputation, and the forfeiture of all future trust and confidence in human 
nature”.120 In sum, rather than being deceived by educators or limited by their 
own stupidity, the non-knaves can obtain some true benefits from the observance 
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of the general rule.121 Although such benefits might not be cherished by the 
knaves, especially those “so secret and successful”, they make sense to the 
ordinary people and are taken seriously by them. This is not to deny that such 
pleasure is only secondary and auxiliary, arising from the “form” of justice (i.e. the 
general rule, which is both a generalizable principle applied to all members of 
society and a custom applied to all time), thereby cannot substitute the first-order 
interest derived from the “content”. Nevertheless, it plays an indispensable role 
in defence of the moral status of justice, as it outweighs the extra material 
advantage gained by opportunistic unjust actions, which is no more than 
“worthless toys and gewgaws” from the non-knaves’ perspective. 122  Hume 
therefore saves the moral obligation of justice from reducing to a product of 
Hobbesian coercion or Mandevillean statecraft. 
However, the crisis of justice is not so easily overcome, thus we should not 
overstate Hume’s difference from Hobbes and Mandeville. Notwithstanding the 
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motivational force of the sense of duty, it is far from sufficient to uphold the social 
order. As is admitted by Hume, the principle of sympathy “has sufficient force to 
influence our taste”, but “is too weak to controul our passions”.123 The case of the 
sensible knaves also illustrates that there indeed are some people who are so 
self-centred that reject to judge themselves from the general point of view, and 
are not influenced by moral sentiments at all. The infirmity of human nature as 
well as our awareness of it causes us to have a pessimistic expectation of others’ 
conduct, thus destroying the mutual confidence required for the preservation of 
convention. “You are, therefore, naturally carry’d to commit acts of injustice as 
well as I. Your example both pushes me forward in this way by imitation, and also 
affords me a new reason for any breach of equity, by showing me, that I shou’d 
be the cully of my integrity, if I alone shou’d impose on muself a severe restraint 
amidst the licentiousness of others.”124 The Hobbesian rational suspicion, which 
had been avoided in the original condition by the common sense of common 
interest, now emerges and aggravates the confusion. 
Moreover, while individuals in the original condition do harm to others merely 
by seizing their possessions, now there are new and more harmful forms of 
injustice, such as promise-breaking, deceptions, personal dominion and bodily 
violence. This regression of social order is not difficult to understand. Promise-
breaking takes place only after the formation of the convention of promise. 
Deceptions are easier and more frequent in a society of strangers. Personal 
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dominion is desired when men’s vanity of power has developed and a slave is 
able to produce more than his own necessities. Violence against life and limbs 
also occurs in the war caused by “considerable goods among man.”125 In a word, 
human beings are in an even more terrible situation than they had experienced 
at the pre-justice stage. The dilemma of rational suspicion and violence against 
life indicate that a true “Hobbesian Moment” has come. 
In order to solve this typically Hobbesian problem, unsurprisingly, Hume 
returns to an ultimately Hobbesian trajectory. 
IV. Life in Civil Society: A Humean Picture 
1. Government, Allegiance, and Justice 
While redirection and hypocrisy are not sufficient to secure the social order, 
some new artifice is needed, namely coercion. For Hume, human beings are too 
short-sighted to follow their long-term interest. But such an infirmity is not entirely 
incurable, for men are able to engage in an undistorted reflection on their real 
interest when their minds are not disturbed by present desires. “When we 
consider any objects at a distance, all their minute distinctions vanish, and we 
always give the preference to whatever is in itself preferable, without considering 
its situation and circumstances.”126 This leads to two important consequences. 
On the one hand, while reflecting on situations that will take place in the far future, 
we have no problem of preferring the greater good for us, regardless of its relative 
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distance. The awareness of our long-term interest as well as our natural infirmity 
may make us “embrace with pleasure any other expedient, by which I may 
impose a restraint upon myself, and guard against this weakness”.127 On the 
other hand, if we are considering the situation of others with whom we have no 
interested relations, we can find out what is more advantageous for them without 
difficulty. Therefore, if we could find some disinterested people and let them be 
willing to impose a restraint upon us, our propensity to prefer contiguous to 
remote would be overcome by the necessity of observing justice. Given that 
human nature is unchangeable, the only method to achieve this is to change the 
circumstance of a few persons by a new artifice. Now human begings are divided 
into two parts. A few of them are put in the position of rulers or magistrates and 
bestowed the power of executing justice. Since they are indifferent to most of 
others in society, and their part in society brings about a satisfaction of their desire 
of dominion, they will identify the observance of justice as their immediate interest. 
“These persons, then, are not only induc’d to observe those rules in their own 
conduct, but also to constrain others to a like regularity, and enforce the dictates 
of equity thro’ the whole society.”128 And from the perspective of the subjects, 
unjust actions now result in some obvious disadvantages, because they will be 
punished by the rulers. Therefore, while the magistrates observe justice thanks 
to their rearranged self-interest, the subjects are compelled to do so due to their 
fear of punishment.129 According to Hume, this explains the origin of government 
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and allegiance. Albeit “the state of society without government is one of the most 
natural states of men, and may subsist … long after the first generation”,130 large 
and civilised society cannot be sustained unless it develops into a civil society, 
namely a political society. As allegiance is so necessary for the subsistence of 
government, the preservation of social order and the well-being of individuals, we 
are obliged to perform it both by our natural long-term interest and by our moral 
sense. Therefore, besides the natural duty of justice, we are also bound by the 
civil duty of obeying the government. 131  Hume agrees with Hobbes and 
Mandeville that it is the government that ultimately overcomes men’s society-
regarding self-love and consolidate men’s association. 
Yet we would not like to underestimate Hume’s difference from Hobbes. 
Hume’s distinction between our natural (private) and civil (public) duties is of great 
theoretical significance, for it breaks the Hobbesian dichotomy between natural 
rights (or natural liberty) and civil obligations which is quite influential in the 
tradition of natural jurisprudence.132 As we have discussed, for Hobbes, there is 
a world of natural condition characterised by natural rights and disorder, as well 
as a world of civil society characterised by civil obligations and order. After the 
                                                        
subjects, they are just “constrained” by the magistrates. While ostracism by other fellows is only a relative disadvantage 
in comparison with participating in social commerce, punishment by magistrates is an absolute disadvantage, making 
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196 
 
erection of political power, this distinction is to some extent preserved and 
transformed into the split between one’s artificial person and natural person. On 
the one hand, all law-obeying actions, public-regarding or private-regarding, are 
attributed to the artificial person, because they are performed through the 
sovereign’s authorisation. On the other hand, when the laws are silent, the 
subjects, as natural persons, still enjoy the liberty remaining in their hands. In this 
way, the subjects’ obligation to observe civil laws and other social norms are 
absorbed in their obligation of obeying the sovereignty, whereas all injustice are 
actually disobedience. But from Hume’s viewpoint, the obligations to justice and 
allegiance are independent from each other, for they are grounded on different 
but equally indispensable sorts of interest. A regard to property is necessary to 
natural society, as well as obedience is to civil society or government; the former 
society is necessary to the being of mankind, as well as the latter to their well-
being and happiness.133 Therefore, justice, being artificial, is no less a duty even 
without government, nor was the pre-political society a moral vacuum. 
However, unlike Locke’s distinction between society and government, 
Hume’s theory is not mainly intended to protect the seemingly self-sustaining 
society from the potential violence of the government. Rather, it is employed in 
defence of the political authority against the revolutionary instinct inherent in the 
contractual theory,134 or more precisely, to establish a balance between authority 
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and liberty. Notwithstanding the complexity and diversity within the tradition of 
contract theory, for Hume, the political contractarianism is to a large extent an 
ideological position on the legitimacy of government mainly associated with the 
Whig party. 135 Hume summarises such a theory as the doctrine of “original 
contract”, which includes three main points: firstly, all men are born equal; 
secondly, the government is always rested on the consent or voluntary 
acquiescence of the people, while the people owe allegiance to no government 
unless bound by the obligation and sanction of a promise; thirdly, the people’s 
promise is conditional, because the sovereign promises them in turn the 
advantages of justice and protection, so the people possess the right of 
resistance and are able to get free from allegiance once the sovereign fail to fulfil 
his promise.136 These arguments are often used in defence of the legitimacy of 
the 1688 Revolution and the Settlement after it. But from the perspective of Hume, 
such a theory is both dangerous in practice and implausible in theory. Practically 
speaking, “almost all the governments, which exist at present, or of which there 
remains any record in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or 
conquest.”137 If the original contract theory is true, then most rulers must be seen 
as illegitimate, and rebellions must be frequent due to the fury and caprice of the 
multitude. That would of course threat the authority of the government, which is 
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nonetheless necessary for the subsistence of peace and order. “In reality, there 
is not a more terrible event, than a total dissolution of government.” 138  
Theoretically speaking, the contract or consent theory fails to explain the 
experience in our common life. Hume sees “opinions” as of fundamental 
significance for the authority of government. In the general opinions of the 
subjects, “where he thinks (as all mankind do who are born under established 
governments) that by his birth he owes allegiance to a certain prince or certain 
form of government; it would be absurd to infer a consent or choice.”139 In fact, 
most individuals just take their obligation of obedience for granted, never 
considering the government as dependent on their voluntary choices, let alone 
participating in any original contract. Hume does not deny the truth of the 
contractual and consensual theory in explaining the very earliest infancy of the 
government, but considers it nonsensical for clarifying the foundation of our 
allegiance in mature civil society. 
Hume overcomes the imbalance between authority and liberty inherent in the 
doctrine of “original contract” by liberating the obligation of allegiance from that of 
promise-keeping, and grounding both obligations on the general principle of utility 
and moral sense as well as the particular dispositions of the imagination. 
According to Hume, both obligations are based on private and public utility, 
whereas the utility they target are different. “To obey the civil magistrates is 
requisite to preserve order and concord in society. To perform promises is 
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requisite to beget mutual trust and confidence in the common offices of life.”140 
While there is no reason to reduce the latter to the former, there is also no reason 
to reduce the former to the latter. Even if the government and particular rulers are 
erected by voluntary consent at first, the separate interest of submission would 
be sensed after some time, and produce a separate sense of moral obligation. In 
this new situation, individuals feel obliged to obey the government as long as its 
advantage of upholding society lasts. As for the allegiance to particular rulers, to 
avoid confusion and disorder, they no longer consider single cases deliberately 
but conform themselves to general rules determined by imagination and custom, 
such as long possession, succession, and conquest. In a nutshell, the 
government is supported by necessity and moral obligation (in principle) as well 
as by acquiescence (when legitimacy of particular rulers is considered), which 
are solider and more stable than social contract or consent. Hume concedes that 
subjects might resist legitimately when there is tyranny, because the moral 
obligation is parasitic on the interest and must cease when allegiance is no longer 
advantageous. But like Hobbes’s reserved natural right of self-preservation in civil 
society, resistance is permissible only as the “last refuge” in “extraordinary 
emergencies”,141 thereby cannot be theorised or taught systematically. 
Setting aside the debate with the Whiggish contractual theory, the separation 
of the public/civil duty from the private/natural duty brings about some other 
theoretical outcomes in favour of the authority of the government. Hume has 
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noticed a potential challenge to his explanation of allegiance, that “the factitious 
duty of obedience, from its very nature, lays as feeble a hold of the human mind, 
as the primitive and natural duty of justice. Peculiar interests and present 
temptations may overcome the one as well as the other”. It thus seems difficult 
to understand why “our duty to the magistrates is more strictly guarded by the 
principles of human nature, than our duty to our fellow-citizens”.142 This problem 
can be solved by stressing the inherent difference between justice and allegiance. 
Functioning as the rule of mutual engagements between the members of society, 
justice might encounter frequent challenges, for individuals might have lots of 
opportunities of satisfying immediate self-interest by unjust acts. But as an 
obligation owed to the government, allegiance is seldom violated, since chances 
of benefiting from rebellions are quite rare. In other words, as the interest of 
allegiance is substantially different from that of justice, the temptation of 
disobedience is much weaker than that of injustice, and would not frequently 
overcome the sense of duty. This is corresponding to our experience in practice, 
that rebellions are much less common than unjust actions, and that even the 
people facing punishment prefer running away to subverting the government. In 
this way, Hume distances the public authority from the conflicts in our private life. 
More importantly, Hume points out that our private duties are “more 
dependent on” the public:  
Tho’ there was no such thing as a promise in the world, government wou’d 
still be necessary in all large and civilis’d societies; and if promises had only 
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their own proper obligation, without the separate sanction of government, 
they wou’d have but little efficacy in such societies.143 
As we have already seen, large and civilised society is not merely quantitatively, 
but qualitatively different from natural and primitive society. Given that a 
“Hobbesian moment” disrupted the transition from the small society to the large 
and worsened men’s living condition, government is not an auxiliary apparatus 
added to an existing social order to solve some inconvenience and make our 
life more polished, but what saves peaceful common life from the confusion by 
reconstructing the social order. Correspondingly, the civil society should not be 
understood as a natural society plus a government. Since the developed self-
love has already aroused “so many wants, real and imaginary” as well as 
changed our way of life and manners of mutual commerce, human beings at 
the civilised stage could not return to a simple natural society. Therefore, unlike 
the Lockean “society” that can survive the dissolution of government, Hume’s 
natural society is no longer of paradigmatic significance on the normative level. 
It should not be taken as an ahistorical model with reference to which the 
legitimacy of government is measured, but merely a historical phenomenon in 
a past phase. Neither does it afford a self-sustaining “economic society” within 
civil society.144 Replacing the standard theory of natural jurisprudence with a 
natural history of society,145 Hume on the one hand gives up explaining public 
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authority in private law categories, 146  and on the other hand clarifies the 
relationship between the multiple artifices constituting civil society, in which 
government takes priority to the non-government part. In this sense, reading 
Hume as a predecessor of the theory of burgerliche gesellschaft is not without 
merit. But different from Hont and Finlay’s interpretation, the key point is 
Hume’s rejection of the contractual theory and his attention to the role of the 
state, which Hegel shared with him to some extent, rather than the emphasis 
on the autonomy of the “society” or economy independent from the state. And, 
of course, we should not overestimate Hume’s similarity with Hegel as well. In 
spite of his departure from natural jurisprudence, Hume still explains the origin 
of civil (political) society in the same way by which he explains the natural 
society, that is, by self-interest. As might be criticised by Hegel, Hume’s civil 
society is still an instrument to gratify men’s society-regarding self-love, at 
bottom.147 
2. Justice and Politeness in Civil Society 
Highlighting the dependence of justice upon government does not mean that 
large and civilised society is upheld entirely by coercion. 148  Hume has a 
consensus with Mandeville on the indispensable role of men’s sentiments of 
morality and honour. As is already known to us, the moral sense of justice is a 
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“sufficient” as well as “just and satisfactory” motive for “a man in his civilis’d 
state”.149 Such a claim is not withdrawn after the erection of political power. But 
this seems odd at first glance. If the moral sense was a sufficient motive, then the 
government would be of no use. If it is precisely the weakness of the moral motive 
to justice that necessitates the government, then it is hard to imagine how this 
very motive suddenly becomes effectual in civil society, functioning as the main 
motivational force without being replaced by the fear of punishment. 
To answer this question, it is noteworthy that before the artifice of government, 
there are some obstacles to justice besides the short-sightedness of human 
beings. Firstly, despite some universally accepted rules such as occupation, 
prescription, accession and succession, the division of property is no more than 
an informal convention. The determination of mine and yours depends on nothing 
but mutual recognition of the individuals. Nonetheless, “as violent passion hinders 
men from seeing distinctly they have in an equitable behaviour towards others, 
so it hinders them from seeing the equity itself, and gives them a remarkable 
partiality in their own favours.”150 Regardless of men’s inclination of trespassing 
the property of others, conflicts might emerge as early as in the very formation of 
the system of property, for everyone has a disposition of annexing valuable things 
to his person as much as he can, thereby holds a partial understanding 
concerning what belongs to him. Then the system of property must itself be very 
vague and unstable. Secondly, due to the rational suspicion, individuals find 
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themselves in a condition unfriendly to the observance of justice. The potentially 
just men who prefer their long-term interest (granted there are some), are 
eventually deterred by the potentially unjust men. In Hobbes’s terms, the private 
judgments, both concerning one’s rights and concerning the situation one faces, 
aggravate the crisis caused by the infirmity of human nature. 
These difficulties are resolved in civil society. On the one hand, with the 
execution of justice by the magistrates, injustice can be discovered and punished, 
thereby rational suspicion is removed while everyone is kept in awe. On the other 
hand, thanks to the rulers’ decision of justice, the division of property is confirmed 
by civil laws. No longer a conventional qualification of ownership, property now 
becomes a formal and precise legal right. 151  Albeit the general interest of 
conforming to justice is still remote, owing to the elimination of these obstacles 
preventing individuals from performing justly, the moral motive to justice is 
enabled to work effectually. 
For Hume, the formation and consolidation of social norms is a dynamic 
process which is considerably path-dependent. The solider the order is, the better 
it promotes the public interest, and the stronger men’s sympathy with justice 
becomes, which in turn makes the order solider. Even our “natural uncultivated 
ideas of morality” may contribute to the path dependence 152 . If there are 
increasingly more people performing justice, then just actions will be seen as an 
“ordinary course” of men, whereas injustice will rouse a stronger humility. Thus 
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the sense of duty and honour will prompt us more and more powerfully. In this 
way, government reshapes the convention of justice by terminating the vicious 
cycle of injustice and starting the virtuous cycle. Moreover, the rulers take great 
efforts on public education for the sake of easier governance. As public praise 
and blame are most influential on men’s hearts, our sense of justice is much 
enhanced. Eventually, observing justice becomes our habit. This is not to say we 
do just actions naturally and spontaneously, but that our moral sense is so deeply 
ingrained that we habitually praise justice and blame injustice without taking their 
interested effects into consideration. 
we are so accustomed to blame injustice, that we are not, in every instance, 
conscious of any immediate reflection on the pernicious consequences of it. 
The views the most familiar to us are apt, for that very reason, to escape us; 
and what we have very frequently performed from certain motives, we are 
apt likewise to continue mechanically, without recalling, on every occasion, 
the reflections, which first determined us.153 
Once the social order has been stabilised, coercion is no long necessary for 
everyone. Human beings on the one hand have a strong sense of morality, while 
on the other hand regard their moral obligations as self-evident. It is only in a 
society with government that most men are enabled to observe justice without 
the coercion of government. In this sense, the seeming uselessness of political 
power is exactly the effect of its usefulness. Hume thus provides a clarification of 
the role of government, which was to some extent ambiguous in Mandeville’s 
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theory. Men’s moral sense is not derived from the manipulation of politicians, 
nonetheless, our being motivated by moral sense is dependent on the operation 
of the political power. 
Yet the subsistence of large and polished society requires more than the 
basic order of property and justice. Paying due attention to the motivational force 
of men’s moral sense and the accompanied indirect passions, like Hobbes and 
Mandeville，Hume nonetheless does not overlook the negative aspect of pride. 
As we have seen, Hume discerns two fundamental principles in human nature, 
namely sympathy and comparison. The former makes us share the same feelings 
with others, whereas the latter gives us an impetus to pursue positional goods. 
“In all kinds of comparison an object makes us always receive from another, to 
which it is compar’d, a sensation contrary to what arises from itself in its direct 
and immediate survey.”154 We may take pleasure in others’ pain, for it augments 
our own happiness by comparison, and may feel painful because of the pleasure 
of others. Generally speaking, comparison takes place much easier than 
sympathy, for “sympathy being the conversion of an idea into an impression, 
demands a greater force and vivacity in the idea than is requisite to 
comparison”.155 Not to mention that human beings always desire superiority and 
tend to seek pride from objects peculiar to themselves. As a consequence, men’s 
pride, which is pleasant for himself, must cause disagreeable comparisons very 
frequently and arouse uneasiness in others. Hume agrees with Hobbes and 
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Mandeville that it is our own pride that makes us unable to bear the pride of others. 
In this sense, the inclination of causing mutual conflicts inherent in pride is never 
eliminated, no matter to what direction such a passion is channelled. This 
problem is furthermore aggravated by the fact that, albeit “due pride” is a virtue 
in principle, our pride in ourselves is seldom “due”.156 Even if the partiality in 
men’s evaluation of others is almost corrected through the intersubjective 
communication, a strictly general point of view is still beyond our reach when it 
comes to our own self-evaluation. On the one hand, human beings are conscious 
of the great partiality in our own favour, and that is why we take the opinions of 
others into serious consideration. Yet on the other hand, “no one can well 
distinguish in himself betwixt the vice and the virtue, or be certain, that his esteem 
of his own merit is well-founded.”157 Since this is an inherent shortcoming of 
human nature, the negative effects of pride must be regulated artificially. 
As justice and other natural laws are established to prevent the opposition of 
self-interest, 158  laws of good-breeding or politeness are now established to 
prevent the opposition of pride, without making any exceptions “in favour of men 
of sense and merit”.159 According to this new convention, all direct and open 
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expression of pride is condemned, while appearance of modesty is praised. For 
Hume as well as for Mandeville, what is requisite for politeness is only a disguise 
of our pride, rather than true humility in our hearts. In fact, individuals are enabled 
to indulge in (secret) pride more easily without the impediment from others. And 
since politeness is approved as a virtue agreeable to others, conforming to the 
rule of good manners will in turn reward us an additional (though secret) pride, a 
pride in virtue and reputation. Like our self-interest, pride is also redirected and 
gratified in an oblique and indirect way. In sum, while the basic social order is 
secured by justice and allegiance, good-breeding functions as the lubricant of our 
civil commerce. 
But someone may have doubts on the moral status of good-breeding. From 
Mandeville’s perspective, politeness is far from a true virtue/self-denial, which 
means a total conquest of all passions. Nor is it a counterfeit of virtue/self-denial, 
which requires some certain passions being conquered by pride. Though men’s 
performance of other virtues is at bottom a sort of hypocrisy in order to disguise 
their lack of true virtue, politeness is hypocritical in a more thorough sense, 
because pride, the very target against which it works, is not subdued at all but 
merely concealed. 
Hume does not deny Mandeville’s basic arguments as he admits that 
I believe no one, who has any practice of the world, and can penetrate into 
the inward sentiments of men, will assert, that the humility, which good-
breeding and decency require of us, goes beyond the outside, or that a 
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thorough sincerity in this particular is esteem’d a real part of our duty.160 
Politeness seems no more than a set of external actions regulated by the “law of 
good-breeding”, and neither does the deference of others it signifies really exist. 
However, Hume oddly classifies good-breeding as an artificial virtue, which is, at 
bottom, a virtue.161 As is known to us, each virtue presupposes some “inward” 
character or quality as the natural motive to the corresponding actions. If our 
modesty does not “go beyond the outside” at all, then good-breeding can hardly 
be regarded as a virtue because of the lack of an original virtuous motive. 
Such doubts can be answered (paradoxically) by entirely distinguishing 
good-breeding from modesty and humility. The absence of real humility in polite 
men’s hearts does not negate the virtuousness of politeness, but simply 
demonstrates that humility is neither a virtue in itself nor the original virtuous 
motive to politeness. As is seen in the case of justice, it is not our natural 
sociability but the enlightened self-interest, a quality of taking the preservation of 
society as one’s long-term interest, that secures the moral merit of that virtue. 
Now it is exactly our redirected pride, a quality of taking pleasure and pride in 
agreeable and inoffensive conversation, that functions as the natural (i.e. artificial 
but non-moral) motive to good manners and obtains our moral approbation. 
Therefore, despite sincere modesty is not a real part of our duty, the convention 
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of good manners nevertheless imposes upon us some “internal” duty. Politeness 
might be seen as a hypocrisy of humility, but it is not necessarily a hypocrisy of 
its own virtuous motive. Only when good-breeding has already been identified as 
a duty, and the sense of moral obligation solely prompts some individual to act 
politely, can we regard polite actions as a complete hypocrisy. Therefore, by 
carrying the Mandevillean distinction between politeness and modesty to a more 
thorough extent, Hume defends the moral merit of good-breeding which had been 
denied by Mandeville. The formation of good-manners as an artificial virtue now 
indicates the completion of “large and civilised society” where men’s lifestyle is 
“polished”. 
Conclusion 
Like Mandeville, Hume is not a natural lawyer, but the problem of society-
regarding self-love presented by Hobbes is still attractive for him. Since Hobbes 
and Mandeville have already been doubtful about the simplicity of the “self”, such 
an idea in Hume’s eyes becomes more problematic. Instead of a self-evident 
substance, the self is actually a bundle of perceptions constructed by our 
imagination and passions, especially pride. It is complicated and flexible in both 
ontological and sociological senses. The dialectic between the self-centredness 
of human beings and the complexity of our self-understanding leads to a 
paradoxical condition which we have already seen in Hobbes’s and Mandeville’s 




For Hobbes and Mandeville, the paradox of human nature cannot be solved 
but in civil society, which is supported both by a set of artificial institutions and by 
our artificial persons or artificial selves correspondent to the former. But from 
Hobbes to Mandeville more elements can be found in the “civil society”, and the 
artifice upholding it becomes more multidimensional. More precisely speaking, 
what Hobbes had mentioned but not paid great attention to is of increasing 
significance. As far as we concern, both clues can be found in Hume’s moral and 
political philosophy. Hume agrees with his two predecessors that natural 
sociability is not the foundation of the society beyond the scale of family. The 
social order is secured both by artificial conventions (on the macro level) and by 
artificial virtues in ourselves correspondent to the former. Furthermore, the well-
being of individuals is realised only in civil society, which in Hume’s term is also 
a “political society”. Nonetheless, on the other hand, by “artifice” Hume means a 
variety of things, including the redirection of our self-interest, the obligations 
derived from our sentiments of morality and honour, the augmentation of moral 
sense by education and reputation, as well as the coercion and public 
propaganda by the government. Hume notices that men’s pursuit of long-term 
interest affords us some disciplines before and besides the operation of political 
power. These disciplines, approved by our moral sense as virtues and duties, are 
always valid in our “internal court”. In this sense, the civil society is not merely a 
society with government, but where human beings are cultivated through civil 
commerce. However, the social order based on material utility is fragile, what 
eventually conforms our behaviours to the social norms is our sense of honour 
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and fear of punishments. That is to say, the role of self-liking is not replaced by 
that of self-interest, neither is the role of government substituted by the socio-
economic mechanisms. 
From Hume’s perspective, civil society is also a synthesis of political unity, 
civilised society and the more economic burgerliche gesellschaft. But with the 
latter two growing into maturity, the interactions between political power, social-
economic mechanisms and individuals become subtler and more complicated. 
Now to obtain a more adequate understanding, we need to turn to Hume’s 
concrete analysis about the emergence of modern civil society, and see how 
these factors work in the political and historical background.
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Chapter 4  Hume’s Civil Society: The Political-Historical Dimension 
In the previous chapter we have examined Hume’s ideas about human 
nature and social order, as well as the role of artifice in harmonising the former 
with the latter. Now, like what we have done with Hobbes and Mandeville, we 
turn to Hume’s analysis of the basic political-economic features of modern state. 
But in comparison with Hobbes and Mandeville, Hume pays more attention to 
the history of civil society. For Hume, the characters of modern large and 
polished society is more adequately demonstrated by both a comparison with 
ancient societies and a clarification of the political-historical background in 
which it emerges. Thus in this chapter, we will firstly have a look at Hume’s 
explanation of the actual formation of civil/political society. It will enhance our 
critique of the “commercial sociability” model by showing that politics is an 
original and fundamental dimension of human associations. Then Section 2 will 
explore the development of civil society in the light of Hume’s comparative study 
of various forms of civil government. We will see that certain institutions, policies 
and social norms are required for the rise of commerce and civility. As these 
conditions are not fulfilled unless in modern states, Section 3 will probe into the 
principal reason for the transformation from ancient polities to modern states, 
namely the change of the mode of war and war finance. The development of 




I. The Political Dimension of Civil Society: Domestic and International 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Hume brings to light the 
foundation of civil society through a “conjectural history” starting from the 
original state of nature and ending up with a large and polished society. 1 
Underlining the artificiality of society, such a history is divided into two phases 
according to different types of artifice: At the first stage, human beings 
established the conventions of property, voluntary transaction, and promise; 
and then at the second stage, government was erected to execute justice when 
the original conventions had become too weak to oblige the individuals. Hume 
agrees with Hobbes and Mandeville on the theoretical priority of politics, for 
government is the ultimate foundation of all the other conventions once we have 
entered the second stage. Yet from a causal and temporal point of view, it is not 
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historian. (E.g. Juan Castro, “Hume and Conjectural History”, Journal of Scottish Philosophy, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Jun., 
2017), pp157-174; Frank Palmeri, State of Nature, Stages of Society: Enlightenment Conjectural History and 
Modern Social Discourse, NY: Columbia University Press, 2016). Especially, Annette Baier argues that Hume’s 
theory of sociability is “a conjectural history, in which conventions arise in a definite order … Each artifice remedies 
inconveniences the previous one had helped to create” (See her The Cautious Jealous Virtue, p37). For Istvan Hont, 
such a theory is a “natural history of justice” (Politics in Commercial Society, p49; cf. Nicholas Phillipson, David 
Hume: The Philosopher as Historian, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1989, pp32-49), and as is known 
to us, “natural history” is usually considered as an approximation of “conjectural history”. (Dugald Stewart, Account 
of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith, reprinted in Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, ed. E. G. Wakefield, London: Charles Knight & Co., 1843, pplv-lvi; Christopher Berry, The Idea 
of Commercial Society in Scottish Enlightenment, ch2.) On the other hand, Hume’s historical works are also to a 
large extent philosophised. (David Fate Norton et al (eds.), David Hume: Philosophical Historian, Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.) Pocock locates Hume’s history of England in the tradition of enlightenment philosophical 
history, because of its “reconciliation of narrative and philosophy”. (J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion 
(II):Narratives of Civil Government, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp163-257; cf. Duncan Forbes, 
Hume’s Philosophic Politics, Part III.) However, “Hume himself seems to realise that in The History of England he 
is doing something quite different from conjectural history both in terms of interest and in terms of method.” (Simon 
Evnine, “Hume, Conjectural History, and the Uniformity of Human Nature”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 
Vol. 31, No. 4 (Oct., 1993), pp589-606) In his historical works, Hume relies more on historical facts than conjecture, 
and pays more attention to peculiarity that cannot be explained away by general rules. In this chapter, our distinction 
between “conjectural history” and “actual history” is correspondent with the above difference between Hume’s 
philosophical and historical works. 
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entirely unreasonable to say that (natural) society “is a domain with its own 
distinctive principles defined by social relations, conventions and economic 
cooperation”, while government “is a dimension added on to society at a late 
stage chronologically”.2 Regardless of its importance, politics emerges only 
when there is certain growth of economy, which is certainly natural, within a 
society. 
It is noteworthy, however, that a revision is made to this point very soon 
when Hume talks about the actual emergence of government in reality. 
And so far am I from thinking with some philosophers, that men are utterly 
incapable of society without government, that I assert the first rudiments 
of government to arise from quarrels, not among men of the same society, 
but among those of different societies. A less degree of riches will suffice 
to this latter effect, than us requisite for the former. … Now foreign war to 
a society without government necessarily produces civil war. … In a 
foreign war the most considerable of all goods, life and limbs, are at stake; 
and as everyone shuns dangerous posts, seizes best arms, seeks excuse 
for the slightest wounds, the rules of society, which may be well enough 
observ’d, while men were calm, can now no longer take place, when they 
are in such commotion.3 
Rather than explaining the invention of government from the domestic 
perspective, Hume now review it from the inter-societal perspective. At first, it 
                                                        
2 Christopher Finlay, “Hume’s Theory of Civil Society”, p371. 
3 THN, 3.2.8.1, SBN539-540. 
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is conceded that a natural society should have been able to last long without 
the need of government. Nevertheless, foreign wars could break out before the 
society grows so rich as to cause internal conflicts. Since men’s most 
considerable goods, their life and limbs, were endangered in foreign wars, they 
would seek to escape from the formidable task of defence. In this way, wars 
directly gave rise to internal disorder, and called for political power.4 Hume 
provides historical evidence for this argument in the History: 
The ancient Germans were little removed from the original state of nature. 
The social confederacy among them was more martial than civil: They had 
chiefly in view the means of attack or defence against public enemies, not 
those of protection against their fellow-citizens. Their possessions were 
so slender and so equal, that they were not exposed to great danger.5 
The real life of human beings in the original state was neither the enjoyment of 
peaceful commerce nor the struggle against injustice done by their fellows. 
Rather, it was focusing on “attack or defence against public enemies”, namely 
foreign wars. This seems quite unlike the condition Hume depicts in his 
standard theory which we have already explored. The change of perspective, 
from domestic to inter-societal, is therefore not a re-telling of the same story on 
a different level, but rather leads to a substantially different story.6 
                                                        
4 Cf. R. J. Glossop, “Hume and the Future of the Society of Nations”, Hume Studies, Vol. X (1984), p54. 
5 HOE, I, p174. 
6 Andrew Sabl also notices Hume’s “change of emphasis”, that “in conditions that Hume describes as close to or 
resembling a state of nature, the greatest lack people feel is not justice but authority. And the result of their lacking 
it is not unstable property but physical danger, personal security”. (Hume’s Politics, p98) But Sabl does not recognise 
the potential tension between such an argument and Hume’s standard theory of men’s sociability, and of course 
provides no account for it.. 
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In comparison with his standard theory about the origin of government, 
Hume’s logic here more easily reminds us of Hobbes’s depiction of the 
formation of civil society from the state of nature. As is known to us, the main 
purpose of establishing political unity is to secure peace between its members. 
Looking at Hobbes’s analysis in detail, however, we will find that such a process 
is initially triggered by external wars.7 According to Hobbes, individuals in the 
state of war would like to form multitudes for the sake of defence and protection 
against their “common enemy”. But since external security was impossible due 
to the lack of internal order, “the only way to erect such a common power as 
may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of 
one another … is to confer all their power and strength to one man”.8 Therefore, 
the first purpose of government, more precisely speaking, is to secure internal 
order in the face of foreign threats. Hume agrees with Hobbes on this point. 
Hume does not deny that in the early age of history wars might not be frequent 
and long-lasting given the small population of the earth and the far distance 
between different tribes, therefore public authority usually dissolved “after their 
return from the field, and the establishment of peace with the neighbouring 
tribes”.9 He admits that only when the possessions of a society became rich 
enough to arouse injustice at home even in peacetime, did men make use of 
                                                        
7 As Hobbes’s state of nature is a state of war of all against all, then it is impossible to make a distinction between 
internal and external wars a priori. But after the erection of the political unities, we can talk of external wars in the 
state of nature retrospectively. 
8 L, xvii.3-4, 13. Also see Hedley Bull’s insightful comments, “one of the main pressures driving individual persons 
to leave the state of nature is the need to form groupings large enough, united enough, and enduring enough to be 
able to resist external attack.” Hedley Bull, “Hobbes and International Anarchy”, Social Research, Vol. 48, No. 4 
(Winter, 1981), p726. 
9 THN, 3.2.8.2, SBN540. 
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the public authority they had already known during the wars and finally establish 
government as a perpetual institution. Nevertheless, the connection between 
wars and government is of great theoretical significance. Firstly, it suggests the 
inseparability of the domestic and inter-societal (international) aspects of 
politics. In fact, domestic power is initially necessitated by the condition of 
foreign conflicts. Secondly, if wars between societies are always possible for 
human beings, then politics can be more than an outcome of domestic 
economic development, but a phenomenon as original as economy. 
    Someone may have doubts on the above arguments. Given that Hume’s 
theory of sociability is different from Hobbes’s, it seems unlikely that they 
explain the origin of government along the same logic. For Hobbes, the state of 
nature is a state of war through and through, so conflict is the universal 
background against which political artifice is made. Civil societies are, 
figuratively speaking, islands of peace rising up in the sea of war, while the sea 
remains between the islands. In this way, international conflict is the perpetual 
situation that civil societies have to survive. But according to Hume’s standard 
theory, the original condition is far from a state of war, except at the “Hobbesian 
moment” as we have previously discussed. For Hume, mutual commerce is 
always beneficial. Since the common sense of interest is able to set up peace 
and order between human beings, war should not be an instinctive or inevitable 
feature of human life. Despite the frequent quarrels between tribes and nations 
in the history, it is not necessary to conclude that men will never get rid of 
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fighting with each other. One might argue that war is only a result of economic 
backwardness, and with the development of commerce and knowledge men 
will eventually recognise the advantage of trading over fighting. Actually, this 
argument, known as the “doux commerce” thesis, has been quite popular since 
the eighteenth century. 10  In the eyes of thinkers including Montesquieu, 
Thomas Paine, Immanuel Kant and Benjamin Constant, war is a curable 
disease, because more civilised societies are expected to prefer peaceful 
commerce. 
To a considerable extent Hume agrees with the “doux commerce” thesis. 
From Hume’s viewpoint, the hostility between nations is nothing but absurdity. 
Making wars is expensive. It disturbs the ordinary industry of a society, 
consumes labour that otherwise could be employed in manufactory, and 
exhausts the economic superfluity which serves as the incentive of men’s 
productivity. Succession of wars will entrap people in sloth and barbarity, and 
eventually reduce their happiness.11 Moreover, not only wars, but also jealousy 
of trade, which means “to look on the progress of their neighbours with a 
suspicious eye, to consider all trading states as their rivals, and to suppose that 
it is impossible for any of them to flourish but at their expense”, is a groundless 
apprehension.12 In fact, a main purpose of Hume’s political writings is exactly 
                                                        
10 About the intellectual history of the “doux commerce” thesis see Albert Hirschman, Passions and Interests; cf. 
Laurence Dickey, “Doux Commerce and Humanitarian Values: Free Trade, Sociability, and Universal Benevolence 
in Eighteenth-Century Thinking”, Grotiana, Vol. 22, No. 1(2001), pp271-318; Bela Kapossy et al. (eds.), Commerce 
and Peace in the Enlightenment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
11 “Of Commerce”, EMPL, p258ff. 
12 “Of the Balance of Trade”, EMPL, p310. 
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to remove this ill-grounded “jealous fear”: “In opposition to this narrow and 
malignant opinion, I will venture to assert, that the increase of riches and 
commerce in any one nation, instead of hurting, commonly promotes the riches 
and commerce of all its neighbours.”13 According to Hume, the “zero-sum” logic 
of war does not apply to trade, because the latter is by its nature reciprocally 
beneficial as well as reciprocally dependent (otherwise it would not take place), 
and “in this respect states are in the same condition as individuals”.14 The 
prosperity of one nation requires the prosperity of its neighbouring nations, for 
the exportation of its commodities would be impossible if other nations cannot 
give something in exchange. Therefore, the prohibition of free trade will just act 
directly against their intentions, while a more reasonable policy is laissez faire.15 
Hume also believes the development of commerce will bring about 
improvements of human nature. The prosperity of trade let more and more 
people get employed, awakened them from solitude and indolence, and also 
made them more sociable by “instructing men in the advantage of humane 
maxims above rigour and severity”.16 “Industry, knowledge, and humanity, are 
linked together by an indissoluble chain, and are found, from experience as well 
as reason, to be peculiar to the more polished, and, what are commonly 
                                                        
13 “Of the Jealousy of Trade”, EMPL, p328. Cf. Andrew Skinner, “Hume’s Principle of Political Economy”, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Hume, ed. by Jacqueline Taylor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp381-
413. 
14 Ibid, p329. 
15 Leonard Gomes, Foreign Trade and National Economy: Mercantilist and Classical Perspectives, Basingstoke & 
London: Macmillan, 1987, pp107-116; Laurence Dickey, “Doux Commerce and Humanitarian Values”, pp285ff; 
Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade, ch3. 
16 “Of the Populousness of the Ancient Nations”, EMPL, p404. 
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denominated, the more luxurious ages.”17 For Hume, an increase of humanity 
is the natural consequence of the refinement of arts and manners in a 
developed economy. As a result, civilised men will not be as brutal as 
barbarians who took pleasure in fights, slaughters and domineering others, and 
will become less inclined to make wars. In sum, both theoretically and 
historically speaking, commerce is a uniting and pacifying force leading human 
beings to a more harmonious world. 
Nonetheless, Hume is never so optimistic as to expect a “perpetual peace” 
or a global commercial society in which wars and separated political societies 
are wiped out. To understand why we must look more carefully at Hume’s theory 
of sociability. Thanks to the enlightened self-interest, the original condition of 
men is not a Hobbesian state of war of all against all. But since Hume stands 
with Hobbes (and Mandeville) in rejecting Hutchesonian natural sociability, it is 
not a state of universal “peace and concord”, either. Hume reminds us that “our 
primary instincts lead us, either to indulge ourselves in unlimited freedom, or to 
seek dominion over others”.18 The natural operation of men’s appetites results 
in disorder, and it is not regulated unless mutual association is necessary for 
men’s survival. In this sense, conflict is also the background against which 
various artifices work, though “artifice” for Hume means much more than the 
erection of sovereignty. Hume’s societies, like Hobbes’s, are also islands of 
                                                        
17 “Of Refinement in the Art”, EMPL, p271; Neil McArthur, David Hume’s Political Theory: Law, Commerce, and 
the Constitution of Government, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007, ch1. About the moral effects of industry, 
see Carl Wennerlind, “The Role of Political Economy in Hume’s Moral Philosophy”, Hume Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1 
(Apr., 2011), pp43-64. 
18 “Of the Original Contract”, EMPL, p480. 
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peace rising up in the sea of war. Now some important conclusions can be 
drawn from this picture. Firstly, societies are by their nature limited. And more 
importantly, the original association between individuals is not merely economic, 
but also potentially political, given the ever-presenting possibility of foreign 
conflicts faced by each society. 
Yet this is not to say Hume believes in some Hobbesian international 
anarchy. The progress of civilisation arouses more and more desires in men’s 
body and mind, for the gratification of which more extensive commerce is 
needed. Then human beings are increasingly ready to find out the benefits of 
trading with foreigners. “The advantage, therefore, of peace, commerce, and 
mutual succour, make us extend to different kingdoms the same notions of 
justice, which take place among individuals.”19 As the common sense of the 
interest of preserving society has given rise to the convention of justice, now 
the common sense of the interest of international commerce gives rise to the 
convention of the laws of nations, including three fundamental laws of nature 
and other diplomatic rules. In this sense, it is not unreasonable to say that for 
Hume there is an “international society”, in which each nation acts like an 
individual. 20 However, the difference between laws of nations and laws of 
nature should not be overlooked. As is keenly pointed out by Hume, 
The same obligation of interest takes place among independent kingdoms, 
                                                        
19 THN, 3.2.11.2, SBN568. 
20 About Hume and the idea of “international society”, see Renee Jeffery, “Moral Sentiment Theory and the 
International Thought of David Hume”, in Ian Hall & Lisa Hill (eds.), British International Thinkers from Hobbes 
to Namier, London: Palgrave, 2009, pp49-69; Benjamin Straumann &Benedict Kingsbury, “The State of Nature and 
Commercial Sociability in International Legal Thought”, Grotiana, Vol. 31 (2010), pp22-43. 
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and gives rise to the same morality. … But here we may observe, that tho’ 
the intercourse of different states be advantageous, and even sometimes 
necessary, yet it is not so necessary nor advantageous as that among 
individuals, without which ’tis utterly impossible for human nature to 
subsist. Since, therefore, the natural obligation to justice, among different 
states, is not so strong as among individuals, the moral obligation, which 
arises from it, must partake of its weakness.21 
Though interest is always a uniting agent of human beings, national society still 
differs greatly from international society. Hume makes a distinction between two 
sorts of commercial sociability, one is based on our restless desires of real and 
imaginary goods, while the other on the necessity of self-preservation. Roughly 
speaking, the former is the foundation underlying the ever-expanding 
international social relations, but it is not so strong as the latter, which upholds 
the limited national societies. External violence, “because it comes from 
strangers, seems less pernicious in its consequences, than when they are 
expos’d singly against one whose commerce is advantageous to them, and 
without whose society ’tis impossible they can subsist.”22 The force disciplining 
our natural and harmful avidity, namely the advantage of mutual commerce and 
disadvantage of conflicts, is much weaker on international level than on 
domestic. Consequently, quarrels more easily break out between societies than 
between individuals. Returning to the analogy we have used previously, the 
                                                        
21 THN, 3.2.11.4, SBN569. 
22 THN, 3.2.8.1, SBN540. 
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advantage of international commerce may be to build bridges between the 
islands of nations, but it is ultimately unable to fill the sea of conflicts and form 
the Pangaea of global peace. In a nutshell, war is an ineradicable feature of 
human life, because the commercial sociability is by itself limited and uneven. 
Hume’s analysis of war and the actual history of government is consistent with 
his theory of human nature and the conjectural history of civil society. 
Additionally, Hume also mentions other factors impeding the formation of a 
super-national society. The difference in conventions and climates gives rise to 
vastly different national characters. The “passion of national pride” associates 
one’s country more tightly than any other human groups to the idea of oneself, 
making the global unity both impossible and undesirable, because “nothing is 
more favourable to the rise of politeness and learning than a number of 
neighbouring and independent states, connected together by commerce and 
policy. The emulation which naturally arises among those neighbouring states, 
is an obvious source of improvement”.23 More importantly, men’s sympathy, the 
mechanism underlying our moral sentiments, is partial and limited. The more 
distant a person is from us, the weaker we can feel his feelings. It is especially 
difficult for one to sympathise with someone merely “as an individual with a 
private sense of interest detached from that of others”, 24 i.e. as a typical 
                                                        
23 “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences”, EMPL, p119. Some international relation scholars have 
noticed that for Hume the prospect of a peaceful global society is quite bleak. Edwin Van de Haar, “David Hume 
and International Political Theory: A Reappraisal”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 34 (2008), pp225-242; 
Classical Liberalism and International Relations Theory: Hume, Smith, Mises, and Hayek, London: Palgrave, 2009, 
pp41-56. Also cf. Robert Manzer, “The Promise of Peace? Hume and Smith on the Effects of Commerce on War and 
Peace”, Hume Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Nov., 1996), pp369-382. Later we will see what this means for Hume’s theory 
of civil society. 
24 Donald Ainslie, “The Problem of National Self in Hume’s Theory of Justice”, Hume Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Nov., 
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member of human species with no face. Commercial sociability on international 
level, relatively weak in itself, thus must often be overwhelmed by those “local” 
and more violent passions. As a result, discord will never be eliminated even in 
an era of a highly developed global market economy. 
The inevitability of war, along with the connection between war and politics, 
now enhances our critique of Hont’s “commercial sociability” model or Finlay’s 
“(Hegelian) civil society” interpretation, and further demonstrates the 
significance of politics for Hume’s theory. Economic commerce or the pursuit of 
utility, being the foundation of men’s sociability, is nonetheless not necessarily 
the centre of men’s life.25 Politics is also an original and fundamental dimension 
of human association. Besides the necessity of securing domestic order, human 
beings must always respond to challenges from outside as well. Politics is then 
not only a derivative of economic development, nor would it be extinguished by 
further economic development. Therefore, “bringing the politics back in” may 
afford us a more adequate, and also more complex understanding of the civil 
society. It suggests that there is no “natural” progress of economy or growth of 
civilisation without taking political conditions into consideration. This is 
confirmed by Hume’s historical explanation of the origin of modern commercial 
                                                        
1995), pp289-313; A. B. Stilz, “Hume, Modern Patriotism, and Commercial Society”, History of European Ideas, 
Vol. 29, No.1 (2003), pp15-32. Yet we should distinguish Hume’s “patriotism” from Ferguson and Kames’s 
“agonistic patriotism”, which sees antagonism as crucial in generating political cohesion and sustaining moral virtue. 
Cf. Iain McDaniel, “Unsocial Sociability in the Scottish Enlightenment: Ferguson and Kames on War, Sociability 
and the Foundations of Patriotism”, History of European Ideas, Vol. 41, No. 5 (2015), pp662-682. 
25 Andrew Sabl has precisely pointed out that for Hume, human beings “had no initial reason to think economically. 
Money is not automatically more attractive than power”. See his Hume’s Politics, p68. But unlike Sabl, here we do 
not want to read Hume’s history of civil society abstractly as a case of the “liberal” project, which overcomes the 
“coordinating problem” by enlarging the common interest of men with various desires “that in their early form were 
incompatible with another” (Ibid, p53). Rather, our purpose is to understand Hume’s theory of civil society in the 
historical background of modern state building, and better appreciate the relationship between his theory of human 




II. The History of Civil Society: From Barbarity to Civilisation 
1. Arbitrary Power, War, and Ancient Polities 
In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume’s history of civil society (conjectural 
or actual) ends with the invention and institutionalisation of government. 
Although it well demonstrates the fundamental principles of various artifice 
upholding social order, this is a history covering only the early period of the 
progress human beings have experienced. But in his Essays and History of 
England, Hume provides us with the whole story, either from a general 
perspective or focusing specifically on England and its neighbours. 
The process of civilisation, including the development of industry and 
wealth, the refinement of arts and sciences, the improvement of human nature, 
as well as the growth of liberty, is the main theme attracting Hume the 
philosopher and historian’s interest. To a large extent, Hume’s historical 
explanation is delivered through a contrast between the ancients and the 
moderns. The lifestyle of the ancients is bellicose, simple and austere, while 
that of the moderns is more sociable, luxurious, and well-bred. The transition 
from the former to the latter is usually attributed to the increasing role of 
commerce in society. However, it should not be overlooked that Hume also 
organises his analysis into a comparative political framework, in which the 
political-socio-military system is regarded as a significant interpretive 
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variable. 26  For Hume, an important contributor to the debates of civil 
government, the historiography of society is also a historiography of state.27 
According to Hume, the first stage of civil society is the barbarous 
monarchy, or the “pure despotism”, which is the legacy of war during which “the 
suddenness of every exigency” could not be managed “without some authority 
in a single person”.28 At first glance, there seems to be some contradiction 
between the terms “civil” and “barbarous”, and the confusion of “monarchy” and 
“despotism” also looks strange. It is noteworthy that “civil” here means no more 
than “political”, which is distinguished from the “natural” society without 
government, while “barbarous” describes the government itself. Meanwhile, 
departing from classical regime theory as well as Montesquieu’s famous 
trichotomy between despotism, monarchy, and republic, Hume does not make 
a clear distinction between monarchy and despotism, nor does he regard 
despotism as an illegitimate regime. For Hume, despotism is not a definite form 
of government, but the arbitrary way of ruling, which can be expressed in 
various regimes to different degrees. 29 A barbarous monarchy did have a 
                                                        
26 About the role of different constitutions in Hume’s historical analysis, see Neil McArthur, David Hume’s Political 
Theory. Tatsuya Sakamoto claims that Hume in his later works replaces the comparative constitutional framework 
with a manner-centred explanation, while “manner” is a synthesis of modes of substance, social norms and lifestyle. 
“Hume’s Economy as a System of Manners”, in Tatsuya Sakamoto & Hideo Tanaka (eds.), The Rise of Political 
Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, NY: Routledge, 2003, pp86-102; also cf. Christopher Berry, “Hume and the 
Customary Causes of Knowledge, Industry, and Humanity”, History of Political Economy, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2006), 
pp291-317. Here we use “comparative political framework” instead of “comparative constitutional”, and by the term 
“political” we mean not only political forms but also practice, policy and other relevant political-sociological 
elements. From our perspective, the political factors still play important roles even in Hume’s later works, though 
Hume certainly does not believe in some political determinism. And, in this sense Hume is similar to Montesquieu. 
Cf. Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, ed. and tr. by Anne M. Cohler et al, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989, 1.1.3; Thomas Pangle, Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on The 
Spirit of the Laws, Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1973, pp44ff. 
27 J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, Vol. II, p2.  
28 “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences”, EMPL, p116, 125; THN, 3.2.8.2, SBN541. 
29 Also see “Of the Liberty of Press”, EPML, pp11-12. 
228 
 
government executing justice and securing the property of individuals from 
mutual injuries, which makes it a legislative political form. Yet such a society 
was clearly not economy-centred or commerce-friendly. As is pointed out by 
Hume, “among that military and turbulent people, so averse to commerce and 
the arts, and so little enured to industry, justice was commonly very ill 
administered, and great oppression and violence seem to have prevailed.”30 
Here the prevalence of violence did not result from the absence of public 
authority, but from the public authority itself. The barbarity of such a regime 
consisted in the fact that there is no security against the harm from the rulers: 
If the people, … increase to a great multitude, the monarch, finding it 
impossible, in his own person, to execute every office of sovereignty, in 
every place, must delegate his authority to inferior magistrates, who 
preserve peace and order in their respective districts. … The prince, who 
is himself unrestrained, never dreams of restraining his ministers, but 
delegates his full authority to everyone, whom he sets over any portion of 
the people.31 
The purpose of erecting government is to put someone who “being 
indifferent persons to the greatest part of the state, have no interest, or but a 
remote one, in any act of injustice” in the office of enforcing justice upon all the 
other members of society.32 But nothing could guarantee that the rulers would 
                                                        
30 HOE, I, p166. 
31 “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences”, EMPL, p116. 
32 THN, 3.2.7.6, SBN537. 
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be satisfied with their position and never crete advantages for themselves by ill 
performance of their office. This problem is especially serious when it comes to 
the magistrates and aristocrats under the sovereign. The barbarous monarch 
could not rule a large nation without the assistance of sub-magistrates. Then, if 
the magistrates were dependent on the arbitrary will of the monarch, having 
only limited and uncertain terms of office, they would be even more oppressive 
to the subjects to get the utmost out of their contemporary authority. “A people, 
governed after such a manner, are slaves in the full and proper sense of the 
word.”33 And if they were aristocrats and enjoy independent authority from the 
monarch’s, they actually became whom the people are “obliged to consider as 
their sovereign, more than the king himself, or even the legislature”34. The 
exorbitant power of those “petty tyrants” gave rise to violence and disorder, 
while the disorder in turn increased their power, because the subjects had no 
other ways to defend themselves but relying on the force of the aristocrats. 
“Where they receive not protection from the laws and magistrate, they will seek 
it by submission to superiors, and by herding in some inferior confederacy, 
which acts under the direction of a powerful chieftain.”35 In a word, no matter 
how the inferior rulers obtain their power, its arbitrariness could not but threaten 
the security and property of the individuals. Inevitably, “the barbarous policy 
debases the people, and forever prevents all improvements”. 36  And since 
                                                        
33 “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences”, EMPL, p117. 
34 HOE, I, p167. 
35 Ibid, p148. 
36 “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences”, EMPL, p117. 
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nothing but the progress of legal science could cure this disease, the barbarity 
would just propagate itself perpetually. 
Hume attributes this problem to the lack of knowledge, which was 
inevitable in early ages of history. On the one hand, the subjects placed an 
implicit confidence in the rulers, without recognising the necessity of 
establishing general laws and political institutions to protect themselves from 
their oppression. On the other hand, the monarch was also ignorant of the 
advantages of general laws over full discretionary power, namely social stability 
and more effectual control over his magistrates. “All general laws are attended 
with inconveniencies, when applied to particular cases; and it requires great 
penetration and experience, … to perceive that these inconveniencies are 
fewer than what result from full discretionary powers in every magistrate.”37 The 
benefits of acting as a legislator rather than a despot lay beyond the 
understanding of the barbarous monarch. In this sense, the want of stable 
justice indicates precisely men’s incapacity of making a society prosperous. 
However, Hume also notices that barbarous rulers could damage the 
stability of property on purpose (instead of ignorantly). For example, in the 
Anglo-Saxon tribes, 
All the refined arts of life were unknown among the Germans: They even 
seem to have been anxious to prevent any improvements of that nature; 
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and the leaders, by annually distributing anew all the land among the 
inhabitants of each village, kept them from attaching themselves to 
particular possessions, or making such progress in agriculture as might 
divert their attention from military expeditions, the chief occupation of the 
community.38 
And also, in the early era of English feudalism, 
The languishing state of commerce kept the inhabitants poor and 
contemptible; and the political institutions were calculated to render that 
poverty perpetual. The barons and gentry, living in rustic plenty and 
hospitality, gave no encouragement to the arts, and had no demand for 
any of the more elaborate manufactures: Every profession was held in 
contempt but that of arms: And if any merchant or manufacturer rose by 
industry and frugality to a degree of opulence, he found himself but the 
more exposed to injuries, from the envy and avidity of the military nobles.39 
In these cases, the rulers were not simply incapable of securing justice by 
precautionary institutions or effectual administration, rather, they did not want 
to do so. They were “anxious” and tried in a “calculated” way to obstruct 
economic development. Their policies and institutions, being discouraging to 
any progress, are outcomes of political decisions, which were made deliberately. 
In the eyes of the Anglo-Saxon chiefs and the English lords, the improvement 
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of industry and arts would distract the subjects from military activities, the only 
honourable and necessary profession for the survival of their communities. And 
the military service, notwithstanding a heavy burden, was “less felt by a people 
addicted to arms, who fight for honour and revenge more than pay”.40 That is 
to say, commerce was far from the first thing human beings were concerned 
with, but instead was regarded as ignoble and harmful. In Hume’s explanation, 
therefore, politics influences socio-economic activities not only as a structure 
but also as a variety of practices, and not only through coercion but also with 
the help of social norms about honour. 
After barbarous monarchy comes the ancient republic, which for Hume is 
the consequence of the rebellion against tyrants. The republics provided the 
commerce with a much better political condition where the power of the rulers 
is no longer arbitrary. “Though a republic should be barbarous, it necessarily, 
by an infallible operation, gives rise to LAW, even before mankind have made 
any considerable advances in the other sciences.”41 For Hume, at the beginning, 
laws in republics might be as rough as those in monarchies, since the want of 
jealousy between citizens and magistrates allowed the latter to hold great 
discretionary power. But “a republic and free government would be an obvious 
absurdity, if the particular checks and controls, provided by the constitution, had 
really no influence, even of bad men, to act for the public good.”42 The frequent 
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elections by the people afforded considerable checks upon authority, and by 
“trials and experiments” they sooner or later recognised the necessity of 
restraining the magistrates for the preservation of liberty.43 Republics, unlike 
monarchies, by their nature require rule of law. As is sketched in the Treatise 
and demonstrated by the history of ancient Greece and Rome, general laws 
sufficiently secured the lives and properties of the citizens, and then led to the 
improvements of arts and sciences. 
Nonetheless, despite its institutional advantages over barbarous monarchy, 
Hume reminds us that ancient republic is not much better at supporting 
economic prosperity, as some readers might have expected given the 
“indissoluble chain” of “industry, knowledge, and humanity”. 44  Justice 
guarantees the stability of property, which is the precondition of any 
accumulation of wealth, but justice itself does not automatically generate the 
desire for industry and wealth. In fact, the rule of law and perfection of arts in 
ancient Greece and Rome were “attended with poverty, and the greatest 
simplicity of life and manners”.45 The ancient nations were not so populous as 
some of Hume’s contemporaries believed, either.46 Hume points out that the 
extreme love of liberty, as well as the barbarity of ancient tyrants, “must have 
banished every merchant and manufacturer, and have quite depopulated the 
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state, had it subsisted upon industry and commerce”.47 Far from a revolutionary 
transformation of men’s life, the progress ancient republics made is still limited. 
The reason why the growth of economy is hindered in spite of general laws 
is multiple. Hume highlights the instability of the ancient republics. 
Notwithstanding the rule of law, ancient republics could also become “violent 
governments” due to the factional strife: 
In ancient history, we may always observe, where one party prevailed, 
whether the nobles or people … that they immediately butchered all of the 
opposite party who fell into their hands, and banished such as hand been 
so fortunate as to escape their fury. No form of process, no law, no trial, 
no pardon.48 
As there was on the one hand an extreme love of liberty and equality, whereas 
on the other hand “no medium between a severe, jealous Aristocracy, and 
turbulent, factious, tyrannical Democracy”,49 the rage between factions was 
much bloodier than that in modern times, which interrupted the regular exertion 
of laws. Additionally, ancient republics, even uncorrupted, were dominated by 
the spirit of simplicity, frugality and self-denial, which were great obstacles to 
economic activities. Hume shares a consensus with Montesquieu that, although 
a republic (in its classic sense) is distinguished from arbitrary rule of despotism 
or barbarous monarchy, it is not by its nature a moderate government.50 
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Yet the principal reason lies in the fundamental similarity between ancient 
republics and barbarous monarchies, that they “were almost in perpetual 
war”.51 In ancient republics as well as barbarous monarchies, military activities 
were of paramount significance for the public benefit of societies, and were 
considered much more honourable than industry and commerce. While many 
“doux commerce” thinkers explained the perpetual war in ancient times in a (to 
some extent) materialistic way, i.e. regarding it as a result of the undeveloped 
economy, Hume keenly points out a reversed causal relationship. As we have 
discussed previously, war has its ineradicable root in human nature. According 
to Hume, the perpetual ancient war is “a natural effect of their martial spirit, their 
love of liberty, their mutual emulation, and that hatred which generally prevails 
among nations that live in close neighbourhood”.52 But the great cost of war 
causes the scarcity of human and material resources, bringing about a tension 
between private wealth and public finance: 
A state is never greater than when all its superfluous hands are employed 
in the service of public. The ease and convenience of private persons 
require, that these hand should be employed in their service. … As the 
ambition of the sovereign must entrench the luxury of the individuals, so 
the luxury of individuals must diminish the force, and check the ambition 
of the sovereign.53 
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The labour and resources of each economy, once devoted to private industry 
and consumption, could no longer supply the wars and arms. This is especially 
true for the small body politic with only small scale of surplus. Therefore, to 
secure the war capacity of the ancient polities, manufacture and commerce 
could not but be restrained, whereas frugality and public-spiritedness were 
approved as virtues. 
The fewer desires and wants are found in the proprietors and labourers of 
land, the fewer hands do they employ; and consequently the superfluities 
of the land, instead of maintaining tradesmen and manufacturers, may 
support fleets and armies to a much greater extent, than where a great 
many arts are required to minister to the luxury of particular persons.54 
An extreme example is Sparta. It was the extreme rusticity of the Spartans 
that enabled the Helots to feed them, and allowed the republic to maintain so 
great an army. Furthermore, from a dynamic perspective, wars might result in 
a vicious cycle of poverty. Since the superfluity, once produced, is extorted 
away immediately as well as continually to finance the successive wars, 
accumulation of private wealth in turn becomes impossible, nor could the 
interactive mechanism of production and consumption driving the economy 
work. In a nutshell, the greatness of the states and the happiness of the 
individuals are in contradiction. (Holding this viewpoint, Hume is yet different 
from classical republicans, because this contradiction for him is not only on 
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moral but also on political-economic level.) It is for this political reason that in 
both ancient republics and barbarous monarchies, economic activities must 
be discouraged and dishonoured. 
    Clearly demonstrating the political limits to the development of economy,55 
Hume’s analysis on ancient polities confirms the conclusions we have already 
drawn. Instead of a natural progress on the basis of human nature (i.e. the 
“commercial sociability”), the prosperity of commerce could not come true 
unless there are both political institutions entirely safeguarding domestic justice, 
and policies sufficiently encouraging industry and trade in the face of foreign 
wars. To some extent, the latter is even more difficult to achieve than the former, 
because a body politic must overcome the inherent contradiction between 
public power and private wealth. Or in other words, it must find out a new mode 
of securing its state capacity, and then conform men’s way of life to this new 
mode through a variety of artificial conventions. 
2. General Law, Political Economy, and the Modern States 
The situation has changed in modern times when commerce flourishes 
even without free government, as is observed by Hume. This is first because of 
the reformation of constitution that took place in modern monarchies. As we 
have seen previously, “a pure despotism established among a barbarous 
people” is stuck in the vicious circle between violence and ignorance, thus can 
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never by its native force and energy polish itself. However, it is able to “borrow 
its laws, and methods, and institutions, and consequently its stability and order, 
from free governments”.56 The most important thing monarchies “borrowed” is 
the restraint of inferior magistrates by general laws: 
Every minister or magistrate, must subsist to the general laws, which 
govern the whole society, and must exert the authority delegated to him 
after the manner, which is prescribed. The people depend on none but 
their sovereign, for the security of their property. He is so far removed from 
them, and is so much exempt from private jealousies or interests. That 
this dependence is scarcely felt.57 
In the reformed constitution there is a distinction between the monarch and the 
magistrates. The monarch remains absolute, holding full discretionary power 
beyond the system of laws, ruling only according to customs and his own 
deliberation, whereas the magistrates, authorised by the sovereign, cannot 
exercise their power but in accordance with the prescription of the laws. That is 
to say, the government, except its head, is depersonalised. Unlike those 
authors of “vulgar Whiggism” who equate absolute government with slavery, 
Hume argues that such a distinction is enough to overcome the problem of 
barbarous monarchies, namely the oppression from the rulers.58 Since the 
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monarch, as the ultimate sovereign of the state, no longer enters into the detail 
of administration which may be easily influenced by private prejudices, his 
absoluteness is in no direct contradiction with the depersonalised apparatus of 
the state. In this sense, the monarchy becomes “civilised”. It is worth our notice 
that by “civilised” Hume means no longer the mere presence of political 
authority, but that such a regime is “a government of law not of men”.59 Hence 
besides the distinction between natural and civil society, there is now a 
historical contrast between barbarity and “civility” or “civilisation”. Though Hume 
does not make use of Montesquieu’s distinction between monarchy and 
despotism, yet by differentiating civilised monarchy from barbarous monarchy, 
Hume agrees with Montesquieu that modern monarchy can be consistent with 
rule of law and become a “moderate government”. Such a new regime may 
afford “tolerable security” to the people.60 This explains why arts, sciences and 
commerce were able to rise in absolute monarchies like France. 
Nevertheless, it is still unclear why the originally barbarous monarchies 
wanted to “borrow” the general laws to make themselves “civilised”, and how 
they successfully accomplished it. Since Hume concedes that “in a monarchical 
government, laws arise not necessarily from the form of government”,61 there 
must have been some factors that motivated such a reformation. Hume does 
not systematically discuss this topic, yet his comments on the civilisation of 
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English monarchy displays some important elements of this process. 
Feudal England can be justly seen as a barbarous monarchy, in which 
military profession is the centre of men’s life, while judicial authority was 
combined with military command.62 The barons holding comprehensive and 
arbitrary power disturbed the regular execution of justice, and put the people 
into slavery. Hume recognises the great difficulty of breaking such a system, 
since “men, not protected by law in their lives and properties, sought shelter, by 
their personal servility and attachments, under some powerful chieftains.”63 The 
violence of the feudal lords is self-reinforcing. As a result, “it required the 
authority almost absolute of the sovereigns, which took place in the subsequent 
period, to pull down those disorderly and licentious tyrants, who were equally 
averse from peace and from freedom, and to establish that regular execution 
of the laws, which, in a following age, enabled the people to erect a regular and 
equitable plan of liberty.”64 The improvement of the constitution did not take 
place naturally, rather, it was an outcome of some complicated political 
struggles. 
From Hume’s perspective, the kings played an indispensable role in the 
transformation of English constitution. The Norman Conquest once endowed 
the kings with great power over the whole nation, making the central 
government in England relatively stronger than other European governments. 
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Yet with the development of feudalism, the barons gradually obtained the 
hereditary property right of their fiefs, and became independent rulers over their 
serfs. In the eyes of the king, the barons were more his rivals who everlastingly 
challenge his authority than mere vassals subject to him. But the people, more 
than often injured and oppressed by the lords, had some common interest with 
the king. 
Instead of checking and controuling the authority of the king, they were 
naturally induced to adhere to him, as the great fountain of law and justice, 
and to support him against the power of the aristocracy, which at once 
was the source of oppression to themselves, and disturbed him in the 
execution of the laws. The king, in his turn, gave countenance to an order 
of men, so useful and so little dangerous.65 
Restraining the arbitrary power of the barons was beneficial for both the king 
and the people, therefore, the king was ready to implement the general laws, 
which would curb the aristocracy and further promote the obedience of the 
people. Such a strategy was carried out gradually, accompanied by the 
recovery of legal science and the progress of industry and commerce. 
According to Hume, the most significant measure of undermining the feudal 
lords the kings had ever taken was Henry VII’s Statute of Fines: 
… the most important law in its consequences, which was enacted during 
the reign of Henry, was that by which the nobility and gentry acquired a 
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power of breaking the ancient entails, and of alienating their estates. By 
means of this law, joined to the beginning luxury and refinements of the 
age, the great fortunes of the barons were gradually dissipated, and the 
property of the commons encreased in England. It is probable, that Henry 
foresaw and intended this consequence, because the constant scheme of 
his policy consisted in depressing the great, and exalting churchmen, 
lawyers, and men of new families, who were more dependent on him.66 
The reign of Henry VII witnessed the critical decline of the nobility’s power, of 
which Hume’s explanation is quite influential in the history of political thought. 
As is pointed out by Adam Smith and appreciated by many modern scholars, 
Hume keenly highlights the role of commerce and luxury in this process.67 With 
the introduction of the habits of luxury, the peasants and tradesmen acquired a 
share of property, whereas the nobility “acquired by degrees a more civilised 
species of emulation, and endeavoured to excel in the splendour and elegance 
of their equipage, houses, and tables”.68 Attracted by the refined way of life, the 
noblemen exhausted their wealth, which used to maintain their retainers, on the 
consumption of all sorts of opulent goods. In this way, “a nobleman, instead of 
that unlimited ascendant, which he was wont to assume over those who were 
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maintained at his board, or subsisted by salaries conferred on them, retained 
only that moderate influence, which customers have over tradesmen, and which 
can never be dangerous to civil government.”69 As both riches and influence of 
the nobles diminished, a more unified and generalised system of jurisdiction 
became available. It is in this sense that neither the so-called ancient 
constitution nor the recent revolution but rather commerce and luxury gave rise 
to the civil liberty of the modern English state.70 Nevertheless, Hume also paid 
due attention to the legislative actions and policies of Henry VII. The Statute of 
Fine allowed the barons to break the family heritance of their ownership of lands 
and circulate those on open market. Therefore, without fundamentally 
damaging the feudal system, the king effectually undermined the aristocratic 
authority by dissipating their property. “The settled authority, which he acquired 
to the crown, enabled the sovereign to encroach on the separate jurisdictions 
of the barons, and produced a more general and regular execution of the 
laws.”71 In fact, the policies of Henry VII were so constant that Hume even 
suggests that the king had a clear and deliberate project. To a considerable 
extent, there are reasons to say that the king’s pursuit and acquisition of 
absolute power prompted the transformation of English polity into a civilised 
monarchy, while the refinement of manners afforded him favourable socio-
economic conditions. 
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Besides the establishment of general laws, the civilisation of modern 
monarchy was also indicated by policies encouraging development of economy. 
According to Hume’s observation, such an inclination emerged even long 
before the Tudors. Since the reign of Edward II, 
during the course of several years, the kings of England, in imitation of 
other European princes, had embraced the salutary policy of encouraging 
and protecting the lower and more industrious orders of the state; whom 
they found well disposed to obey the laws and civil magistrate, and whose 
ingenuity and labour furnished commodities, requisite for the ornament of 
peace and support of war. Though the inhabitants of the country were still 
left at the disposal of their imperious lords; many attempts were made to 
give more security and liberty to citizens, and make them enjoy 
unmolested the fruits of their industry. Boroughs were erected by royal 
patent within the demesne lands: Liberty of trade was conferred upon 
them; The inhabitants were allowed to farm at a fixed rent their own tolls 
and customs.”72 
Rather than consciously keeping the subjects “from attaching themselves to 
particular possessions”, the kings then began to protect their enjoyment of the 
fruits of their own labour and allowed them to commerce freely. This was not 
only because “the lower and more industrious orders” were more governable 
and more supportive to the kingly authority in the domestic power struggle, as 
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we have seen above. Moreover, the sovereign had recognised the increasing 
significance of industry and trade for the war finance. 
Notwithstanding the fact that military activities used to be the centre of 
men’s life, it must be admitted that “England, as well as other European 
countries, was, in its ancient state, very ill qualified for making, and still worse 
for maintaining conquests”.73 The great devotion to war did not naturally bring 
about strong war capacity. One crucial reason of that lay in the difficulty of 
supporting the army efficiently and steadily. “People possessed little riches and 
the public no credit, made it impossible for sovereign to bear the expense of a 
steady or durable war, even on their frontiers.”74 In order to secure their military 
capacity, the ancient nations had endeavoured to minimise private economic 
activities, supressing all consumption and commerce beyond necessity. But as 
the superfluity of the whole economy was itself thin, and the intensity of war 
was increasing, the supply it could afford to the state was far from adequate. 
That is to say, sufficient support for war requires more surplus, which 
furthermore requires stronger capacity of industry. From this new perspective, 
the manufactures and tradesmen were no longer seen as humble or even 
harmful professions, but indispensable contributors to the public good. Thus 
both the king and the subjects developed a more positive attitude toward 
economic activities. 
The rise in status of economic activities was also facilitated by the relatively 
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safe geopolitical condition England was in. 
Affairs, in this island particularly, took early a turn, which was more 
favourable to justice and to liberty. Civil employments and occupations 
soon became honourable among the English: The situation of that people 
rendered not the perpetual attention to wars so necessary as among their 
neighbours, and all regard was not confined to the military profession.75  
Although national defence remained a fundamental consideration, England, as 
an island, did not face the kind of succession of wars or invasions that would 
prevent all improvements of economy and civilisation. In a relatively peaceful 
situation, the focus of both men’s life and measure of honour begun to move 
from military affairs to civil commerce. Therefore, with the change of relationship 
between industry and war, the kings were increasingly inclined to encourage 
economic growth. Hume does not deny that at first most policies of this sort 
were awkward due to the ignorance of the science of political economy. “If we 
may judge by most of the laws enacted during his reign, trade and industry were 
rather hurt than promoted by the care and attention given to them.”76 For a long 
time, laws against taking interest from money, against the exportation of money, 
and regulations of price, invented to protect the still fragile economy, just 
unintendedly impeded the prosperity of the nation. Thus we may conclude from 
these comments that Hume has a strong critique of government’s interference 
in markets, because “these matters ought always to be let free, and be 
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entrusted to the common course of business and commerce”.77 Yet this merely 
suggests that the economic affairs should be managed in a more reasonable 
as well as subtle way, for the development at least requires the welcome of the 
rulers. The kings’ concern for economy is thus still a progress than the policy of 
the barbarous monarchs. At bottom, the fundamental precondition of the rise of 
industry and commerce is their capacity of fulfilling particular political aims. This 
constitutes the typical feature of the modern states.78 
Like civilised monarchy, modern free government is friendly to civil 
commerce as well, for it also affords general laws securing the stability of 
property and policies promoting economic intercourse. But difference in political 
forms still leads to difference in social norms. “In both these forms of 
government, those who possess the supreme authority have the disposal of 
many honours and advantages, which excite the ambition and avarice of 
mankind.”79 Hume agrees with Mandeville and Hobbes that political power is 
able to channel human behaviours by shaping the system of honour. In 
republics,  citizens are in a great measure independent from each other, while 
the candidate of office must gain the suffrage of the people, thus the power 
rises upwards from the bottom to the top. Such a political structure honours 
                                                        
77 Ibid, p78. 
78 A comparison with the case of China may better reveal this feature of European modern states. In Hume’s eyes, 
Chinese government was a pure but non-despotic monarchy. It was more moderate than barbarous monarchies, for 
the monarch was sufficiently restrained by the people and the magistrates were under the restraint of general laws. 
But it was unfitted for defence against foreign enemies. With no urgent requirement of war capacity due to its peculiar 
geopolitical situation, there was no impetus for Chinese government to grow into an absolute monarchy. And 
notwithstanding its “considerable stock of politeness and science”, it fell into stagnation, compared with modern 
European states. See “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences”, EMPL, p122, footnote 13. 
79 Ibid, p126. 
248 
 
“strong genius”, for a man cannot be welcomed by his fellows (equal to him in 
citizenship) unless making himself “useful, by his industry, capacity, or 
knowledge”.80 In this way, industry and sciences are most encouraged in free 
states. But civilised monarchies are not so “utilitarian” as the republics: 
In a civilised monarchy, there is a long train of dependence from the prince 
to the peasant, which is not great enough to render property precarious, 
or depress the minds of the people; but is sufficient to beget in every one 
an inclination to please his superiors, and to form himself upon those 
models, which are most acceptable to people of condition and 
education.81 
Hume’s analysis of the norms of civilised monarchy is quite similar to 
Montesquieu’s. A civilised monarchy is a society with hierarchy, in which the 
lower orders depend on the higher. As the power goes downwards (though not 
arbitrarily), what is honoured becomes “refined taste”, because to obtain the 
favour of the greats one has to render himself “agreeable, by his wit, 
complaisance, or civility”. 82  Consequently, it is polite arts that are most 
encouraged in monarchies. Hume here analyses the rise of politeness of 
manners in modern courts. Like Mandeville, Hume also regards politeness as 
an artificial virtue necessary for any large and polished society, for it curbs the 
excessive pride inherent in human nature and prevents us from committing real 
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injuries to others. Yet, similar to Mandeville again, from the historical 
perspective, the flourishing of good-manners is regarded as a modern 
phenomenon that originated from a specific political form, namely civilised 
monarchy. “If the superiority in politeness should be allowed to modern times, 
the modern notions of gallantry, the natural produce of courts and monarchies, 
will probably be assigned the cause of this refinement.”83 Therefore, after the 
monarchy’s “borrowing” of general laws from the free state, now it is the latter 
that borrows the politeness from the former, for such a virtue has a natural 
affinity with the refinement in the gratification of the senses which determines 
the lifestyle of modern ages. In this sense, politeness, one of the central 
conventions upholding civil society, also must be understood by taking its 
political and historical condition into consideration. 
However, notwithstanding the conventions of justice and politeness are 
ready and the policies are generally favourable to commerce, Hume still finds 
“something hurtful to commerce inherent in the nature of absolute government, 
and inseparable from it”.84 Hume’s argument here is worth quoting at length, 
Private property seems to me almost as secure in a civilized EUROPEAN 
monarchy, as in a republic; nor is danger much apprehended in such a 
government, from the violence of the sovereign, more than we commonly 
dread harm from thunder, or earthquakes. … Commerce, therefore, is apt 
                                                        
83 Ibid, p131. About the complex meanings of Hume’s conception of politeness, see Marc Hanvelt, The Politics of 
Eloquence: David Hume’s Polite Rhetoric, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012, pp56-79. 
84 “Of Civil Liberty”, EMPL, p92. 
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to decay in absolute governments, not because it is there less secure, but 
because it is less honourable. A subordination of ranks is absolutely 
necessary to the support of monarchy. Birth, titles, and place, must be 
honoured above industry and riches. While these notions prevail, all the 
considerable traders will be tempted to throw up their commerce, in order 
to purchase some of those employments, to which privileges and honour 
are annexed.”85 
Hume appreciates the decisive progress modern monarchy has made in 
performing general laws. Besides, in comparison with the cases of barbarous 
nations, the public evaluation of industry and trade has become much more 
positive in civilised monarchy. The rising approbation of economic activities, to 
a large degree sufficient to excite the ambitions of the lower orders, yet is 
fundamentally limited by the very nature of monarchical government. Unlike the 
free governments in which the principle of authority could almost be harmonised 
with that of utility, (hereditary) monarchy cannot but ground the authority of its 
rulers upon entirely different thing, namely status. As a result, despite the 
advantages of commerce, it cannot gratify men’s pride, and is then put aside 
once more honourable professions are available.86 Hume admittedly does not 
draw from these shortcomings any reason to subvert existing monarchies or 
radically change social norms. But for him, the perfect form of government, at 
                                                        
85 Ibid, p93, original italics. 
86 This case can be seen as a counterexample of Hirschman’s “passions and interests” thesis. The prosperity of 
commerce is supported not by the victory of self-interest over pride, but by a combination of the two passions. 
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least in imagination, is a republic. Though, considering the possible 
improvements of the civilised monarchy, these species of civil polity might 
become almost equal. 
    Hume’s discussion of various forms of civil government is different from the 
traditional regime theories by downplaying the distinction between rule of one, 
few and many, as well as that between good and perverse government. Like 
Montesquieu, Hume also organises his analysis into a system of two dualities. 
Firstly, barbarous monarchy is distinguished from other civil polities, for the 
former is rule of arbitrary will, whereas the latter is rule of general law. Secondly, 
the ancient republic is distinguished from modern civilised monarchy and 
modern free government, for the former is prompted by the love of liberty and 
equality, the spirit of simplicity and frugality, and enthusiasm for war, while the 
latter encourages commerce, industry, luxury, refinement of arts and sciences, 
and the desire for honour and private interest. 87  Meanwhile, since the 
discussion on the nature of government is intertwined with that on the nature of 
“civilisation” itself, such analysis can also be read as a history of civil society 
complementing the theoretical analysis in the Treatise, through which Hume 
also probes into the rise of modern commerce and civility by clarifying its 
                                                        
87 Similarly, Montesquieu also distinguishes despotism from regimes of laws at first, and then distinguishes republic 
from monarchy. While the principle of republic is virtue, Istvan Hont insightfully argues that, Montesquieu’s model 
of monarchy is fundamentally Hobbesian-Mandevillean, for social order is achieved through making use of men’s 
psychological desire for false honour. See Politics in Commercial Society, pp43-45. Thus the contrast between 
republic and monarchy is actually one between ancient and modern principles of government, rather than one 
between liberty and absolutism. Cf. Peter T. Manicas, “Montesquieu and the Eighteenth-Century Vision of the State”, 
History of Political Thought, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer, 1981), pp313-347. Such a contrast also corresponds with 
Mandeville’s contrast between small and large societies. Montesquieu does not take modern free government as a 
definite category, but to some extent, this position is filled by the “Constitution of England”, which is also grounded 
on the “marvellous dexterity” of amour proper. Paul Rahe, Montesquieu and the Logic of Liberty, pp108-113. 
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political condition.88 On the one hand, there is no doubt that commercial society 
has its roots in human nature, and that all the artificial conventions sustaining it 
result from the mutual engagement of human beings. Yet on the other hand, the 
rise of commercial society requires certain conditions which should not be taken 
for granted: Firstly, there should be a government executing justice, especially 
political institutions enabling rule of general laws, to completely secure the 
stability of property. Secondly, the practice of the rulers, including their 
legislative actions and policies, have to be favourable to commercial activities. 
In addition, the accumulation of wealth, the polished way of life, industry and 
trade must be encouraged by the rulers and the social norms. While the first 
condition provides the basic framework of all orderly civil commerce, it is the 
latter that substantially incite the desire for riches and refinements which drives 
the mechanism of modern economy.89 According to Hume, the entire fulfilment 
of the three conditions is brought about by the historical combination of 
commerce and the power of the state.90 The (in some sense) autonomous 
                                                        
88 Cf. Dario Castiglione, “The Origin of Civil Government”, p491. And, it is incorrect to say that for Hume the 
essential feature of civil or “civilised” society is “not in its political feature but in the organisation of material 
civilisation”. Cf. Jean L. Cohen & Andrew Ataro, Civil Society and Political Theory, p90. 
89 Carl Wennerlind has rightly claimed that “property alone would not suffice to generate the greatest possible 
industry and consequent prosperity”. Yet by taking for granted “the government’s primary role was to … generate 
as much industry, commerce, and advancement in the arts as possible” (which is definitely untrue for ancient polities), 
Wennerlind still underestimates the crucial role of politics in the rise of modern commercial society. (“The Role of 
Political Economy in Hume’s Moral Philosophy”, p47, p56.) 
90 Hume’s history of civil society deeply influenced the four-stage theory of his Scottish successors. A comparison 
with Adam Smith may help us better understand Hume’s position. According to the standard four-stage theory, as a 
result of men’s “desire of bettering our life”, different modes of subsistence naturally follow one after another, and 
bring about the corresponding progress of politics. (Ronald Meek, Social Sciences and the Ignoble Savages.) 
However, while Smith presents the four-stage theory as a natural progress of society, he also provides an “unnatural 
and retrograde” explanation of the actual history of modern European commercial society. In the “unnatural and 
retrograde” history, the development of commercial society is tightly intertwined with wars and also changes of 
political institutions and policies. Modern commercial society is an outcome of sophisticated historical process, thus 
it is impossible to understand it without a political perspective. But for Smith, we had better understand such a history 
as an unintended process of getting rid of the political shackles on the natural improvement of economy, and from  
this point Smith argues against the Physiocrats that the actual history has its own legitimacy, so we should not attempt 
to “correct” the “unnatural” order according to the pure and simple natural law orders. (Istvan Hont, Jealousy of 
Trade, ch6.) Comparatively speaking, Hume relies less on the idea of the natural evolution of civilisation. In his eyes, 
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sphere of civil society is from its very birth intertwined with the political.91 
III. Commercial Society, The Modern State, and Hume’s Mandevilleanism 
Hume has keenly captured the characteristic of modern politics 
distinguishing it from its ancient counterpart, that trade has been “esteemed an 
affair of state”. “The great opulence, grandeur, and military achievements of the 
two maritime powers seem first to have instructed mankind in the importance 
of an extensive commerce.”92 People are ready to admit that commerce is 
important, precisely because it is politically important. This phenomenon 
indicates the historical transformation of the relationship between economic 
activities and state power, or in other words, between private pursuit of riches 
(motivated by self-interest as well as by pride) and public benefits (in terms of 
security or “greatness” of the nation). While the unity of private passions and 
public order on moral level is accomplished through the artificial conventions of 
justice, allegiance, and politeness, here it comes again to a typically 
Mandevillean topic, and what is required now is a new mechanism of political 
economy. 
Like Mandeville, Hume also well understands the radical change of the 
mode of war. Although Hume is not an advocate of standing army, 93  he 
                                                        
the more sophisticated history seems to be the only possible history of modern civil society. 
91 Cf. Bruce Buchan, “Enlightenment Histories: Civilisation, War, and the Scottish Enlightenment”, The European 
Legacy, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2005), pp177-192; “Civilisation, Sovereignty, and War: The Scottish Enlightenment and 
International Relations”, International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2006), pp175-192. Buchan correctly points out that 
the Scottish philosophers have a broader understanding of “civilisation” or “civil society” containing not only the 
diffusion of “civility” but also the development of state monopolization of violence, though his discussion focuses 
mainly on the domestic power struggle. Also see Norbert Elias’s classic study on this topic, The Civilising Process: 
Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations. 
92 “Of Civil Liberty”, EMPL, p89. 
93 John Robertson, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue, Edinburgh: John Donald, 1985. 
254 
 
acknowledges that the antique thymos no longer plays a decisive role in 
modern military affairs. In an era of refinement and politeness, what supports 
the martial spirit is a “civilised” sense of honour, an artifice resulting from the 
manipulation of political authority and the influence of social norms, instead of 
the original anger or spirit of revenge which are more volatile and 
uncontrollable.94 Moreover, courage itself is of less significance for modern 
wars. The invention of firearms and gunpowder brought about a “military 
revolution” which had thoroughly changed the tactics of war.95 The strength of 
a modern army does not depend on the physical force or heroic performance 
of each individual soldier, but on the efficient organisation of men and various 
equipment. In other words, modern war is not merely war of men, but also of 
techniques and material resources. “Success in war has been nearly to be a 
matter of calculation.”96 Therefore, it is upon two pillars that the war capacity of 
modern states rely. First of all, the soldiers, even though they do not have great 
vigour, must be easily trained and disciplined. “Courage can neither have any 
duration, nor be of any use, when not accompanied with discipline and martial 
skill, which are seldom found among a barbarous people.”97 The requirement 
of discipline can be better fulfilled by armies composed of ordinary labourers 
than those composed of citizens (as masters of their slaves) and barons, for 
                                                        
94 Maria Pia Paganelli & Reinhard Schumacher, “The Vigorous and Doux Soldier: Hume’s Military Defence of 
Commerce”, History of European Ideas, vol. 44, No. 8 (Aug., 2018), pp1141-1152. 
95 Cf. Michael Roberts, “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660”, in The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on 
the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, ed. by Clifford Rogers, NY: Routledge, 1995, pp13-35. 
96 HOE, II, p432. 
97 “Of Refinement in the Arts”, EMPL, p274. 
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industry and trade have accustomed them with orderly commerce and rational 
behaviours. A reliable manufacture or tradesman is thus ready to act as a 
reliable soldier. Secondly, the nation itself must be populous and prosperous, 
able to afford enough human and material resources. In this sense, the defence 
of modern states depends even more on economic flourishing than ancient 
nations. And such prosperity is unavailable without the rise of commerce and 
luxury. 
In comparison with Mandeville, Hume provides a more systematic 
explanation of the new political-economic mode. Mandeville only roughly 
discusses about the positive but unintended effects of hypocrisy, luxury, and 
squander, whereas Hume starts from an analysis of the basic structure of 
economy of civil society. “The bulk of every state must be divided into 
husbandmen and manufacturers. The former are employed in the culture of the 
land; the latter work up the materials furnished by the former, into all the 
commodities which are necessary or ornamental to human life.”98 With the 
improvements of the arts of agriculture, the land may maintain a greater number 
of men than the peasants and manufactures immediately supplying the basic 
needs of human beings. Then there are two ways of making use of the 
superfluity. The ancient nations facing perpetual wars had to devote it entirely 
to military affairs, since only in this way could they obtain so strong a power 
from so small a territory. However, in Hume’s eyes, such a scheme was “violent, 
                                                        
98 “Of Commerce”, EMPL, p256. 
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and contrary to the more natural and usual course of things”. 99  Like 
Mandeville’s purified beehive, Hume also imagined a “fortified camp” in which 
each individual was infused with “so martial a genius, and such a passion for 
public good, as to make every one willing to undergo the greatest hardships for 
the sake of the public”.100 Hume concedes that in this condition, the public spirit 
might alone be a sufficient spur to industry, and to banish arts and luxury might 
be an advantageous policy. But “as these principles are too disinterested and 
too difficult to support”,101 it on the one hand required intensive public education 
and strong moral pressure to work against private avarice, and on the other 
hand achieved only limited success, providing ancient nations with no more 
than a fragile system of public finance. As is pointed out by Hume, both aspects 
make the ancient political-economic mode unfit in modern times. Citizens 
ardent in their political liberty, living in a small territory against which invasion 
might take place at any time, are easier to be implanted with public spirit, 
whereas people in a more “large and polished” nation are unlikely to be.102 More 
importantly, the industry spurred by such a passion, hardly covering the cost of 
an ancient army, is much less than what is needed by modern wars. 
Hume’s analysis here is consistent with the principles displayed in his 
philosophical works. It is passion rather than reason that motivates our 
                                                        
99 Ibid, p259. 
100 Ibid, p262. 
101 Ibid, p262. 
102 Benjamin Constant underlines this point in his famous comparison between the ancients and the moderns. See 
his “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns”, in Political Writings, tr. & ed. by Biancamaria 
Fontana, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp308-328. Interestingly, while Constant discerns from this 
fact an inclination of the moderns to give up wars, Hume detects a transformation of the mode of war. 
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actions.103 Human beings tend to be indolent if there were no passions exciting 
them. Yet different passions differ in their motivational force upon particular 
actions. As “a motive too remote and too sublime to affect the generality of 
mankind, and operate with any force in actions so contrary to private 
interest”,104 the regard to public interest cannot function as the sufficient motive 
of justice, and nor could it alone arouse industry. “Avarice, or the desire of gain, 
is an universal passion, which operates at all times, in all places, and upon all 
persons.”105 Even with the help of pride, i.e. a sense of honour in serving the 
public, the public spirit still puts the individuals in a contradiction with their 
private avarice, which weakens the strength of the former. “They have no 
temptation, therefore, to increase their skill and industry; since they cannot 
exchange the superfluity for any commodities, which may serve either to their 
pleasure or vanity. A habit of indolence naturally prevails.”106 In the long run, 
the want of manufacture and trade hinders rather than promotes the greatness 
of the body politic. 
In order to secure its military capacity, the modern state must turn to a 
different scheme, devoting its economic surplus to luxury and trade. At first 
glance, this seems a mere consumption of the human and material resources. 
Nevertheless, 
The superfluity, which arises from their labour, is not lost; but is exchanged 
                                                        
103 THN, 2.3.3.4, SBN415. 
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105 “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences”, EMPL, p113; Edward Soule, “Hume on Economic Policy 
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with manufactures for those commodities, which men’s luxury now makes 
the covet. By this means, land furnishes a great deal more of the 
necessaries of life, than what suffices for those who cultivate it. In times 
of peace and tranquillity, these superfluity goes to the maintenance of 
manufacturers, and the improvers of liberal arts. But it is easy for the 
public to convert many of these manufacturers into soldiers, and maintain 
them by the superfluity, which arises from the labour of the farmers.107 
According to Hume’s explanation, such a political-economic system consists of 
two basic mechanisms. Firstly, there is an interaction between luxury and 
industry. Luxury is not only an expense of wealth serving the pleasures of life, 
but also enlarges the employment of the manufacturers and tradesmen, as well 
as incentivises the increase of production of all labourers. Secondly, there is a 
transformation between peacetime finance and wartime finance. The increment 
of economy created in peacetime is used to cover the cost of the wars. The 
mobilisation is accomplished easily by levying a tax, which obliges the people 
to retrench unnecessary consumption and indirectly leads the labour to military 
service or agriculture. In Hume’s words, therefore, “the increase and 
consumption of all the commodities, … are a kind of storehouse of labour, which, 
in the exigencies of state, may be turned to the public service”. 108  It is 
noteworthy that the above mechanism also implies the end of the perpetual war 
ancient nations were faced with. Modern states are not always fighting, yet from 
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the distinction between peace and war they obtain stronger power of fighting. 
In turn, the prosperity of commercial society and progress of civilisation are 
promoted in neither perpetual war nor perpetual peace (of Chinese style)109, 
but in relatively peaceful states preparing for war. 
From such a political-economic system Hume draws a significant 
conclusion. “As private men receive greater security, in the possession of their 
trade and riches, from the power of the public, so the public becomes powerful 
in proportion to the opulence and extensive commerce of private men.”110 
Modern civil society successfully unites the happiness of the individuals and the 
greatness of the state. Additionally, according to Hume’s theory of moral 
evaluation, industry can be approved as a virtue because of the benefits it 
produces for both the subject and others, while luxury should not be 
condemned as a vice unless “it engrosses all a man’s expence, and leaves no 
ability for such acts of duty and generosity as are required by his situation and 
fortune”. 111  The paradox between “private vices” and “public benefits” in 
Mandeville’s “luxury thesis”, is now transformed into the harmony between 
private and public interests. Therefore, all the three forms of the Mandevillean 
Maxim have their counterparts, in a technically more delicate and morally less 
shocking version but meanwhile maintaining all Mandeville’s original insights, 
in Hume’s theory. 
                                                        
109 About perpetual peace and the stagnation of China, see footnote 79. 
110 Ibid, p255. 




The purpose of our above discussion is not to clarify Hume’s contribution 
in the debates of luxury or his critique of classic virtues, as many scholars have 
already done. Rather, it attempts to obtain a comprehensive understanding of 
Hume’s theory of civil society. For Mandeville, political power, civilised lifestyle, 
and economic prosperity are combined in civil society, while the mechanisms 
underlying them, the “fear thesis”, “pride thesis”, and “luxury thesis” are unified 
in the Maxim “Private Vices, Public Benefits”. Now, the similarity between 
Mandeville and Hume implies some deeper unity between Hume’s theory of 
human nature, his moral philosophy and political economy. A common principle 
can be found behind Hume’s analysis of various elements of civil society, 
namely the artificial exploitation and cultivation of men’s society-regarding self-
love. 112  With the conventions of justice, allegiance and politeness, the 
avaricious and proud human beings find common interest as well as moral 
approbation in orderly and complaisant intercourse. Likewise, the policies and 
social norms encouraging commerce and industry also lead the individuals’ 
desire for riches and enjoyment to the power of the state, though the economic 
mechanism itself is not man-made. In this sense, it is with considerable truth to 
say the logic of “unsocial sociability” is best demonstrated by modern 
commercial society, for it even runs through the operation of the fiscal-military 
state. 
                                                        
112 At bottom, as we have discussed in previous chapters, this principle is first clearly proposed by Hobbes. 
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Yet it is no less important that, the formation of modern commercial society 
should not be isolated from its specific political-historical background, nor 
should we read into Hume’s theory of civil society a project of distinguishing a 
spontaneous economic society from the state. It is the state that provides the 
institutional conditions in which prosperous commerce is made possible, and it 
is the state’s desire for power that motivated the encouragement of economic 
activities. For Hume, the mechanism of the artificial cultivation of men’s society-
regarding self-love matches perfectly with the process of modern state 
building. 113 In brief, both modern commercial society and modern civilised 
individuals are always embedded in modern politics. Notwithstanding his 
attention to the autonomous sphere of socio-economic activities, Hume is still 
on the path made by Mandeville, and Hobbes.
                                                        
113 In comparison with Hume, the seventeenth-century natural lawyers, even Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, and 
John Locke who had developed sophisticated thoughts about property right, international commerce and the 
civilizational aspect of civil society, have no clear idea of a commercial society grounded on restless production and 
consumption with great prosperity and military strength. (Maybe C. B. Macpherson could read into these thinkers 
an anticipation of modern capitalism, but his ideological interpretation has been adequately criticised by scholars. C. 
B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism; cf. James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John 
Locke and His Adversaries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. As is pointed out by Tully, the life in 
Locke’s civil society is still of agricultural style. Due to the same reason, besides, we should also be careful about 




This thesis has attempted to provide a balanced understanding of civil society, 
the key word of modern political thought that describes the modern form of 
men’s living together, over and against the non-political, economic view. 
Focusing on Hume, the representative thinker of the Scottish Enlightenment 
who is usually seen as the apologist of men’s self-interest and the autonomy of 
commercial society, we nonetheless read him through the tradition of Hobbes 
and Mandeville, who are often considered as theorists underlining men’s 
unsociability and the necessity of political power. In fact, this re-reading of 
Hume is also a re-reading of Hobbes and Mandeville. From our perspective, 
Hobbes, Mandeville and Hume are all theorists of unsocial sociability and civil 
society. On the one hand, their political philosophy starts from the same point 
of departure, society-regarding self-love, which is a combination of desire for 
self-preservation and pride. On the other hand, their political philosophy 
achieves the same destination, the political unity in which individuals lead a 
civilised life and devote themselves to various socio-economic activities, which 
is a synthesis of political society, civilised society, and potentially 
bourgeois/economic society. And the path connecting the point of departure and 
the destination, for them all, is men’s artifice. 
It is undeniable that from Hobbes to Mandeville and Hume the exact 
meaning of artifice undergoes some important changes. For Hobbes, the 
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“artificial” equals the “political”, though by “the political” Hobbes means more 
than the coercive power of the state. The civil society has common power 
keeping individuals in awe as well as a public rate of worth redirecting their 
desire for honour. Importantly, in a typically “artificial commonwealth” rather 
than natural, personal dominion, both the commonness of the “common power” 
and the publicity of the “public rate of worth” require the true unity of will within 
the civil society. Hobbes argues that such a unity is obtained through the 
juridical relation of authorisation and representation. Acting as an artificial 
person bearing the person of each individual, the sovereign is recognised by 
the subjects and enabled to make use of their power. The subjects, 
correspondingly, also experience a splitting of their personality. When obeying 
the laws and the sovereign’s commands, they are acting as artificial persons, 
for the sovereign is responsible for their actions. While acting in the sphere 
where laws are silent, they remain natural persons exerting their private liberty. 
Therefore, the construction of artificial persons serves as the foundation of the 
artificial social order. 
When it comes to Mandeville, the juridical theory of “person” is replaced by 
a socio-psychological analysis of the self. According to Mandeville, men’s 
natural self, namely their instinctive qualities, are ugly and mean, whereas they 
may connect some learnt manners and external possessions to themselves and 
draw their own value from them, in this way the artificial self is constituted. 
Mandeville then attributes the “governability” of men to the artificial process of 
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education, which redirects men’s pride, their desire of embellishing their 
artificial selves, to behaviours beneficial for the public. Albeit the government 
still plays an indispensable role in determining the content and endorsing the 
force of the social norms, yet the norms are not entirely uttered by the politicians 
and executed by the coercive power. Rather, they evolve gradually from men’s 
everyday civil commerce, and are enforced through the pressure of public 
opinion. Specifically, in modern society it is the refined lifestyle that is honoured, 
thus the adornment of the artificial self takes the form of politeness and luxury, 
which further propels the economic mechanism of consumption and production. 
Therefore, Mandeville’s insistence of the artificiality of men’s socio-economic 
activities, and his addition of socio-economic connotations to the term “artifice”, 
constitute the two sides of the same coin, and give rise to Mandeville’s 
transformative status in the history of political thought. 
Mandeville’s revision of Hobbes is developed by Hume. From Hume’s 
viewpoint, artifice includes not only political coercion and the redirection of pride, 
but also the redirection of self-interest (i.e. justice). Moreover, Hume defines the 
essence of those artifices with the terms “convention” and “virtue”. On the one 
hand, “convention” captures the historical evolution of the social norms taking 
place gradually and unintendedly. On the other hand, “virtue” means that justice, 
politeness and allegiance, being artificial, are still qualities with moral merits, 
though what human beings actually perform might be some hypocrisy. In 
comparison with Hobbes’s cold-hearted absolutism and Mandeville’s 
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provocative moral paradox, Hume’s picture of civil society seems much less 
shocking. 
Yet some of Hobbes’s and Mandeville’s core ideas are accepted by Hume 
and well integrated into his theorising of the socio-economic aspect of civil 
society. From a static perspective, Hume claims that government functions as 
the ultimate foundation of civil society by re-constituting the convention of 
justice, which was damaged at the Hobbesian moment during the 
transformation from small to large and polished society. The political authority 
also contributes to shaping the artificial aspect within each individual. This is 
achieved not only by public education, but also by providing a favourable 
condition in which the motivational force of men’s sense of morality and honour 
is enhanced. Therefore, only in a political society could most individuals obey 
the social order while not coerced by the political power. From a dynamic and 
historical perspective, Hume pointed out that modern civil society, characterised 
by prosperous commerce, is not a natural embodiment of “commercial 
sociability” but requires a certain political impetus. The basic order of justice 
and allegiance does not automatically generate economic prosperity until there 
are strict rule of law as well as commerce-friendly policies and social norms. 
The latter conditions are not realised until commerce becomes necessary for 
supporting the power of the state in domestic and international struggles. 
Though the constitutional reformation and cultural transformation in favour of 
commerce might not be attributed to particular rulers, yet it is the concern for 
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political effects that enables the rise of modern economy. In a nutshell, modern 
commercial society is born at the same time with the modern state. 
Such a complicated understanding of civil society and its artificiality is not 
always appreciated in the history of political thought. Seeing it as a shortcoming 
needs to be overcome, Smith traces the origin of justice instead to men’s 
natural resentment and re-emphasises the naturalness of orderly social 
interactions.1 After Smith, the four-stage conjectural history also regards the 
progress of civilisation, based on the evolution of modes of subsistence, as a 
natural process determined by human nature. 2  With the discovery of the 
“system of natural liberty” and the formation of modern economics and 
sociology, the synthesis of political, civilised and bourgeois society is soon 
sublated by the distinction between the self-sustaining socio-economic sphere 
and the government. This is not to say such a development necessarily leads 
to a narrow concern for economy and an overlooking of the significance of 
politics. Hegel, by distinguishing civil society from the state, nonetheless 
stresses the dignity of the state even more thoroughly than Hobbes. But unlike 
his analysis of civil society, Hegel’s theory of the state is not generally accepted 
by the mainstream of modern liberalism and socialism. And, although 20th 
century has witnessed a revival of the idea of “civil society” which has a political 
and normative concern for both freedom of association and democratic 
                                                        
1 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, II.ii.2.1. 
2 Cf. Christopher Berry, Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment, ch3; The Idea of Commercial Society in the 
Scottish Enlightenment, ch2; Frank Palmeri, State of Nature, Stages of Society. 
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participation, yet civil society is defined more narrowly as a specific part of the 
social domain. To a large extent, the contemporary theory of civil society, 
whether in individualistic or communitarian form, is a defence of principles of 
pluralism and self-rule against the invasion of the state.3 Specifically, in Eastern 
European countries and China (especially in 1990s and 2000s), the discussion 
of civil society contributes to the criticism of the totalitarian state and the 
reflection on the road to modernisation.4 
Reading Hume in the Hobbesian-Mandevillean tradition and highlighting 
the artificial and political dimension inherent in civil society, we are not going to 
re-politicise this concept. Nor would we like to return to the classic version of 
civil society before the rise of commercial society, or the Rousseauian version 
against the corruptive development of commercial society, or the totalitarian 
version putting commercial society entirely under the control of the state. Our 
purpose is to remind the readers that modern civil society is not so natural, 
autonomous and spontaneous as it sometimes appears. Rather, it is supported 
by a complex dialectic of society-retarding self-love and political impetus that 
should not be taken for granted. It requires combination as well as balance 
between human nature and social discipline, private commerce and public 
power, prudential deliberation and moral commitment. As an artifice, it is the 
fruit of elaborate cultivation and even some contingent historical occasions. 
                                                        
3 E.g. Ernest Gellner, The Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals, NY: Penguin Books, 1996; Jurgen 
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Enquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, 
tr. by Thomas Burger, Oxford : Polity, 1999; Charles Taylor, “Invoking Civil Society”. 
4 Cf. Zhenglai Deng ed., State and Civil Society: The Chinese Perspective, Singapore: World Scientific, 2011. 
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